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This thesis is of legal clarification, analytical discovery and method. It questions the 
relationship between international law and the institutional complexities of global 
governance by taking climate finance as a fruitful ground of analysis. Furthermore, it 
provides a novel systematization and critical appraisal of the international law applicable in 
the context of climate finance. 
 
Climate finance can be broadly defined as the transfer of financial resources from 
industrialised states to developing countries for the purposes of climate mitigation (reducing 
greenhouse gasses emissions) and adaptation. Although numbers are uncertain, currently 
states face not just the policy challenge of scaling up climate finance to needed levels, but 
also the one of forming a sustainable and effective institutional structure. In fact, the scant 
international obligations contained in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change and its Kyoto Protocol have developed into a complex international and multilevel 
regulatory realm, where numerous and multifarious institutions de facto implement the 
treaties by acting as intermediaries for the sourcing and disbursement of financial resources 
towards developing countries. 
 
In addition to offer a detailed outline of the regulatory roles and development of these 
‘climate finance institutions’, the thesis relies on an understanding of ‘governance’ and 
‘legitimacy’ as two fundamental but multifaceted conceptual devices. Because international 
law faces some ‘cognitive limits’ in dealing with the governance aspects of the institutional 
complex of climate finance, a new conceptualization, based on the idea that such institutions 
compete and at the same time seek to complement their activities, underpins an analysis of 
inter-institutional instruments. This allows discovering some legal practices, which promote 
complementarity in the context of geographical, functional and regulatory institutional 
overlaps.  
 
Despite these emerging realities, the ‘effectivity’ of climate finance institutions still faces 
legitimacy challenges, as their activities and regulations are often contested by a wide array 
of actors (states, private entities, and national groups). This work proposes a comparative 
analysis between six climate finance institutions, based on a theoretical stand that a legal 
analysis of institutional legitimacy should be based on some relevant procedural 
components. The comparative analysis, based on four regulatory factors, provides numerous 
elements for a reflection on the interplay of legitimacies among climate finance institutions. 
 
Equipped with a legal clarification of the principles and the substantive international legal 
issues provided in the first chapter, the thesis concludes with three lines of argument. First, 
climate finance institutions will increasingly face the need to balance the existing bias 
towards contributor countries with the emerging concept of country ownership of funds, 
while enhancing their accountability. Second, the analysis unfolds and structures several 
substantive and institutional tensions, which require constant and further engagement from 
lawyers in interpreting and framing future developments. The third and broader argument is, 
instead, of legal method: methodologically it is a more fruitful path for international lawyers 
to deal with the legitimacy of (global) governance, rather than with the governance of 
legitimacy. While the intellectual goal of ‘governing legitimacy’, followed by several 
scholars, hinges on a, refutable, managerial idea of the law, the pluralist legal structure of 
global governance opens uncountable spaces for lawyers to reconceptualise and discover 
new ‘intimated’ practices of law. 
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In April 2014 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a Nobel prize-
winning international body, in its fifth assessment report provided further scientific evidence 
of the already grim prospects for the Earth’s climate if humanity will persist on the current 
greenhouse gasses (GHGs) emissions path. Anthropogenic GHGs emissions between 1970 
and 2010 have increased by 80%
1
, reducing the chance to limit GHGs concentration in the 
atmosphere at a level suitable to avoid disastrous consequences in the next decades.
2
 Sadly, 
such a high increase also shows the failures of international and national climate policies 
adopted since the signing of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) in 1992, and its 1997 Kyoto Protocol.
3
 
While there is little doubt that transformative changes in the world economy and 
society are required to embark on a needed mitigation path, the same goes for building 
policies and infrastructures able to make livelihoods and ecosystems adapt and be resilient to 
increasingly changing climatic patterns.
4
 It is the gargantuan scale of these two pillars of the 
international climate change regime (mitigation and adaptation) which make climate change 
a highly-complex and pressing challenge. 
On the international plane the issue is further complicated by equity concerns. The 
UNFCCC recognizes in one of its core principles the “different responsibilities and 
                                                     
1 G Blanco et al., ‘Chapter 5 - Drivers, Trends and Mitigation’ in Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate 
Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (CUP 2014), at 4. 
2 This level is broadly accepted to range between 450 and 550ppm of CO2eq, so to avoid a raise of 2C°of the 
global mean temperature from pre-industrial levels. See D Victor et al., ‘Chapter 1 – Introductory Chapter’, in 
Ibid, at 34. 
3 Respectively, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, adopted on 9 May 1992, 
entered into force on 21 March 1994, 1771 UNTS 107; and Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, adopted on 11 December 1997, entered into force on 16 February 2005, UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 10 December 1997; 37 ILM 22. 
4 See I. Noble et al., ‘Chapter 14 – Adaptation Needs and Options’ in Climate Change 2014: Impacts, 
Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the 




respective capabilities” of states
5
 in reaching the ultimate objective of the Convention, 
namely a “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”.
6
 Due to 
political and moral reasons at the time of its adoption, the UNFCCC binds only developed 
states
7
 to adopt national mitigation measures and take the lead in curbing emissions,
8
 while 
developing countries have been legally unrestrained from pursuing their economic growth 
with no emissions-related mitigation restrictions. After more than twenty years, rapid 
changes in the global economy and in emissions patterns from fast-growing economies, such 
as China and India, have inevitably led all the Parties to renegotiate and reconsider those 
equity bases that first buttressed the UNFCCC: it is argued that in a way also some 
developing states should embrace some kind of legally-binding emissions targets for the 
future. Yet, despite the yearly meetings of the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) 
and the numerous sessions of the subsidiary technical bodies of the Convention, currently the 
Parties have managed to only agree on a negotiating path leading to “[…] a protocol, another 
legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention” by 2015.
9
 
Thus, an internationally binding agreement on clear mitigation efforts from all major 
emitting states is still not in place. 
 
Against this background, the object of this doctoral thesis is climate finance, an 
indispensable equity component for meeting the challenges of climate mitigation and 
adaptation. 
There is neither a legal nor a widely accepted definition of climate finance, but the 
matter can be approached by referring to some broad international legal obligations 
contained in the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, paralleled by a global phenomenon and a 
                                                     
5 UNFCCC, Article 3(1). 
6 Ibid., Article 2. 
7 Listed in Annex I of the Convention. 
8 Ibid., Article 4(2)(a). 




remarkable policy challenge. In the context of the differential treatment between developed 
and developing states, the UNFCCC generally provides that the former shall provide “new 
and additional” financial resources in order to support the latter in setting up climate 
mitigation and adaptation measures.
10
  
If these are the core of international obligations, nonetheless states, international 
financial institutions, multinational banks, private financial intermediaries, as well as other 
private investors have through time sourced, leveraged and transferred increasing capital for 
climate-related activities in developing countries jurisdictions. The range of financed 
activities that contribute to either reduce GHGs emissions or adapt local livelihoods and 
ecosystems to climate change is extremely vast. As a phenomenon climate finance can take 
the form, for instance, of a large-scale hydropower plant co-financed by the host state, 
private banks, and multilateral development banks; in a bundle of small-scale, off-grid, 
renewable energy projects in rural areas sustained by carbon market instruments; in an 
education project for rural farmers to cope with weather variability financed by a charitable 
foundation; or in a public-private joint programme aimed at substituting traditional light 
bulbs with energy-efficient LED lights in highly-populated urban areas. 
While joint public and private capital flows for climate activities from industrialized 
economies to developing countries are roughly estimated in a range of USD 39-120 billion a 
year in the last three years,
11
 this amount is certainly insufficient to match the actual needs of 
developing countries –particularly the least developed ones.
12
 Moreover, it is clear that the 
emerging developing economies will also need to sensibly reduce their emissions, if the 
world is to reach the ‘safe’ global warming target of 2C°,
13
 and that this entails conspicuous 
financial costs. Furthermore, the harsh realities of recent climate disruptions in Sub-Saharan 
                                                     
10 UNFCCC, Article 4(3) and (4). 
11 S Gupta et al, ‘Chapter 16 - Cross-cutting Investment and Finance Issues’, in IPCC, Climate Change 2014, 
supra note 1, at 3. 
12 Admittedly, macroeconomic scenarios on investment needs, for though skewed, all point to the existence of a 
financial gap. See B Buchner, et al., ‘The Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2013’, Climate Policy Initiative, 
October 2013, at 32-3,  <http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/The-Global-Landscape-
of-Climate-Finance-2013.pdf>. 




Africa, small-island and low-lying coastal states confirm that the least developed countries 
will be the ones to pay the biggest in price in terms of social and environmental changes. 
Therefore, while the phenomenon of climate finance evidences an increasing level of capital 
transfers to developing countries, the policy problem requires not only a dramatic increase in 
its quantity, but also its effective delivery for both mitigation and adaptation. 
 
The recent responses to the climate finance problem in international negotiations 
under the UNFCCC concretised in a collective pledge by industrialized countries to raise the 
amount of financial transfers to USD 100 billion a year by 2020,
14
 and in the establishment 
of a new multilateral trust fund, the Green Climate Fund, aimed at sourcing and disbursing a 
“significant proportion” of this pledge, particularly in adaptation.
15
 However, the same 
pledge also clarifies that such resources shall come both from public and private sources. 
 
For analytical purposes, this work will adopt a twofold definition of climate finance. It 
will primarily focus on the phenomenon of public financial resources mobilized by 
developed states and other international institutions, and disbursed for the purposes of 
climate mitigation and adaptation projects in developing countries. However, it will also 
consider the private climate finance as channelled by institutions that, as will be seen, 
exercise public authority at the international and transnational level. 
Thus the overall aim is to address the international legal issues of just part of the 
‘phenomenon climate finance’ and, as a consequence, just part of the policy challenge, 
mainly because covering both public and private climate finance would overly extend the 
range of private and public international legal issues involved. 
 
                                                     
14 Decision 2/CP.15, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, 10 March 2010 [hereafter, ‘Copenhagen Accord’]. 




In this narrower context, the core purpose of this doctoral thesis is twofold. On one 
side is to provide the first comprehensive legal clarification of the international law 
applicable to climate finance. Indeed, apart from some scholarship addressing specific 
issues, there is no overall assessment of climate finance under public international law, 
leading to a legal systematization and critical assessment of its substantive practices in view 
of its future challenges. 
 
The second, and more central, aim is to address some emerging legal questions 
stemming from climate finance’s institutional complexity. As will be seen below, the 
international financial obligations under the UNFCCC give ample discretion to developed 
states in choosing the institutions that gather and channel their public climate finance. This 
has led to a complex institutional structure populated by numerous institutions with different 
functions and legal natures, which de facto contribute to the implementation of the 
Convention. Institutional complexity is a common feature in current global governance 
structures; however, it does pose new policy problems and legal questions. 
The policy problem relates to the challenge of scaling up climate finance to the 
necessary levels and relates to the task of delivering a sustainable and effective institutional 
structure of financial disbursement towards developing countries. Yet, both the low numbers 
of finance disbursed, and the inter-institutional issues that emerged after decades of practice 
tell us that there is still much to understand, plan and reconsider. 
The legal questions are perhaps more subtle but strictly connected to the policy issue: 
how does international law relate to such institutional complexity? Do international 
institutions participate as active lawmakers, and under what law? Where do international 
institutions source their legitimacy to regulate and decide on each climate-related project and 
programme, often affecting local groups and the environment? And what role does law play 




These are the main questions that this work will try to answer under a legal 
understanding of ‘governance’ and ‘legitimacy’ as two fundamental but multifaceted 
conceptual devices. As will be seen, because this object of analysis has been little explored 
by international legal scholars, broader theorizations will be needed with a view of carving 
out a solid method of legal analysis. 
 
Accordingly, the thesis is divided into two parts and six chapters. 
Part 1 is dedicated to the legal clarification of the substantive international law on one 
side, and to the legal assessment of the institutional governance of climate finance on the 
other. 
Chapter one starts by placing climate finance in the context of general concepts and 
principles of international law, and of the (emerging) lex specialis of international 
development law. In particular, climate finance will be framed in relationship with the 
general concept of sustainable development as a key concept of general international law, 
and with the special legal principle of common but differentiated responsibilities within the 
international climate change regime. In addition, the same chapter will delve into a further 
clarification of some specific international obligations contained in the climate treaties, such 
as those related to the ‘novelty’ and ‘additionality’ of finance, and to the limit of covering 
only the incremental costs of projects. Also, substantive legal practices of international 
development will be addressed, such as financial instruments and the use of conditionalities 
in financial agreements. 
After tackling these substantive legal issues, Chapter II will set the stage for the 
institutional analysis of climate finance under the law. It will offer a detailed and 
comprehensive outline of the creation, development and proliferation of those climate 
finance institutions working as financial intermediaries of public climate finance. The outline 
will be generally divided between climate finance institutions acting within the international 




untied from such regime, nonetheless act as de facto implementers of its international 
obligations on finance. 
In Chapter III, concluding the first Part of the thesis, the complex landscape emerged 
will be re-conceptualized under the lens of institutional complexity. The chapter will expose 
some limits inherent to international law, when dealing with the problems emerging from 
uncoordinated, incoherent and overlapping institutional activities. This will lead to 
reconsider the key facts and dynamics occurring in the institutional realm of climate finance 
according to more recent, ‘heterodox’, international legal approaches. In its final section, the 
chapter will discover some ‘intimations’ of law in the emerging practices and instruments 
seeking complementarity among climate finance institutions, with critical implications for 
law and governance. 
The first set of findings will prompt Part 2 of the thesis, which will shift the attention 
to a parallel set of issues stemming from the institutional complexity of climate finance: as 
for other areas of global governance, the legitimacy of individual institutions is contested by 
the very entities that create them (states), and by other actors affected by or engaged with 
these institutions, such as civil society organizations, local groups and private enterprises. 
Legitimacy in climate finance is a key driver of further institutional complexity and 
proliferation with their ensuing problems. 
Hence, Chapter IV will be entirely dedicated to discuss the theories and methods of a 
legal analysis of institutional legitimacy of the most relevant climate finance institutions. 
After identifying the legitimacy problem as a problem of ‘social’, and not ‘formal’, 
institutional legitimacy, the chapter will delve into an empirical analysis of legitimacy 
contestations brought against climate finance institutions: this will lead to discover four 
regulatory factors of procedural legitimacy,
16
 assumed to influence the effectivity of each 
institution as perceived by states and other actors. 
                                                     
16 These are i) iinternational governance and decision making; ii) access and disbursement modalities of finance; 




The following Chapter V will consist of a comparative analysis of institutional 
legitimacy for six relevant climate finance institutions: the Global Environment Facility, the 
Adaptation Fund, the Clean Development Mechanism, the Green Climate Fund, the Climate 
Investment Funds, and the World Bank. A careful comparison of the instruments regulating 
the four regulatory factors individuated in the preceding chapter will lead to innovative 
insights on how the similarities and differences of such processes contribute to the formation 
of legitimacy. 
To conclude, the final Chapter VI will offer some cross-cutting reflections from the 
findings throughout the thesis. Two strands of conclusion will be singled out, where the first 
will attain to the realm of climate finance: some crucial themes that influence the interplay of 
legitimacies among institutions will be assessed, as well as some underlying tensions 
stemming from the substantive law which together pose a challenge for scaling up climate 
finance in the long-term. 
The second strand will look at the broader question of what role international law (and 
law in general) plays in the increasing institutional complexities of global governance. Some 
international legal literature on the matter will be criticised and a legal method of re-












In the introduction to this work, climate finance has been described as a form of inter-state 
financial support with a specific aim: the one of bringing about mitigation and adaptation 
activities in developing countries. 
In general terms, there are many forms of financial support taking place between 
states, often divided between multilateral and bilateral (state-to-state) forms of financial 
support. Two classic examples of multilateral finance are the two Bretton Woods 
institutions, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Despite having different 
core ends (international monetary stability for the IMF and poverty reduction for the World 
Bank)
1
, both institutions provide financial support to states in their monetary and 
development policies.
2
 While the IMF and the World Bank are multilateral in their nature, 
since states participate through their quota to its capital base and membership, states also 
engage in bilateral financial activities especially through loans, guarantees or international 
aid. 
 
Being a form of support from states, climate finance is relevant under international 
law not only because it finds its legal foundations in an international treaty, the United 
                                                     
1 See the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Bretton Woods, adopted on 22 July 1944 as 
amended in 2008, entered into force on 27 December 1945,  <http://www.imf.org>, Article I(v); and Articles of 
Agreement International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, adopted on 22 July 1944 as amended in 
2012, entered into force on  27 December 1945,  <http://web.worldbank.org>, Article I. 





Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
3
 but also because its rationale can 
be understood as a form of development cooperation in the field of sustainable development. 
It is therefore a sub-species of those inter-state economic supports often defined as 
‘international development’ or ‘development cooperation’, whose nature as a branch or lex 
specialis of international law is still debated.
4
 More specifically, climate finance is a jigsaw 
in the complex puzzle of the protection of the global environment within sustainable 
development pathways. 
 
This chapter will provide an understanding of climate finance under international law 
on two levels. First, it will canvass the matter from the widest perspective, by addressing the 
relationship between climate finance and two core concepts and principles of international 
law: the general concept of sustainable development (section 1), and the special principle 
Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR)
5
 
embedded in the UNFCCC (section 2). 
Secondly it will systematize and clarify the international legal obligations related to 
climate finance stemming from the UNFCCC, and the international practices branching off 
from those obligations (section 3). 
 
The main claim is that there is a reciprocal relationship between the norms buttressing 
international climate finance and the applicable general principles and concepts of 
international law. Such relationship is mutual because, while the law and practice of climate 
finance contributes to interpret and give significance to those two indeterminate formulas, at 
the same time the CBDR principle and the concept of sustainable development offer a 
systematic and normative justification for climate finance activities. 
                                                     
3 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, adopted on 9 May 1992, entered into 
force on 21 March 1994, 1771 UNTS 107 [hereinafter and throughout the whole work ‘UNFCCC’ or ‘the 
Convention’]. 
4 P Dann, The Law of Development Cooperation: a Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU and 
Germany (CUP 2013). 




However, when the analysis shifts to the specific obligations and practices of states 
and institutions, the ‘building blocks’ of climate finance are characterised by indeterminacy 
and contested formulas between contributing and recipient countries.  
 
 
1. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE FINANCE 
There is interplay between climate finance and the wider normative context of sustainable 
development. As a form of inter-states’ support, climate finance is aimed at realising 
transformational shifts of many sectors in developing economies by bringing about 
mitigation and adaptation-related infrastructures, policies and projects. The rationales of 
climate finance are aligned with the ones of sustainable development. The latter has been 
notably defined by the 1987 World Commission on Environment and Development as 
“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs.”
 6
 Hence, sustainable development is a concept that 
seeks to strike a balance between two core interests by the international community: the one 
to further development and better living conditions, especially in least developed countries, 
and the one of avoiding that such development could severely alter social and environmental 
conditions for the generations to come. 
Also climate finance is concerned with development, as it aims to set up the 
conditions for a low carbon future in countries that are in economic disadvantage and, at the 
same time, enhance their climate resilience of their livelihoods and ecosystems. At the same 
time, it takes into account inter-generational concerns, because investments on carbon 
mitigation and adaptation are most likely to spread their positive effects on people and the 
environment in the long term. 
 
                                                     
6 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, UN Doc. A/42/427, 4 August 




If those are the similarities between the two concepts, unravelling the normative 
effects of sustainable development in the practices of international climate finance is a 
difficult task. The UNFCCC states that “[t]he Parties have a right to, and should promote, 
sustainable development”.
7
 However, it is contested whether a general ‘right to sustainable 
development’ by developing countries exists in international law,
8
 particularly because it is 
uncertain whether sustainable development could be regarded as a right, a set of positive 
obligations, or a general principle of international law. Moreover, even supposing a clear 
legal nature of the concept, its actual meaning would be probably too indeterminate to create 
rules of conduct on states.
 9
 
In an international legal system dominated by the principle of states’ sovereignty on 
their territories and on the exploitation of their national resources,
10
 it is difficult to envision 
or even impose universal sustainable development standards without states’ agreement.
11
 
Because of this conundrum, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has understandably made 
little progress by defining sustainable development first as a ‘concept’
12
 and more recently as 
an ‘objective’
13
, while other international tribunals have dealt indirectly with its normative 
nature and generally stated its relevance for states activities and interpretation of treaties.
14
 
                                                     
7 UNFCCC, Article 3(4). 
8 P Birnie, A Boyle, and C Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (3rd edn, OUP 2009), at 115. 
9 PM Dupuy, ‘Où en Est le Droit International de l’Environnement à la Fin du Siècle?’ (1997) 101 Revue 
Générale de Droit International Public 873, at 886. 
10 By way of illustration, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development [hereinafter ‘Rio Declaration’], UN 
Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol.1), 14 June 1992, Annex I, Principle 2: “States have […] the sovereign right to 
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies, and the 
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment 
of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.” 
11 On this issue and the need of ‘environmental indicators’ see G Handl, ‘Sustainable Development: General 
Values versus Specific Obligations’ in W. Lang (ed), Sustainable Development and International Law (Graham 
& Trotman 1995), at 40. 
12 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary vs. Slovakia), Judgment, ICJ Rep.1997, 7, para 140. 
13 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, ICJ Rep. 2010, 14, para 177. Sustainable 
development as an object is also mentioned in the preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, adopted on 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995, (1994) 33 ILM 1144. 
14 See the Iron Rhine (“IJzeren Rijn”) Railway (Belgium vs. Netherlands), PCA Arbitral Award, 24 May 2005, 
para 59, where the tribunal acknowledged the relationship between the duty to prevent transboundary 
environmental damage and Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration on the concept of sustainable development. At the 
intersection between international trade law and environment see United States – Import Prohibition of certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Rep., WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998, para 131, where 
sustainable development served as an interpretative tool to deem the livestock of turtles an ‘exhaustible natural 
resource’ according to Article XX(b) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, adopted on 15 April 1994, 




A recent International Law Association draft report recognized that there has been 
“[…] little movement in the development of the legal foundations of sustainable 
development”
15
 and that “ […] the question as to the legal status of sustainable development 
[has proved - DR] sterile”.
16
 Yet regardless of the legally-binding nature of sustainable 
development, its presence in over 300 conventions –of which more than a third of 





For Sands sustainable development amounts to a lex specialis of international law in 
the fields of development, environment and human rights,
18
 for others it works as a 
“conceptual matrix”,
19
  a “meta-principle”,
20
 or even as a principle of international law
21
 
which itself contains further concepts that can clarify extant international obligations. These 
concepts are generally regarded to be i) inter-generational equity; ii) intra-generational 
equity; and iii) integration.
22
 Inter-generational equity seeks to limit current levels of 
exploitation of natural resources and damages to the environment, in a way that future 
generations will be able to enjoy them in a similar or better manner than present 
generations.
23
 Intra-generational equity, instead, addresses unbalances in the current 
economic and environmental systems, whereby developing nations face disadvantages in 
coping with their development needs, eradicating poverty and protecting their environment. 
                                                     
15 This sounds in contrast with Principles 27 of the Rio Declaration which calls for cooperation in development of 
international law in the field of sustainable development. 
16 ILA Committee on International Law on Sustainable Development, (2012) Draft Report to the Sofia 
Conference, at 6,  <http://www.ila-hq.org>. 
17 V Barral, ‘Sustainable Development in International Law: Nature and Operation of an Evolutive Legal Norm’ 
(2012) 23 European Journal of International Law 377. 
18 P Sands, ‘International law in the Field of Sustainable Development’, in W Lang (ed), Sustainable 
Development and International Law (Graham & Trotman 1995) 54. 
19 Dupuy, ‘Où en Est le Droit International de l’Environnement à la Fin du Siècle?’, supra note 9, at 886. 
20 V Lowe, ‘Sustainable Development and Unsustainable Arguments’ in Alan Boyle and David Freestone (eds), 
International Law and Sustainable Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges (New edition. OUP 
2001) 19, at 31. 
21 C Voigt, ‘The Principle of Sustainable Development’ in C Voigt (ed), Rule of Law for Nature: New 
Dimensions and Ideas in Environmental Law (CUP 2013) 146-57, at 154-5. 
22 Barral, ‘Sustainable Development in International Law’, supra note 17.  
23 E Brown Weiss, ‘In Fairness to Future Generations and Sustainable Development’ (1992) 8 American 




Intra-generational concerns are today widely recognized by relevant UN Declarations,
24
 and 
buttress the legal machinery of many Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs), 
including the UNFCCC with its CBDR principle.
25
 Finally, the integration principle –also 
present in UN declarations, treaties and international disputes–
26
  stands at the core of 
sustainable development as it requires states to take into account environmental concerns in 
their developmental activities. Referring to the principle of integration it has been argued 
that “[…] the most far-reaching aspect of sustainable development is that for the first time it 
makes a state’s management of its own domestic environment a matter of international 




Sustainable development, intended as an ‘interstitial norm’,
28
 permeates numerous 
aspects of climate finance. The use of the integration principle to interpret climate finance 
provisions in the UNFCCC explains the role of climate finance as a sustainable development 
component in developing countries’ policies as well as the need for single climate related 
projects and programmes to take into consideration other economic, social and 
environmental factors across all the phases of implementation. Supposing, for instance, the 
construction of a high-scale, internationally financed, hydropower plant in a developing 
country, while its contribution to the national renewable energy production and avoidance of 
                                                     
24  See Rio Declaration, Principle 5; restated in The Future We Want, Report of the UN Conference on 
Sustainable Development, UN Doc A/CONF.216/16, 20-22 June 2012, Resolution 1, para 76. 
25 UNFCCC, Article 3(1). 
26 For highly participated declarations see Rio Declaration, Principle 4; see, more recently, the outcome document 
of the 2012 Rio de Janeiro UN Conference on Sustainable Development, The Future We Want, supra, para 3. As 
to MEAs see UNFCCC Article 3(4); United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted on 25 June 
1992, entered into force on 19 December 1993, 1760 UNTS 79, Article 6(b) which reads that parties shall 
“integrate, as far as possible and as appropriate, the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity into 
relevant sectoral or cross-sectoral plans, programmes and policies.”; and the Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, adopted on 22 March 1989, entered into 
force on 5 May 1992, 28 ILM 649 Article 4(2)(a), where it is prescribed that each party must ensure that the 
generation of hazardous wastes “is reduced to a minimum taking into account social, technological and economic 
aspects.”; although not an MEA, see also the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, adopted on 10 
December 1982, entered into force on  16 November 1994, 21 ILM 1261, Article 207(4), providing that states in 
controlling pollution from land-based sources shall take into account inter alia “the economic capacity of 
developing States and their need for economic development.” 
27 Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, supra note 8, at 85.  
28 Lowe, ‘Sustainable Development and Unsustainable Arguments’, supra note 20: his definition is similar to 




emissions is clear, at the same time the principle of integration would require the state and 
other intervening international institutions to take into account the impacts from its 
construction and operation on the local environment and livelihoods. Indeed, as will be seen 
below, international institutions have incorporated sustainable development concerns in their 
own regulations. 
Another example of this ‘integrating effect’ of sustainable development in climate 
finance can be found in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol,
29
 
often hailed as a successful climate finance and technology transfer mechanism. Article 12 
of the Kyoto Protocol, establishing the CDM, requires that mitigation projects should be 
beneficial to the achievement of the sustainable development of developing countries. In 
practice, CDM regulations require national administrations to release an ‘approval letter’, 
stating that the project falls within their national sustainable development strategies.
30
 
Because without the approval letter a mitigation project cannot be validated under the CDM 
approval cycle, the interpretation and application of the integration principle appears within 
discretion of developing countries. 
These two last examples showcase the hurdles in defining enforceable sustainable 
development standards applying evenly to all states and other international subjects. The 
direct application of sustainable development standards in the national context is eventually 
an affair left to the discretion of governments according to the principle of states sovereignty 
in public international law. As aptly noted, legal claims to hold a state responsible under 
international law for violating sustainable development standards are unlikely to succeed 
before international tribunals, not only because of the indeterminacy of the concept, but also 
because there are no direct means for individuals or group within a state to hold such state 
internationally responsible.
 31
 Furthermore, a supposed uniform practice of sustainable 
                                                     
29 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted on 11 December 
1997, entered into force on 16 February 2005, UN Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 10 December 1997; 37 ILM 22, 
Article 12 [hereafter and throughout the whole work ‘Kyoto Protocol’, ‘the Protocol’, or ‘KP’]. 
30 Decision 3/CMP.1, UN Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1, 30 March 2006, Annex, para 40. 




development standards might prove detrimental, since sustainable policies and practices need 
flexible frameworks to take into account the peculiarities of each case. 
 
Shifting the focus from states to international organizations, the principle of 
integration also sustains the activities of Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), which 
are highly involved in climate mitigation and adaptation finance. For instance, the 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is a compulsory element of project financing in the 
World Bank’s Operational Policies,
32
 resulting in a complex screening process that integrates 
natural and social implications of a given project.
33
 Other major MDBs also involved in 




Finally, the principle of integration in sustainable development implicitly shapes the 
debate about the issue of ‘country ownership’ of climate-related funds. As will be seen more 
in detail, a substantive issue in the development of climate finance involves the modalities of 
access to funds by developing countries. The general claim by recipient countries is that not 
only access to funds should be streamlined, but the channelled sums should be managed at 
country level with less interference by MDBs or implementing agencies.
35
 If it is uncontested 
that the principle of integration requires the framing and implementing of climate policies 
taking into account environmental and social standards, the direct access to climate funds by 
developing countries can result in a reduced regulatory influence by financing institutions on 
the environmental and social safeguards for each project. In other words, ‘country-
                                                     
32 World Bank, Environmental Assessment, OP 4.01, January 1999, as amended on April 2013,  
<http://go.worldbank.org/K7F3DCUDD0>. 
33 Ibid., para 2. 
34 See the Asian Development Bank’s Safeguards Policy Statement, June 2009,  <http://www.adb.org>; The 
European Investment Bank and European Bank of Reconstruction and Development are signatory of a declaration 
embracing environmental principles and practices stemming from the EU Treaties and EU secondary legislation 
See <http://www.eib.org/projects/topics/environment/epe/index.htm>. For the African Development Bank see its 
Environmental and Social Assessment Procedures for Public Sector Operations, June 2001,  
<http://www.afdb.org>. 
35 Expectedly this is a claim pervasive across all international development. See, notably, Declaration of Paris on 
Aid Effectiveness, OECD Doc. DCD/DAC/EFF(2005)1/FINAL, 3 February 2005, paras 33-4. On the role of 




ownership’ does not question whether to apply the principle of integration to single projects 
and programmes, but who is the regulatory authority to shape and apply the principle: either 
the recipient developing country or the financial institutions. Understandably, results might 
change, and thus the implementation of the integration principle, if implementing agencies 
are left out from the process. 
 
To conclude, despite the uncertain status of sustainable development in international 
law, the concept offers some systematic clarity to the role of climate finance in international 
development. At the same time, some international provisions and processes of climate 
finance appear to absorb and implement key principles of sustainable development. 
To be sure, this concept not only is constantly evolving, but there are also signs of a 
paradigm shift to other ideas, such as ‘green economy’, or ‘green growth’.
36
 Aside from 
some reasoned critical views,
37
 however, the concept of sustainable development is indeed 




2. THE ROLE OF THE COMMON BUT DIFFERENTIATED 
RESPONSIBILITIES AND RESPECTIVE CAPABILITIES PRINCIPLE 
Shifting the discussion from a general contextualization of climate finance in international 
law to the specific realm of the climate change regime,
38
 the principle of Common But 
                                                     
36 E Morgera and A Savaresi, ‘A Conceptual and Legal Perspective on the Green Economy’ (2013) 22 Review of 
European, Comparative & International Environmental Law 14. 
37 Voigt, ‘The Principle of Sustainable Development’, supra note 21, generally criticizing that integration cannot 
be reached without a clear goal, which the concept lacks; and M Koskenniemi, ‘Hegemonic Regimes’ in 
Margaret A. Young (ed), Regime Interaction in International Law (CUP 2012) 305-324, at 319-20, arguing that 
the linguistic hybrid of ‘sustainable development’ is used to formally conceal unsolved political struggles 
between international legal regimes. 
38 For climate regime it is here meant the body of provisions and regulations comprising the climate change 
treaties, and the decisions of the Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC and the Meeting of the Parties of the 
Kyoto Protocol, the two supreme bodies of the conventions. On the climate treaties as a regime see, implicitly, 
also B Simma and D Pulkowski, ‘Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in International Law’ 




Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR) and the specific 
international obligations on climate finance appear to be in a symbiotic relationship: the 
evolving implications from this principle reflect the developments occurred in climate 
finance since the entry into force of the UNFCCC. 
2.1. The evolving nature of the CBDR principle 
Article 3(1) of the UNFCCC reads: 
“The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future 
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, 
the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and 
the adverse effects thereof.” 
Despite its ‘soft’ language marked by the use of the verb ‘should’ instead than ‘shall’, 
this provision lays down a differentiation amongst states, assigning a greater share of 
responsibility and commitments to the developed ones. As Hey explains, “[t]he concept of 
common but differentiated responsibilities in international environmental law entails that 
while pursuing a common goal States take on different obligations, depending on their socio-
economic situation and their historical contribution to the environmental problem at stake.”
39
 
To be sure, differentiations among countries agreed in the context of international 
issues that necessitate concerted action are not new to international law. Examples span from 
the International Labour Organization Constitution, to the system of preferential treatment in 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or to the governance arrangement of the 
common Seabed Area in the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea.
40
 In the field of 
international environmental law, the CBDR is present in several MEAs and multilateral 
declarations. Apart from being a cornerstone of the UNFCCC regime, the principle has until 
                                                     
39 E Hey, ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibilities’, 2011, Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International 
Law, online ed., para 1. 
40 Respectively, The Constitution of the International Labour Organization, adopted on 1 April of 1919, entered 
into force on 28 June 1919, available as amended at 
<http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:62:0::NO:62:P62_LIST_ENTRIE_ID:2453907:NO>; and supra 




recently worked as a tenet in multilateral climate negotiations for developing countries to 
claim minor commitments and increased financial and technological support.
41
 
The main effect of CBDR in the climate regime is that it alters and deviates from the 
principle of sovereign equality between states,
42
 to create a specific treatment justified by 
equity considerations. In other words, the formal equality guaranteed through the principle of 
sovereignty is replaced by a more substantive equality, based on the multilateral agreement 
of the Parties.
43
 In fact, in a formal application of equality among states, differentiations are 
left to the different levels of power and to the relations among nations.
44
 The need of closer 
cooperation to tackle global environmental threats such as climate change has moved the 
redistribution of responsibilities from the area of power to the one of law by progressively 
developing principles of differentiations and substantive equality. 
 
However and in a similar fashion to the case of sustainable development, it is unclear 
what the normative effects and legal nature of this principle are. Scholars seem to agree on 
the lack of sufficient opinion juris to qualify it as a custom of international environmental 
law.
45
 Referring to the wording in the UNFCCC, the CBDR principle has been defined as a 
“soft binding obligation”,
46
 or even as “a non-legally-binding concept”
47
. Even views about 
its normative effects are contrasting, with some arguing that the CBDR has not been helpful 
                                                     
41 See, for instance, The Future We Want, supra note 24 , para 91. 
42 As codified in the UN Charter, Article 2(1). 
43 P Cullet, ‘Differential Treatment in International Law: Towards a New Paradigm of Inter-state Relations’ 
(1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 549, at 551. 
44 Soltau correctly notes that “in reality, of course, states vary widely with respect to their military power, 
economic might, and strength if their institutions.” See F Soltau, Fairness in International Climate Change Law 
and Policy (CUP 2011), at 180. 
45 Ibid., at 190.; CD Stone, ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law’ (2004) 98 The 
American Journal of International Law 276, at 299.; and P Cullet, ‘Differential Treatment in International Law', 
supra note 43, at 579. 
46 Ibid, at 575. 






 and others that it constitutes an inescapable common ground from which 




Despite the different language,
50
 the substantive effect of the CBDR principle in the 
UNFCCC regime is similar to the one of sustainable development. It is widely accepted that 
a strong interaction exists between the two principles, both embracing strong equity, inter-
generational,
51
 and intra-generational concerns.
52
 In particular, through years of practice in 
norms implementation and negotiations, both the CBDR and sustainable development 
principles have been subject to continuous evolution. When Barral notes that the meaning of 
sustainable development varies according to the changing social, environmental and 
scientific scenario,
53
 the same seems to apply to the CBDR principle in the UNFCCC. 
 
The evolving character of the CBDR principle can be traced from the time of 
negotiating the UNFCCC text, when the broad political set consisted of a division between 
the developed and developing countries interests.
54
 The rationale for the inclusion of the 
CBDR in the text was to lay down a principle that would have taken in consideration the 
historical responsibilities of advanced economies and the need of support for the developing 
countries’ group. This resulted in a set of more onerous commitments by developed (Annex 
                                                     
48 Because “(1) There is no agreement on what it means; (2) there is no agreement on when it applies; (3) it is 
over-argued; and (4) it breeds laziness in the negotiating process.” S Biniaz, ‘Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities’ (2002) 96 American Society of International Law Proceedings 358, at 359. 
49 J Brunnée and S J Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account (CUP 
2010), at 166; and E Brown Weiss, ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibilities’ (2002) 96 American Society of 
International Law Proceedings 358, at 366. 
50 In the UNFCCC it is stated the developing countries have a right and obligation to sustainable development, 
while parties to the Convention only should protect the climate system in accordance with the CBDR principle 
(respectively UNFCCC, Articles 3(4) and (1)). 
51 Brown Weiss, ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibilities’, supra note 23; and Hey, ‘Common but 
Differentiated Responsibilities’, supra note 39, at para 5. 
52 Hey, ibid., para 12, stressing that “the concept of common but differentiated responsibilities can be understood 
as a translation of the concept of intra-generational equity to the inter-State level.” 
53 Barral, ‘Sustainable Development in International Law’, supra note 17, at 382-3. 
54 D Bodansky, ‘The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary’ (1993) 18 Yale 






 and in the subsequent adoption of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol imposing binding 
emissions caps only to Annex I countries.
56
 
The political scenario showed signs of change from 2007, when the UNFCCC 
Conference of the Parties (COP), the supreme decisional body of the Convention
57
 adopted a 
negotiating roadmap, the Bali Action Plan (BAP), with a view of finding a new global 
agreement on crucial aspects of climate change, including enhanced mitigation measures by 
the developed and developing countries groups.
58
 At the 2009 COP meeting in Copenhagen, 
where high hopes were cast on a new comprehensive agreement on climate, the focus of 
negotiations shifted on getting major developing economies such as China and India, to 
formally adopt clear mitigation commitments. This led to a backlash in negotiations which 
still remains live.
59
 After more than fifteen years from the adoption of the UNFCCC, the 
environmental and economic conditions grounding a future multilateral agreement on the 
climate have changed, given the sheer rise of emissions
60
 and higher economic growth rates 
of some developing countries.
61
 Such shift entailed a call by some for further differentiations 
within the developing countries group, which would inevitably affect the conceptualization 
of the CBDR principle.
62
 In the negotiations for a post-2015 agreement set up under the 
‘Durban Platform for Enhanced Action’
63
 on climate this resulted in a progressive “softening 
the edges of the CBDR principle”.
64
  
                                                     
55 UNFCCC, Article 4(2) and (3).  
56 Kyoto Protocol, Article 3, and Annex B. 
57 UNFCCC, Article 7. 
58 Decision 1/CP.13, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, 14 March 2008, para 1(b)(i) and (ii). 
59 D Bodansky, ‘The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Postmortem’ (2010) 104 American Journal of 
International Law 230, 232. 
60 It is estimated that by 2004 and 2005 Chinese GHGs emissions have overpassed US ones. See the World 
Resources Institute’s Climate Analysis Indicators Tools at < http://www.wri.org/project/cait/>. 
61 Mostly the so called BASIC block, Brazil, South Africa, India and China. 
62 On this line see MJ Bortscheller, ‘Equitable but Ineffective: How the Principle of Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities Hobbles the Global Fight against Climate Change’ (2009) 10 Sustainable Development Law and 
Policy 49. 
63 Given the failure in reaching agreement for a post-2012 period, the Durban COP shifted the expected year for a 
deal to 2015, with a view of developing “[…] a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with 
legal force under the Convention […]”: Decision 1/CP.17, supra note 9, para 2. 
64 J Brunnée and C Streck, ‘The UNFCCC as a Negotiation Forum: towards Common but More Differentiated 




Starting from the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, passing through the Cancun Agreements 
at COP16, and more recently with the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action,
65
 the cleavage 
between Annex and non-Annex I parties has been progressively reduced, and similarly the 
reliance on a static interpretation of the CBDR principle favoring developing countries as 
whole. The Copenhagen Accord, a last-ditch non-binding deal adopted by twenty-eight 
countries,
66
 called developing countries to implement mitigation actions (National 
Appropriate Mitigation Actions - NAMAs) that could be measured, reported, and some of 
them internationally financed.
67
 At the following COP16 in Cancun, the COP formalized the 
outcome of the Copenhagen Accord into a COP decision:
68
 the use of an almost identical 
language to embark developed and developing countries’ onto future mitigation efforts was 
accompanied by a less prescriptive language for all parties in relation to mitigation 
commitments.
69
 Finally, a significant step has been done in 2011 in Durban, where the COP 
established another negotiating platform to come up with an agreement no later than 2015.
70
 
As has been noticed, the striking feature of the COP decision laying down the nuts and bolts 
for the Durban negotiating path is that the CBDR principle is recalled only in marginal 
provisions,
71
 without even being mentioned in the preamble as often happened before. 
The changing nature of the CBDR principle reflects the political balances among 
UNFCCC Parties: the developed countries block, with the US at the front, sets as a condition 
to a future agreement on the climate the adoption by major developing economies of clear 
emissions targets. Concurrently, emerging economies are reluctant to enter the path of pre-
set emissions targets, which would imply abatement costs and limitations to economic 
development. To some this represents a better way to understand the CBDR both in 
                                                     
65 Respectively, Decision 2/CP.15, supra  note 14; Decision 1/CP.16, supra note 15; and  Decision 1/CP.17, 
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66 In the following months 141 states have associated with it. See L Rajamani, ‘The Cancun Climate Agreements: 
Reading the Text, Subtext and Tea Leaves’ (2011) 60 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 499, at 500. 
67 Copenhagen Accord, para 5. 
68 At the Copenhagen Conference the COP only ‘took note’ of the Copenhagen Accord. Meaning that there was 
no consensus on formally adopting the document text. 
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 and political terms.
73
 To others it marks a new challenging period for the 
conceptualization and application of the principle.
74
 
2.2. The symbiotic relationship between the CBDR principle and climate finance 
As for the case of sustainable development, there is strong interaction between the legal 
obligations on climate finance and the CBDR principle, mainly in a way that the evolutive 
nature of the latter influences the former. It is widely recognized that a crucial component of 
the CBDR principle consists of providing financial support countries that are less able to 
cope with global warming.
75
 In such a context the UNFCCC contains a relevant provision 
that more than an obligation has the nature of a binding statement by the ‘differentiated’ 
developing countries. Article 4(7) reads:  
‘The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their 
commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective implementation by 
developed country Parties of their commitments under the Convention related to 
financial resources and transfer of technology and will take fully into account that 
economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding 
priorities of the developing country Parties.’ 
Arguably, this provision shows a prime characteristic of climate finance in the context 
of the CBDR principle and international law. It constitutes a condition for the 
implementation of developing countries’ climate change measures, but, while the provision 
was adopted in 1992 including current major economies, the current negotiations and 
developments within the COP reveal a shift towards further differentiations among the non-
Annex I countries. 
It is noteworthy that in the UNFCCC text there are already differentiations among 
developing countries. Article 4(8-9) obliges the developed countries to “give full 
                                                     
72 See Stone, ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law’, supra note 45, at 284, 
distinguish between three hypothetical economic understanding of CBDR and arguing the current one to be 
inefficient. 
73 Bortscheller, ‘Equitable but Ineffective’, supra note 62, at 51. 
74 L Rajamani, ‘The Durban Platform for Enhanced Action and the Future of the Climate Regime’ (2012) 61 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly 501, at 507-511. 
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consideration” of financing needs for developing countries that have a specific position 
given the adverse effects from global warming and the severe impacts of implementing 
response measures on their territories.
76
 Special consideration must also be given to the Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs). These two paragraphs draw additional differentiations among 
the developing countries’ group. As will be seen, their implementation has almost entirely 
been centered on the financing of adaptation measures in LDCs or other developing 
countries that would suffer disproportionate burdens from climate change.
77
 Finally, another 
differentiation in the financing obligations of the UNFCCC consists of recognizing the 
special position of those states that, after the dismantling of the USSR, have been facing a 
transition toward the establishment of market economies. Article 4(3) of the Convention 
obliges only parties listed in Annex II –not including economies in transition– to provide 
financial support to developing countries. As has been noted, the following practice of 
climate finance within the UNFCCC made the status of those economies in transition even 
more marked, since they have been de facto eligible to receive support under the Article 11 




The CBDR can be framed in different ways, depending on the political balances 
between the parties.
79
 As for the concept of sustainable development, it works as a common 
denominator for negotiations, but can also serve as an interpretative tool and shape specific 
provisions of the climate change regime. Climate finance stands at the heart of the 
                                                     
76 UNFCCC Article 4(8) offers the following, non-exhaustive, list of countries: (a) Small island countries; (b) 
Countries with low-lying coastal areas; (c) Countries with arid and semi-arid areas, forested areas and areas liable 
to forest decay; (d) Countries with areas prone to natural disasters; (e) Countries with areas liable to drought and 
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implementation of the CBDR principle. Yet the current shift of significance of the latter is 
likely to affect the legal architecture of the former. 
There are already some developments that redesign and soften the sheer division 
between Annex I and non-Annex I countries also in climate finance. For instance, as a 
unilateral move, since January 2013, the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme has 
been accepting CDM offset credits stemming only from projects in LDCs,
80
 thus excluding 
the eligibility of credits from countries like China and India which host the biggest share of 
CDM projects.
81
 Similarly, LDCs are considered the primary target of finance in the context 
of adaptation to climate.  
 
Finally, the CBDR principle informs the process of access and disbursement 
modalities and the balancing of scarce resources between mitigation and adaptation needs. 
As will be seen below, access and disbursement modalities set up a formal process of 
countries eligibility for tapping into certain multilateral trust funds; at the same time they 
‘divide the pot’ of sourced money between potential recipients. It is evident that, depending 
on how the CBDR principle is understood, different solutions ensue with practical effects on 
ways finance is channeled. 
 
Given these evolving character of the CBDR principle, it might be the case that, if 
until recently developing states have been successful in working as a united block, the 
current blurring of the Annex I/non-Annex I divide might also impact on climate finance 
flows, building up selective country groupings within the developing ones. 
 
 
                                                     
80 See Directive 2003/87/EC of the EU Parliament and the Council, OJ L. 275, 32, as amended by Directive 
2009/29/EC, OJ L.140/63, Article 11a(4). 




3. THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS 
RELATED TO CLIMATE FINANCE 
While sustainable development and the CBDR principle provide the general legal framework 
for the climate finance machinery, other substantive obligations –stemming either from the 
climate change regime or from the practices in international development– further define 
some core elements for their implementation. Noticing how these practices affect the specific 
understanding of the CBDR principle, Hey claims that “another side of the story”
82
 emerges 
when one addresses the actual building blocks of climate finance obligations. 
The purpose of this section is to concentrate on these core practices, with a view of 
understanding the contested grounds where states and international institutions play when 
acting as contributors, intermediaries, and recipients of finance. 
 
Two different aspects are taken into account. First, when approaching the issue of the 
multilateral obligations related to climate finance, the problem of incremental costs on one 
side, and additionality and predictability of financial flows on the other are at center stage. 
The second aspect is based on the assumption that the specific legal relationship in the 
financial transaction between the entities providing the finance and the recipient state sheds 
light on the way international obligations of climate finance are actually implemented. The 
obligations and the conditions that the international actors agree on in climate-related 
financial instruments reflect such relationship. In particular, two elements are relevant: i) the 
type of financial instrument (grant, concessional loan, market based loan, etc.; and ii) the 
conditionalities often attached to the core financing obligations. 
                                                     




3.1. Incremental costs 
The concept of incremental cost is a crucial limitation to the financing obligations of 
developed countries in the UNFCCC, as it is markedly less than the full costs of a climate-
related project or programme. 
The financing obligation in Article 4(3) of the UNFCCC states that developed 
countries are to cover just the “full incremental costs” for the implementation of climate 
related measures in developing countries. The concept of incremental cost in climate finance 
amounts to the additional economic burden sustained by developing countries to implement 
a climate related project or programme that diverts from a business-as-usual scenario. A 
hypothetical case could be made of a developing country willing to reduce local pollution 
and GHGs emission of one of its cities by renovating its public road transportation: the 
incremental costs to be covered by international climate finance would then broadly amount 
to the difference between the costs of acquiring, for instance, buses with unleaded gasoline 
engines (business-as-usual benchmark), and the costs of modernizing the fleet with methane 
vehicles, assuming this last solution being more expensive. 
Despite the proven difficulty in applying this concept for specific programmes or 
projects, public climate finance in the UNFCCC still hinges on incrementality and is likely to 
do so also with the operationalization of the recently-established Green Climate Fund. 
Incrementality is nonetheless challenged: the shifting balances in international negotiations 
show how developed Annex I counties are increasingly less willing to pay for the full 
incremental costs of projects in emerging economies such as China and India. 
 
The UNFCCC substantive obligations by Annex II Parties consist of the provision to 
developing Parties of two different kinds of finance: 
1– The covering of the full costs incurred by developing countries in setting up a 
national inventory of greenhouse gasses’ emissions and in preparing 




2– The covering of the full incremental costs for the implementation of –inter 
alia– mitigation and adaptation policies and programmes.
83
 
The first type of finance has not proven controversial, because aimed to fund relatively 
inexpensive activities, such as the establishment of national inventory of anthropogenic 
GHGs emissions in developing countries and the preparation of national communications to 
the UNFCCC Secretariat according to Article 12 of the Convention. 
The challenging commitment is rather the second, because the range of activities and 
the quantity of financial transfers required are vast.  
Right after the adoption of the Convention, Sands commented that these provisions 
might have emerged as “[…] one of the more unusual, and perhaps costly commitments in 
the Convention.”
84
 Apart from the abatement costs for industrialized countries in reducing 
emissions, Sands’ comment proved right, given that the actual financing needs dwarf the 
funds actually provided by the developed states under the UNFCCC.
85
 The main rationale 
behind the introduction of the incremental costs concept lies in the intention by industrialized 
states to limit their contribution to just the additional costs sustained by developing countries 




To be sure, the presence of the incremental costs’ requirement in multilateral 
environmental financing is not limited to the UNFCCC but can be found in other MEAs 
adopted during the same period. The concept made its first appearance in the Multilateral 
Fund of the Montreal Protocol on the Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,
87
 and has 
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then been replicated in the 1992 UN Convention on Biological Diversity,
88
  the 1994 UN 
Convention to Combat Desertification,
89
 and the Kyoto Protocol.
90
 
Since the creation of the Financial Mechanism of the UNFCCC the interpretation and 
application of incrementality has been de facto delegated to the appointed operational entity 
of the mechanism, the Global Environment Facility ( Determining the incremental cost GEF). 
for funding under the GEF has proved controversial since the beginning,
91
 with states 
representatives in the GEF Council providing contrasting interpretations. The basic 
agreement was that the GEF was to finance projects and programmes that would achieve 
global environmental benefits.
92
 However, it was disputed whether also the costs for 
domestic environmental benefits should have been accounted into the notion of incremental 
costs, because, if so, the amount of finance for recipient countries would have been higher.
93
 
After an initial decision to exclude the costs for domestic environmental benefits,
94
 in 2007 a 
renewed operational policy by the GEF confirmed the domestic component for the 




What eventually emerges is that the practical identification of incremental costs is not 
only challenging, but highly dependent on the political context in which it is framed.
96
 The 
current operational policy of the GEF explicitly recognizes that the individuation of 
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incrementality is to be left on negotiations between all the actors in the project, with a central 
role given to the GEF Secretariat. 
Moreover, it is still unclear what will be the future role of incrementality in the 
UNFCCC. At the 2010 meeting in Cancun the COP, while endorsing the ‘Copenhagen 
pledge’, did not clarify whether this money will cover the incremental or full costs of 
mitigation.
97
 The following meeting in Durban clarified that the newly-established Green 
Climate Fund is to support both full and full incremental costs,
98
 yet the modes and types 
such cost coverage are still under formulation by the Green Climate Fund’s Board. 
What stands from years of practice and literature on the argument
99
 is that 
incrementality is practically determined through political processes and that, because it 
constitutes a quantitative limit to the climate finance obligations posed by developed states, 
it constitutes a ground of contention for current and future climate finance. 
3.2. New, additional, adequate and predictable finance 
While the limit set by incremental costs restricts the quantity of money to be transferred by 
Annex II countries, other substantive UNFCCC obligations spell out some guarantees for 
recipient countries on the overall amount of finance. Those requirements state that climate 
finance flows under the Convention shall also be new, additional, and that “[t]he 
implementation of these commitments shall take into account the need for adequacy and 
predictability in the flow of funds”.
100
 This formula has been proposed by the developing 
countries group during the negotiations for the Convention, but in that occasion its exact 
                                                     
97 Decision 1/CP.16, supra note 15, paras 95-112.  
98 Decision 3/CP.17, supra note 9, Annex, para 35. 
99 See also C Streck, ‘Ensuring New Finance and Real Emission Reduction: A Critical Review of the 
Additionality Concept’ (2011) 2 Carbon and Climate Law Review 158; and J Werksman, ‘Consolidating Global 
Environmental Governance: New Lessons from the GEF?’ in N Kanie and PM Haas (eds), Emerging Forces in 
Environmental Governance (United Nations University 2004) 35. 
100 UNFCCC, Article 4(3) [emphasis added]. However at COP16 in Cancun states agreed to include adequacy 




meaning was not specified, with the US even refusing its entry into the final text until the 




Similarly to the concept of incrementality, the practical definition of what can be 
earmarked as new and additional finance generated long-lasting debates and still there seems 
to be no accepted solution. Since the adoption of the UNFCCC text, the individuation of the 
counterfactual scenario against which one could recognize future funding as genuinely ‘new 
and additional’ appeared challenging. The basic understanding at the time of negotiations 
seemed to be that such finance should have added to and not be sourced from existing 
development aid. Yet, after almost two decades of that provision being into force, there are 
still no binding international standards on how to account for existing aid and, hence, 
measure new and additional finance, the only exception being the non-binding self-reporting 
activity under the OECD-DAC’s Rio-Markers.
102
 The issue is also inevitably linked with the 
one of finding a legal definition of ‘climate finance’ itself, because ‘new and additional’ are 
adjectives defining also the ‘Copenhagen pledge’ made by industrialized countries for long-
term finance.
103
 Being a legal requirement under the UNFCCC, ‘new and additional’ can be 
plausibly interpreted as a qualifier of such funds in the sense that what cannot be accounted 
as ‘new and additional’ would also not add to the fulfillment of the Copenhagen pledge. An 
alternative view might be that the rationale of novelty and additionality stands in a guarantee 
that climate finance shall not consist of existing foreign aid shifted for climate-related 
purposes. This is why, understandably, practitioners, think tanks and economics scholars are 
concerned about the question of accounting for new and additional finance, with the aim of 
extrapolating trends and compare them.
104
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Apart from the text of the Convention, the issue has been replicated in the almost 
exact terms during the BAP negotiations, the new formula being that financial resources 
should be “adequate, predictable, sustainable, new and additional”.
105
 The following 
negotiating process for a new climate deal, passing through the Copenhagen Accord, the 
Cancun Agreements and Durban, rather than remaining stuck on the interpretative challenge 
of financial additionality, has wisely set up two mechanisms
106
 for enhancing transparency in 
estimating climate finance flows, in this way creating a more solid ground to develop a 
common understanding. On one side, the Cancun and Durban COP established a new body, 
the Standing Committee on Finance under the COP. with the main functions of “[…] 
improving coherence and coordination in the delivery of climate change financing, 
rationalization of the financial mechanism, mobilization of financial resources, and 
measurement, reporting and verification of the support provided to developing country 
Parties[…]”.
107
 Among its various tasks, the Standing Committee must prepare biennial 
assessments of climate financial flows. 
Another innovation is the NAMA registry, which seeks to create a virtual platform 
with transparent data on mitigation actions by developing countries, together with their 
eligibility and conditions to be internationally financed. As introduced above, the BAP 
recognized that non-Annex I countries would undertake measured and verified mitigation 
policies on their territories. Such efforts are labeled as NAMAs, in contrast with the parallel 
but supposedly more stringent “nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions by 
the developed countries”.
108
 The Copenhagen Accord and the Cancun Agreements provide 
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that NAMAs are to be measured and verified by an independent international system and 





A COP decision in the Durban meeting stresses the matching role of the NAMA 
registry, in the sense that mitigation measures reported by developing countries can be 
coupled with international finance for mitigation. While the registry receives information on 
a voluntary basis, it is likely that NAMAs published in the registry will be more successful in 
receiving the required finance, in particular through the Financial Mechanism. 
The developments under NAMAs show the efforts by the COP to leapfrog the 
unwieldy debate on what constitutes ‘new and additional’ climate finance by setting up 
processes towards a clearer understanding of current efforts and needs. The aim is clearly to 
set the basis for a more efficient system of financial transfers, but also to indirectly create the 
future baselines and scenarios from which ‘new and additional’ efforts can be later gauged. 
 
Along with novelty and additionality, the UNFCCC Parties agree on the need to seek 
predictability and adequacy of financial flows, meaning that industrialized economies would 
promote an economic support to be constantly delivered and quantified according to the 
contingent needs of developing countries. The UNFCCC text and several COP decisions 
stress the need to consider predictability and adequacy when implementing the financial 
commitments of the Convention. The UNFCCC bodies have been promoting initiatives to 
improve the adequacy of flows, an example being the National Economic, Environment and 
Development Study (NEEDs) Project, which however has proven ineffective;
 110
  or the more 
                                                     
109 See Copenhagen Accord, para 5; and Dec.1/CP.16, supra note 15, para 53. 
110 The NEEDs project is a comprehensive study on financial needs assessment to implement mitigation and 
adaptation measures in developing countries according to their national development plans. According to Article 
12(4) of the Convention, developing countries can propose specific projects for international financing. Para 7 of 
the same article requires the COP to arrange for the provision of such finance and carry on an assessment of its 




recent (and more useful) work programme on long-term finance, which clarified and 
proposed means to overcome some policy barriers in promoting mobilization, enabling 




Despite the recent pledge of USD 100 billion per year by 2020 (‘Copenhagen 
pledge’), the developed countries block might not yield stable financing flows for three 
reasons: first, the pledge is not legally binding under international law, meaning that if 
industrialized states collectively or individually fail to provide the pledged sums, no 
international responsibility would ensue. Second, the uncertainty on finding the sources to 
fulfill the pledge, coupled with the current budgetary restriction of many industrialized 
countries due to the unstable global financial situation make the quest of predictability and 
adequacy even more challenging. Thirdly, there is no ‘burden-sharing agreement’ between 
industrialized countries on the individual efforts of their public finance contributions. 
 
In regards to the predictability and adequacy of climate finance, Yamin and Depledge 
note their importance for a challenge like climate change, against the background of the 
political and technical difficulties from developed countries governments to formally commit 
to stable financial flows beyond different electoral cycles.
112
 A determination procedure was 
set up to enhance the predictability of the funds. Article 11(3) of the Convention requires the 
COP to determine the necessary amount of finance to implement its commitments. The 
determination procedure was further specified in the Memorandum of Understanding 
between the COP and the GEF, where a collaborative process of determination was set.
113
 
Such process required the GEF replenishment to be ‘based on’ the COP’s assessment of 
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funding, while the GEF should “clearly indicate the rationale by which the amount described 
as “new and additional” is regarded as such, vis-à-vis other sources of ODA [Official 
Development Assistance - DR].”
114
 
The joint determination by the GEF and the COP has been de facto replaced by an 
assessment process between the GEF and its trustee, the World Bank. The results would then 
be communicated directly to contributing states for the replenishment face of the GEF. Such 
practice has not guaranteed predictability, in the sense of a long-term vision of financial 
flows. Rather, it left to contributing countries the final determination of the amounts to be 
channeled. Moreover, the process applies only to resources managed through the Financial 
Mechanism of the Convention, thus excluding other extra-UNFCCC financing activities, 
which as will be seen currently represent the majority of climate finance. 
3.3. Financial instruments 
The issues discussed above give context to the more general principles and concepts 
applicable to climate finance. However, exploring the means how international obligations 
are actually implemented can reveal the legal and financial relationships under international 
law between the states and intermediary international institutions. 
Indeed, the implementation of UNFCCC’s requirements on climate finance and their 
rationale can be further explained through the current practice of financial instruments 
agreed between states, and other international institutions. This is because such instruments 
often consist of bilateral agreements,
115
 agreements between an international organization 
and the recipient state, or international contracts containing the type of support, the 
modalities of principal and interest repayment, and the ‘conditionalities’ agreed in order to 
transfer the various tranches of payments for the project. Conditionalities to financial streams 
are a particular feature of development finance to sovereign entities. They generally consist 
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of ‘strings’ or requirements that condition the delivery of finance to specific internal 
measures that the recipient state must enact. Since they raise specific debates on the future of 
climate finance, they will be treated separately below. 
 
Bearing in mind that the object of this discussion involves primarily public 
international climate finance, the realm of financial instruments is extremely complex and 
ranges from typical ODA instruments to debt and equity profit-aimed participations. A 
conceptual line is often traced between ODA and other flows in development finance.  
ODA is a statistical definition –conventionally agreed between international 
organizations such as the OECD, the IMF and the World Bank– which identifies financial 
support by industrialized states less onerous on recipients than market-rated instruments, and 
holding the specific aim of fostering developing countries development, LDCs in particular. 
The OECD states that distinguishing feature of ODA is a ‘grant element’ in the financial 
transaction. “[T]he grant element is defined as the difference between the face value of the 
loan and the discounted future debt service payments to be made by the borrower. The 
discount rate used in the ODA calculation is constant over time and across currencies, and 
fixed at 10 per cent.”
116
 Therefore, to be qualified as aid, a financial instrument between a 
contributing institution
117
 and a recipient country must hold three necessary characteristics: i) 
it has to have a development objective (in the case of climate finance, climate change 
resilience); ii) a fourth of the finance must be a grant, meaning that part of the finance will 
not be paid back by the recipient country; iii) the remaining sums can be asked back but at a 
‘concessional’ rate of interest to be lower than market rates.
118
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What does not constitute ODA takes usually the form of other debt instruments, often 
loans at market-level interest rates, equity, meaning that the public finance from a developed 
country takes the form of direct investment by participating with shares into specific project 
and programmes, and export guarantee to private sector enterprises from developed 
countries. The matter is made more complex by two facts: firstly, such instruments have 
most of the times mixed components (grant, concessional and non-concessional) and sources 
(private and public);
119
 secondly, financed projects sometimes have mixed goals among 




The difference between ODA and non-ODA, concessional and non-concessional 
finance is relevant in assessing the implementation of UNFCCC provisions by developed 
countries. This, in fact, raises some interpretative questions about the financial nature of 
UNFCCC obligations on climate finance. 
Article 4(3) of the Convention indicates that substantive finance obligations should be 
implemented according to the Financial Mechanism defined in Article 11. The latter not only 
states that finance under the Financial Mechanism should be on a grant or concessional basis, 
but in paragraph 5 it also provides that: 
 ‘The developed country Parties may also provide and developing country Parties avail 
themselves of, financial resources related to the implementation of the Convention 
through bilateral, regional and other multilateral channels.’
121
 
As will be seen in the next chapter, this latter provision not only ushered into the 
climate finance arena numerous international institutions, but it also states that their 
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financing activity can account for the implementation of the Convention’s financial 
obligations on Annex I countries. 
The relation between this provision and the current practice of financial instruments 
leads to two alternative interpretations about the actual nature and rationale of climate 
finance: 
1– Non-concessional instruments by multilateral or bilateral institutions do not 
belong to the bulk of UNFCCC-covered finance; 
2– or, if they do, then finance for UNFCCC’s implementation is de facto not 
fully based on grant and concessional loans towards developing countries, but 
it also embraces public finance through non-concessional debt and equity 
instruments at market rates. 
On the legal plane, choosing one interpretation or the other is crucial for compliance, 
regardless of the issue of accounting for such finance. The binding language of Article 4(3) 
suggests the existence of an international obligation of results (the covering of full 
incremental costs). Hence, an interpretation under the “ordinary meaning” of the text in the 
context of the Convention,
 122
 as in the first hypothesis, would cut out from compliance all 
those financial instruments that –despite aimed at climate related measures– are non-ODA or 
non-concessional in character. Conversely, the actual practice after almost twenty years since 




As there are no official data on the amount of transferred finance, this also applies to 
the type of financial instruments used. A recent report by an international think tank has 
found that about a third of bilateral climate finance takes the form of non-concessional loans 
and, in tiny portion, equity. The bulk of finance flowing through multilateral channels 
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Also the ‘Copenhagen pledge’, formally recognized by the COP in 2010,
125
 seems to 
suggest the second option, as it abandoned any referral to grant and concessional 
components of climate finance, but it extended its sources also to private capital.
126
 
Because COP decisions are adopted through consensus and represent a form of 
decision and law-making within a treaty regime, it is possible to affirm that climate finance 
legally includes concessional and non-concessional instruments. This, however, inevitably 
affects the understanding of the basic rationale of climate finance, especially if confronted 
with the CBDR principle and sustainable development. Hence, if climate finance is a form of 
support to developing countries, justified by their particular status and need to develop 
sustainably, such support does not mean gratuity. Apart from grant instruments, developing 
states agree on concessional or non-concessional debt instruments. 
This normative shift of the ‘Copenhagen pledge’ has a twofold effect. On one side, it 
expands the scope of the Convention to financial instruments not clearly covered before. On 
the other, it might conflict with the original (literal) interpretation of the Convention 
provisions on financial instruments. The issue, however, is unsettled and is still ground of 
conflict between developed and recipient countries particularly in the context of future, long-
term finance. 
 
A final type of financial instrument that is peculiar to the case of climate mitigation is 
the so called ‘carbon finance’, which relies on the existence of marked-based regulatory 
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schemes of GHGs mitigation, and of markets of carbon allowances and credits. A more in 
depth account of how marked-based mechanisms work is given the next chapter.
127
 Here is 
noteworthy that one of the Kyoto Protocol’s marked-based mechanisms, the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), is designed to support the realization of mitigation 
projects in developing countries. Finance for projects is sourced thanks to the sale of 
Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) –a kind of offset credits– for the amount of 
greenhouse gasses emissions abated by each project. CERs can be sold in carbon markets 
that recognize such credits as eligible for compliance in international and domestic emissions 
trading schemes. 
In terms of financial sources the CDM is a hybrid instrument in the sense that 
depending on the actual financer for projects and purchaser of CERs, sources can be either 
public or private. At the same time, the CDM hinges on a complex international 
administrative framework to be explored later. Therefore, carbon finance does not fully enter 
within the conceptual boundaries adopted in this work. Nevertheless, the CDM is worth a 
mention among financial instruments, not because it is an instrument per se, but for the 
particular position of developing countries. Rather than being direct recipients of finance, 
they benefit from additional support for mitigation activities and technology transfer without 
necessarily entering into direct grant or debt transactions: often a relief for developing states 
budgets. 
3.4. Conditionalities 
Rarely does international aid or financial support come without strings attached.
128
 Apart 
from the amounts, goals and modalities, contributing states and climate finance institutions 
often attach sets of contractual conditions in their financial instruments (in finance towards 
sovereigns they are called ‘conditionalities’) aimed at safeguarding repayment and the sound 
and efficient spending toward their goal. Conditionalities stand at the heart of the legal 
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relationship between the releaser and the recipient of finance and have been ground of 
longstanding contentions between contributor and developing countries, because they limit 
political discretion, can and add burdens and transitional costs to the process of channeling 
development finance. 
The main rationale lying at the basis of conditionalities is the interest from the lending 
entity in guaranteeing that its support is efficiently managed and spent. However, sometimes 
fierce critiques have been cast against certain conditionalities which have been seen to 
conceal specific political agendas from contributors.
129
  
To be sure, the practice of conditional lending to sovereign entities can be traced back 
for centuries.
130
 After the Second World War and with the rise of globalization, its 
contemporary version has as main actors multilateral financial institutions with the IMF and 
the World Bank as the two core multilateral lenders for stabilization and development 
purposes.
131
 The practice of conditionalities in these two institutions has changed through the 
years, so that different types have been imposed for different aims.
132
 In particular, Collier et 
al. highlight that among the intrinsic objectives of conditionalities are the ones of 
inducement and selectivity.
133
 Conditionalities with inducement bring “[…] the government 
to do something it would not have chosen to do”
134
 in the absence of aid, while selectivity 
expresses the focus of finance delivery on those developing countries that already provide a 
satisfactory legal and political environment to make finance expenditures effective. 
 
                                                     
129 C Tan, Governance through Development: Poverty Reduction Strategies, International Law and the 
Disciplining of Third World States (Routledge 2011). 
130 One notable example is the bankruptcy of the Florence-based Bardi bank due to their unpaid loans made to 
Edward III of England for the Hundred Years’ War. Conditionalities for loans took the form of tax exemptions 
for the business activities of the Bardi family in England. See ES Hunt, ‘A New Look at the Dealings of the Bardi 
and Peruzzi with Edward III’ (1990) 50 The Journal of Economic History 149. 
131 MC Tsai, ‘Globalization and Conditionality: Two Sides of the Sovereignty Coin’ (1999) 31 Law and Policy in 
International Business 1317. 
132 See the distinction made between financial, macroeconomic and structural conditionalities in SL Babb and BC 
Carruthers, ‘Conditionality: Forms, Function, and History’ (2008) 4 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 
13. 
133  P Collier, et al.,‘Redesigning Conditionality’ ‘Redesigning conditionality’, supra note 130, at 1400-1: the 





In climate finance the system of conditionalities has its own peculiarities because of 
the intersecting claims by providers and recipients. As the narrative goes, developing 
countries tend to deem climate finance a form of compensation for the efforts they will have 
to sustain for a threat mainly caused by industrialized states, who in turn claim that 
developing countries emissions reductions are necessary to avoid dangerous global warming. 




Werksman details three main sources of conditionalities in climate finance: i) policies 
agreed multilaterally within the UNFCCC and its financial institutions; ii) policies set 
unilaterally by donor states in their bilateral finance activities and carbon portfolios; and iii) 
policies established by the developing countries for the purposes of national mitigation and 
adaptation plans.
136
 The same author asserts that the recent challenges in climate negotiations 
on finance arise from the fact that such policies do not align and, as a result, conditionalities 
are often inconsistent with national strategies and the interests of recipient governments.
137
 
Expectedly, this has led to a sense of frustration from developing countries for the coercive 
nature of conditionalities. 
  
Part of the recent reforms of the Financial Mechanism is attributable to this issue. The 
establishment of the Green Climate Fund, as an operating entity of the mechanism acting 
alongside the GEF, has been triggered by the developing countries’ discontent about 
conditionalities imposed by the GEF and its implementing agencies.
138
 Furthermore, 
consensus on an agreed set of conditions to financial flows, which would increase 
‘ownership’ of the finance to developing countries, seems today an inevitable component for 
                                                     
135 J Werksman, ‘From Coercive Conditionality to Agreed Conditions The Only Future for Future Climate 
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a future agreement in climate negotiations.
139
 A similar discourse applies to the practices of 





Looking at the very heart of the conditionalities conundrum, the issue of country 
ownership on the delivered sums is pivotal, as it shapes the contours of the general 
international obligations on climate finance. In other words, the delivered finance is not only 
meant to support a developing country in bringing about climate related measures, but it also 
requires that the same country shall approve an array of policies and activities that the 
lending entity deems necessary for the sound execution of the project.
141
 
With the task of delivering part of the ‘Copenhagen pledge’ and with the increasing 
political role of developing countries in climate negotiations, it is likely that the balance 
between national priorities and lenders’ conditionalities will shift towards increased ‘country 
ownership’ by developing countries . Yet, as will be seen, this might come at a legitimacy 
cost of the institution adopting processes with ‘high’ country ownership. This is already 
taking place through various reforms in the most significant climate finance institutions 
which are re-shaping the governance structure within and outwith the UNFCCC regime. The 
significance and effects of country ownership for governance and legitimacy of climate 
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This first chapter sought to provide a novel systematization and a legal clarification of the 
international law applicable to climate finance, to serve as a substantive understanding of the 
context in which the institutional governance of climate finance has developed.  
The international legal concept of sustainable development and the CBDR principle as 
expressed in the UNFCCC frame and, at the same time, give significance to the aims of 
climate finance, intended as a form of international support. However, to provide an account 
of its substantive international obligations, it has been worth looking at the core limitations 
and guarantees agreed by the Parties in the UNFCCC, as well as at the legal instruments 
often used in the practice of climate finance institutions.  
The emerging portrait is sketchy on various accounts. Firstly, the legal framework at 
the basis of climate finance obligations is affected by indeterminacy due to the lack of 
agreement on general principles and specific concepts such as incrementality and 
additionality. This should be no surprise, since the UNFCCC has been adopted through 
multilateral law-making procedures based on consensus:
142
 whereas its merit is to bring 
about a deal with the largest possible number of states, the prohibition to make reservations 
to the text inevitably leads to a compromise package in terms of legal output.
143
 This means 
that ambition and legal clarity have been sacrificed. 
Secondly, twenty years of COP decisions, coupled with the changing practices in the 
use of financial instruments, inevitably shed light on the concrete significance of treaty 
obligations. Indeed, they seem to depart from a literal interpretation of the Convention when 
it comes to the nature of the financial support to be provided in developing countries. The 
recent ‘Copenhagen pledge’ does not state whether to include just grants and concessional 
finance, or also other forms of financial support such as loans at market rates, carbon 
finance, including private and public schemes. Since the mixed solution seems to be the one 
                                                     
142 Rule 27 of the Rules of Procedure of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for the UNFCCC stated 
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Rules of Procedure. See the Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for the UNFCCC, UN Doc. 
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currently accepted, then it is possible to assert that Article 11 of the Convention is only 
partially prescriptive under the climate change regime, and that the normative activity by the 
COP and the legal practice by relevant institutions have stretched the nature of support to 
other financial instruments. 
Finally, the interest of financing countries and institutions to guarantee efficiency and 
effectiveness of flows has led to a practice of conditionalities that poses additional burdens 
and transitional costs not directly addressed in the UNFCCC’s text. Such practice not only 
gives significance to the broad treaties obligations, but also tells that in some cases the 
access to climate finance requires developing states to accept further conditions that are at 
times felt intrusive of their sovereignty. 
 
With such an understanding of the substantive international law and the building 
blocks of climate finance, the next chapter will enter into the main object of this work: the 














This chapter will shift focus from the substantive issues of climate finance under the 
principles of international law to its complex institutional structure formed since the 
adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992. It will provide a mapping of the current types of 
institutions which source and disburse public flows of finance, as well as a contextualization 
of their role in such a global activity. 
The institutional dimension of climate finance is the core subject of this work. After 
more than twenty years of implementation of financial obligations under the UNFCCC, it is 
widely recognized that the financial needs of developing countries have not been met,
1
 
particularly the costs of climate adaptation for least developed countries. While the reasons 
for lagging behind are many, it is posited that the progressive fragmentation of the 
institutional channels of climate finance not only represents a pressing issue, but it also holds 
a relevant legal dimension which is underestimated by current policy actions,
2
 as well as the 
legal scholarship. 
This chapter will equip the reader with an outline of current institutions and will serve 
as starting point for framing the factual and legal issues in the following chapters. It is 
divided in three sections according to the legal domain to which those institutions belong: 
the first will introduce the two international institutions working as operating entities of the 
                                                     
1 See, for instance, UN, ‘Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Advisory Group on Climate Change 
Financing’, 5 November 2010, para 9, 
 <http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/climatechange/shared/Documents/AGF_reports/AGF_Final_Report.pdf>. 
2 A recent work programme under the aegis of the UNFCCC spends little words on just specific aspects of the 
institutional fragmentation of finance: Report on the outcomes of the extended work programme on long-term 
finance, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2013/7, 1 November 2013, at para 64. Similarly, a recent report by the OECD 
addresses the issue only partially and with reference to few institutions: OECD Environment Policy Committee, 
Scaling up and replicating effective climate finance interventions, COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2014)1, 28 May 




UNFCCC Financial Mechanism: the Global Environment Facility, and the Green Climate 
Fund. The second analyzes the Clean Development Mechanism and the Adaptation Fund, the 
two climate finance mechanisms engendered under the Kyoto Protocol, as well as the 
proposed New Market Mechanism under a future climate agreement. Finally, the third 
section will offer an outline of those institutions which, despite working outside any formal 
linkage with the climate conventions, nonetheless channel the biggest bulk of climate 
finance. It categorizes them in four types: multilateral development banks; national bilateral 
agencies; public-private and inter-institutional partnerships; and implementing agencies. 
 
 
1. THE UNFCCC FINANCIAL MECHANISM: FROM THE GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENT FACILITY TO THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND 
Being a common feature among Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs), also the 
UNFCCC establishes in Article 11 a Financial Mechanism with the aim of supporting the 
implementation of developing countries obligations. Currently the Financial Mechanism is 
‘operated’ by two international institutions, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the 
Green Climate Fund (GCF). 
 
After almost two decades of relying exclusively on the GEF, the Financial Mechanism 
was also affected by the proliferation of climate funds, and the need to adapt the delivery of 
finance under the Convention to the shifting political balances between financing and 
recipient countries.
3
 This process has recently culminated with the establishment of a new 
GCF and a consultative body to the COP, the Standing Committee on Finance. The Financial 
Mechanism has faced a first period of consolidation (1994-2001) characterized by the unique 
role of the GEF and its Trust Fund, which is shared between other MEAs financial 
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mechanisms. Following the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997,
4
 in 2001 a landmark 
COP meeting in Marrakesh set up two new funds dedicated to adaptation activities under the 
UNFCCC, the Special Climate Change Fund and the Least Developed Countries Fund; yet 
the management of these funds was once again entrusted to the GEF. The GEF ‘dominating’ 
role in the Financial Mechanism started to be questioned after that in 2007 a new negotiating 
path, under the COP’s Bali Action Plan, envisioned new forms for “[e]nhanced action on the 
provision of financial resources […]” to be included in a future international agreement on 
the climate.
5
 After years of negotiations and the impasse that the COP faced in 2009 in 
Copenhagen, in the following year a new operating entity of the Financial Mechanism, the 
GCF, was the resulting compromise of new political arrangements between developed and 
developing countries. 
1.1. The Financial Mechanism 
The 1972 Stockholm Declaration was the first international instrument to call for the 
establishment of technology and financial transfers mechanisms to tackle global 
environmental issues.
6
 Its Principle 9 solemnly states that:  
“Environmental deficiencies generated by the conditions of under-development and 
natural disasters pose grave problems and can best be remedied by accelerated 
development through the transfer of substantial quantities of financial and 
technological assistance as a supplement to the domestic effort of the developing 
countries and such timely assistance as may be required.” 
Despite the level of consensus, fifteen years passed before states would come up with 
a first substantive achievement in international environmental financing: the adoption of the 
1987 Montreal Protocol on Substance that Deplete the Ozone Layer.
7
 Its Article 10 
                                                     
4 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Tokyo: 11 December 1997, 
entered into force on 16 February 2005, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, Dec. 1/CP.3 Annex-I, 
<http://unfccc.int> [hereafter ‘Kyoto Protocol’ or ‘the Protocol’]. 
5 Decision 1/CP.3, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, 14 March 2008, para 1(e). 
6 Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 5-16 June 1972, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1. 
7 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, adopted on 16 September 1987, 1522 UNTS 









Building on the model of the Multilateral Fund, the UNFCCC Financial Mechanism is 
aimed at “[…] the provision of financial resources on a grant or concessional basis” and it is 
only ‘defined’ rather than ‘established’ by the Convention.
9
  
This language exposes a lack of ‘institutional concretization’ in the sense that it 
appears uncertain whether the mechanism is an institution per se, or rather requires the 
implementation of other institutions. While the second option seems to be in line with the 
wording of the Article, which states that the Financial Mechanism’s operation “[…] shall be 
entrusted to one or more existing international entities”,
10
 the same article provides that the 
same Financial Mechanism “[…] shall function under the guidance of and be accountable 
to[…]” the COP. This is an unfortunate language, because any guidance and accountability 
relationship would require an institutional nature of the Financial Mechanism, which it 
clearly lacks. To overcome this incongruence, the COP has rightly interpreted exerting 
guidance and accountability on the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, rather than 
the Mechanism itself. 
It is noteworthy that the discretion of the COP to ‘cherry-pick’ the international 
institutions working as operating entities is not present in the parallel cases of the Montreal 
Protocol and the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).
11
 In particular the latter 
                                                     
8 Ibid., Article 10(2) specifies that the financial mechanism “shall include” the Multilateral Fund, allowing also 
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financial mechanism. 
9 UNFCCC, Article 11(1). 
10 Ibid. 





envisions only a single “institutional structure” of finance for its financial mechanism
12
 with 
the further clarification that the GEF should work as its ad interim institutional structure.
13
 
Hence, given its indeterminate status and through the interpretation and practice by the 
COP, the UNFCCC Financial Mechanism has proved to be more an ‘empty box’ than an 
institution, to be subsequently filled by entities established or selected by the COP. A 
provisional choice was expressed already at the time of adoption of the UNFCCC, which in 
Article 21(3) appoints the GEF as the ad interim “[…] entity entrusted with the operation of 
the financial mechanism”. The GEF has then been reconfirmed at the end of every fourth 
year review
14
 and has acted as the sole operational entity of the Financial Mechanism until 
2010, when the COP established the GCF. 
 
The institutional openness of the Financial Mechanism goes in parallel with the 
flexibility provided to developed countries in choosing other means outside the Financial 
Mechanism for the implementation of the Convention’s financial commitments. Article 11(5) 
reads:  
“The developed country Parties may also provide and developing country Parties avail 
themselves of, financial resources related to the implementation of the Convention 
through bilateral, regional and other multilateral channels.” 
This provision, which recognizes the role of institutions other than the operating 
entities of the Financial Mechanism, has set the legal basis for the progressive mushrooming 
of institutions and funds aimed at de facto implementing the UNFCCC’s financial 
commitments, which will be treated in section 3 below.  
                                                     
12 Ibid., Article 21. 
13 Ibid., Article 39. 
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1.2. The Global Environment Facility 




The GEF was created in response to an “institutional gap”
16
 created by two 
advancements in global environmental politics. In 1987 the UN World Commission on 
Environment and Development adopted the ‘Bruntlandt Report’, which inter alia called for a 
reorienting of the action of the existing multilateral financial institutions towards coordinated 
sustainable development financing.
17
 Following, the 1989 Hague Declaration on the 
Environment envisioned a “[…] new institutional authority either by strengthening existing 
institutions or by creating a new institution […]”.
18
 In anticipation to possible contrasting 
demands from developing countries at the approaching UN Convention on the Environment 
and Development, in 1989 at an inter-ministerial meeting the World Bank, the IMF and the 
French Prime Minister agreed to give start to a fund which would finance projects benefiting 
the global environment.
19
 After two years the World Bank set up the GEF as a three-year 
pilot program,
20
 embedded within its own institutional structure, but hinging on the 
cooperation of the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) and the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP).
21
 Thus, the core aim was to establish a bridging entity between 
international agencies that could provide their own expertise, instead of creating a new 
independent institution.
22
 Interestingly, donor states were already concerned with the 
proliferation of funds and institutions in a period of creation of different multilateral 
environmental regimes,
23
 which were already feared to cause the legal challenge of ‘treaty 
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16 J Werksman, ‘Consolidating Governance of the Global Commons: Insights from the Global Environment 
Facility’ in G Handl (ed), Yearbook of International Environmental Law, vol. 6 (OUP 1995), 27-63, at 29-34. 
17 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, supra note 6, at 329. 
18 Hague Declaration on the Environment, 11 March 1989, 28 ILM 1308. 
19 C Streck, ‘The Global Environment Facility‘, supra note 15, at 72. 
20 World Bank, Executive Directors’ Resolution No. 91-5, (1991) 30 ILM 1758. 
21 For their role in the institutional architecture of climate finance see below, at 91. 
22 Such cooperation was legally based on a tripartite agreement between the agencies. See World Bank, 
Establishment of the Global Environment Facility, April 1991, 30 ILM 1739, 1740. 






  Being a brand-new institution, at the time of its establishment there was no 
clear agreement on the GEF’s structure and its future strategy.
25
 This is why the constituting 
document contained very general indications on the operational modalities and inter-agency 
structure of the GEF. This was coupled by the lack of direction that participant countries 
could give to the fund.
26
 
According to some authors, the GEF pilot has been dominated by the managing role of 
the World Bank and its contributing members, with developing countries and NGOs having 
little say on its constitution and activities.
27
 Thus, during the negotiations for the UNFCCC 
in the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee, developing countries sought an alternative 
for an increased control of financial resources by way of a new ‘Green Fund’. On the 
opposite side, industrialized countries, with US and UK in first line, argued that the GEF was 
the best solution to serve as the Financial Mechanism of the Convention.
28
 
Eventually the GEF was appointed as the interim financial entity of the UNFCCC and 
also of its ‘cousin’ treaty, the CBD. Moreover, both the conventions included a provision 
conditioning the GEF’s appointment to an internal structural reform:
29
 this actually 
culminated in 1994 with the adoption a new GEF Instrument
30
 adopted jointly by the three 
cooperating institutions, the World Bank, UNDP and UNEP.
31
 The Instrument reshuffled the 
GEF’s governance with the creation of a Council, seconded by an Assembly, a Secretariat 
and a Scientific Technical Advisory Panel, all reflecting the general aim of increasing 
                                                     
24 E Brown Weiss, ‘International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New World 
Order’ (1992) 81 Georgetown Law Journal 675, 697-702. 
25 L Boisson de Chazournes, ‘The Global Environment Facility: A Unique and Crucial Institution’ (2005) 14 
Review of European Community & International Environmental Law 193, 194. 
26 Werksman, supra, 50. In order to partake, participant countries had to deposit a minimum contribution of 4 
million of Special Drawing Rights. 
27 See Werksman, Ibid.; and L Gomez-Echeverri and B Müller, ‘The Financial Mechanism of the UNFCCC - A 
Brief History’, April 2009, ECBI Policy Brief, 2, <http://www.oxfordclimatepolicy.org>; and D Reed, ‘The 
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International Law and Policy 191. 
28 D Bodansky, ‘The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary’ (1993) 18 Yale 
Journal of International Law 451, at 538-539. 
29 See UNFCCC, Article 21(3); and CBD, Article 39. 
30 Instrument for the Establishment of the Restructured Global Environment Facility, Geneva 16 March 1994, 33 
ILM 1283 [hereafter the ‘Instrument’] 
31 See UNDP Executive Board’s Decision DP/1994/9; and the decision by the Governing Council of UNEP, 




developing countries’ participation to the GEF’s decision-making process.
32
 The Instrument 
also set up a GEF Trust Fund to serve as a source of finance for the MEAs financial 
mechanisms and for the other two focal areas.
33
 
In this way, the original ‘network structure’
34
 of the GEF pilot could be enhanced 
thanks to the multiple roles that the restructured GEF would have covered across different 
international environmental regimes. 
 
If that was the idea behind the restructuring, the GEF has faced several backlashes 
well described by the literature and the GEF’s independent Overall Performance Studies.
35
 
On a general level, the GEF’s restructuring had only partially solved the lack of participation 
by developing countries and had not eased typical donor-recipient contrasts.
36
 That is 
because the GEF Council, the executive body of the GEF, decides on a double-weighted 
majority vote that eventually gives a major decisional role to contributor states.
37
 The project 
cycle often resulted in a cumbersome and sluggish process.
38
 Furthermore, the Instrument 
does not provide for clear linking norms with the internal regulations of the GEF’s 
Implementing Agencies. Therefore, the latter would still apply their own internal regulations 
with the result that project proponents have to pass a double approval stage first by the GEF 
Council and then by the competent implementing agency.
39
 Fostered competition, different 
comparative advantages and expertise underpinned the idea of clustering the work of three 
                                                     
32 For a detailed analysis of GEF’s internal governance see Chapter IV below. 
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34 The term is borrowed from the homonymous case study: C Streck, ‘The Network Structure of the Global 
Environment Facility’, UN Vision Project on Global Policy Networks, undated, <http://www.thegef.org>. 
35 See Chapter IV below, at 187. 
36 A Ghosh and N Woods, ‘Developing Country Concerns about Climate Finance Proposals’ in RB Stewart et al. 
(eds), Climate Finance: Regulatory and Funding Strategies for Climate Change and Global Development (NYU 
Press 2009) 157-164, at 161. 
37 Article 25(c)(i) of the Instrument states: “[…] decisions requiring a formal vote by the Council shall be taken 
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number of Participants and a 60 percent majority of the total contributions.” 
38 A recent OPS found that “[t]he key stakeholders in the GEF partnership perceive the GEF project cycle to be 
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implementing agencies, the World Bank, the UNDP and UNEP. Yet competition in many 
cases resulted in actual conflicts between these institutions, especially because the GEF 




Shifting to its external dimension, the relationship between the GEF and the UNFCCC 
COP has suffered from indeterminacy of core inter-institutional provisions. The UNFCCC 
uses a weak language on the relationship between the COP and the GEF, which has not been 
strengthened when a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the COP and GEF was 
adopted in 1995.
41
 Stating –as Article 11 of the UNFCCC does– that the Financial 
Mechanism should follow the guidance and be accountable to the COP is not like imposing 
formal ‘authority’ on the GEF.
42
 Neither the MoU nor subsequent decisions of the COP set 
up effective mechanisms to solve possible conflicts between the two institutions,
43
 
particularly in the context of Article 11(3)(b) of the Convention, which requires the COP to 
establish “[m]odalities by which a particular funding decision may be reconsidered in light 
of […] policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria”.  
 
The GEF has responded to concerns expressed within the COP, by taking several 
initiatives such as enlarging the number of accredited implementing agencies from three to 
ten, in order to increase the range of comparative advantages between the agencies;
44
 by 
opening direct access to funds to civil society and national or regional administrations 
                                                     
40 Werksman makes the case of the so-called ‘enabling-activities’ programme aimed at building capacity in 
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42 B Müller, ‘Under the Authority of the COP?’, Novermber 2009, Oxford Energy and Environment Comment, 
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44 The Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the Inter-American Development Bank, the International 
Fund for Agricultural Development, the UNDP, the UNEP, the UN Industrial Development Organization 




through a process of accreditation;
45
 or by applying a flexible approach on the determination 
of incremental costs on a case-by-case basis.
46
 
Despite this, the level of pledges at each negotiation for the replenishment of the Trust 
Fund has never skyrocketed to levels matching the actual needs of global environmental 
finance, including climate change.
47
 Already in 2006 Clémençon noted the lack of trust and 
the difficult positioning of the GEF in the midst of the concurrent action of MDBs and 
bilateral institutions.
48
 As a result, in the area of climate change, the establishment of the Bali 
Action Plan in 2007,
49
 and of the Climate Investment Funds
50
 marked a political shift from 
the COP that tortuously led to the establishment of the GCF in 2010. 
Nevertheless, currently the GEF is a key player in climate finance, especially in its 
role as a catalyst of funding through co-financing with other sources, both private and public. 
The GEF manages the following funds related to climate change: the general Trust 
Fund, shared with the other financial mechanisms of other Conventions, the Special Climate 
Change Fund (SCCF) and the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF).
51
 The first is the 
main fund operated by the GEF. It is not only aimed to climate change projects and 
programmes, but it also implements other MEAs financial mechanisms: the CBD, the UN 
Convention to Combat Desertification
52
 and the Stockholm POPs Convention.
53
 Contributing 
countries refill the fund according to a replenishment process taking place every four years.
54
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46 Werksman, ‘Consolidating Global Environmental Governance’, supra note 16, at 10. 
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The SCCF and the LCDF are meant to be complementary to the other GEF funds and the 
Kyoto Protocol’s Adaptation Fund.
55
 The SCCF delivers finance mainly for adaptation and 
technology transfer,
56
 whilst the LDCF covers the full costs borne by eligible developing 
countries for the development and implementation of their National Adaptation Programmes 
of Actions (NAPAs).
57
 At the time of writing the LCDF resources amount to USD 415 
million with 45 countries having completed their NAPA. Instead, the SCCF gained lower 
pledges and significantly less supply compared to its demand with an approved sum for 




Looking at over twenty years of activity, the GEF appears to be an institution with a 
consolidated governance model, offering a wealth of useful lessons for future climate and 
environmental finance. Its flexible structure allowed continuous transformations and internal 
reforms, although limited by its lack of institutional independence. The contrasting views of 
its constituencies, the conflicting interests of the implementing agencies and the lack of 
funds, have hampered the scaling up of activities from project to sectoral levels. The GEF’s 
internal reforms have also come at slow pace, if compared to the changing realities in 
climate negotiations. These shortcomings have certainly contributed to a future decision of 
the COP that a new international institution was needed to scale up financial disbursement to 
the pledged levels of USD 100 billion per year by 2020. 
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UNFCCC, which stresses the importance to understand what adaptation actions are needed for the most 
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1.3. The Green Climate Fund 
The launching of the GCF at the 2009 COP15 in Copenhagen
59
 signaled a response to the 
political shifts in international climate negotiations, which have witnessed an increased 
political weight of emerging economies, particularly the so called BASIC countries.
60
 In 
particular, the establishment of this institution can be interpreted as the result of developing 




The GCF operates the UNFCCC Financial Mechanism with the GEF. Because it is yet 
to be operational, only further regulatory developments under its Board and subsequent 
practice will clarify the actual positioning of this institution in the global arena of climate 
finance, especially having as yardstick the previous experience with the GEF. 
However, this does not reduce the importance of the negotiating process and the 
constitutive legal documents to the extent that they provide early signs about the role the 
GCF is likely to cover. In particular, the creation of the GCF should be read in the context of 
the parallel reforms in the UNFCCC related to increased mitigation efforts by non-Annex I 
parties in the context of Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs), and to the 
setting up of a Standing Committee on Finance to the COP. 
 
In aftermath of the 2007 Fourth Assessment Report of the Inter-governmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC), which confirmed and made more stringent the need of 
enhancing climate action at global level,
62
 UNFCCC parties agreed on a new negotiating 
path, the Bali Action Plan.
63
 The scope was to come up, inter alia, with a long-term 
emissions reductions goal to which also non-Annex I countries would contribute, together 
with an increased provision of financial resources for mitigation, adaptation and technology 
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 A binary track of negotiations hinged on two newly established subsidiary bodies 
of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.
65
 During the two years of negotiations and before 
the 2009 COP15 in Copenhagen, it was evident that the political arena had changed, mostly 
because of the increased role of emerging economies both as polluters and as economic 
powers.
66
 If developing countries were to accept more stringent obligations on their 
emissions reductions through the system of NAMAs,
67
 a rearranging of the financial 
mechanism would have been a counter-balance to strike a deal. 
At the Copenhagen COP15 in 2009, collective hopes for a new and comprehensive 
international agreement on the climate fell apart.
68
 Lack of consensus on key issues and the 
risk of a diplomatic failure, led a closed group of developed and developing parties to meet 
for a last minute solution. The Copenhagen Accord was the resulting document; a non-
binding one,
69
 of which the COP only took note in its related decision. Nonetheless the 
Accord enshrines many features taken aboard in the following COPs in Cancun and Durban, 
including the intention to establish a ‘Copenhagen Green Climate Fund’ to channel a 




In particular, the ‘Cancun Agreements’ formally establish and lay down the basic 
structure of the GCF.
71
 According to the text, the Fund is to be governed by an 
intergovernmental Board made of 24 members with balanced representation between 
developed and developing states, to be supported by an independent Secretariat, and a 
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 Whilst in Cancun consensus was forged just on a very initial structure, the COP 
decided to leave the remaining definition of the GCF to a Transitional Committee, made of 
forty representatives, twenty-five elected by developing parties.
73
 The scope of the 
Committee was to find agreement and report to the COP on the many elements that would 
have made the GCF operational in the forthcoming 2011 COP17 in Durban, including the 
principles underpinning the working of this institution.
74
 During the negotiating sessions of 
the Transitional Committee, the cleavage between developed and developing countries 
emerged as in almost the same fashion as in the GEF. On one side developed countries 
stressed the need to secure efficiency and effectiveness also through the imposition of 
fiduciary standards;
75
 the use of financial instruments other than traditional grants and 
concessional loans;
76
 and their view that a large proportion of long-term finance would not 
flow through the UNFCCC-based funds, including the GCF.
77
 Conversely, developing 
countries were firm on the following points: provide a frame for climate finance within the 
broader issues of human development and poverty reduction; the consideration of developing 
countries most vulnerable to the effects of global warming;
78
 a reform of the Financial 
Mechanism toward a less onerous use of conditionalities and debt instruments;
79
 and an 
enhancement of ‘country-ownership’ of the funds.
80
 Furthermore, and despite some contrary 
views,
81
 developing countries envisioned private sector financing as only supplemental to 
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Internal reference document-3, 27 May 2011. 
81 See Peru in Transitional Committee, Submission by members of the Transitional Committee, Internal reference 




public finance. Their main argument was based on the fact that private financing streams 




More surprisingly, some developing countries complained about the implementation 
of the negotiating process in the Transitional Committee.
83
 They lamented that the Co-Chairs 
of the Committee and the Technical Support Unit, a group of experts and practitioners 
coming also from institutions already involved in climate finance, had taken over the 
process.
84
 According to the Philippines’ representative, the Transitional Committee had only 
the chance to submit views on the documents prepared by the Co-Chairs and the Technical 





Despite the differing views, at the 2011 COP17 in Durban the UNFCCC parties 
adopted a decision on the GCF which incorporates the ‘Governing Instrument’ negotiated in 
the Transitional Committee.
86
 Differently from the GEF, which manages three separate funds 
for climate protection, not only the GCF is to operate a single Fund under the auspices of the 
UNFCCC but it is also bestowed with juridical personality
87
 and legal capacity to conduct its 
functions, as well as and privileges and immunities.
88
 The Fund is to be guided –but not 
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formally bound– by the UNFCCC principles and the goals of efficiency and efficacy in the 




Among the novelties contained in the Governing Instrument, the following appear the 
most relevant if compared to the GEF and other past experiences of climate finance: 
1- The Fund will be divided into thematic funding windows with adaptation and 
mitigation as compulsory channels. It will be up to the Board to set up additional 
windows according to the circumstances and specific needs.
90
 
2- A ‘private sector facility’ has been established with the aim of financing ‘directly 
or indirectly’ private entities in mitigation or adaptation activities.
91
 
3- Beside the traditional access, based on the intermediation of implementing 
agencies,
92
 a ‘direct access’ to the Fund is set up, where the word ‘direct’ 
expresses the possibility for recipient countries to nominate eligible national or 




4- The range of financial instruments to be used by the Fund has been extended from 




These innovations seem to reflect a new balance between the contributing and 
recipient countries in climate finance. 
In the Governing Instrument developing countries secured the insertion of a ‘country-
driven approach’ amongst the principles of the GCF, yet there is no clear legal definition of 
what such approach would entail. It could be that the expression ‘country-driven approach’ 
is a deflated version of ‘country-ownership’ of the funds. The last expression, advocated by 
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developing countries during negotiations, constitutes an emerging principle in the context of 
international development cooperation to indicate an enhanced decision-making role by 
national administrations in accordance to aligned development strategies.
95
 It is diminished 
because ‘ownership’ expresses an idea of appropriation, which might contrast with the 
reality of conditionalities described in the previous chapter.
96
 Therefore, a country-driven 
approach would still express the claim that developing countries should be the primary 
decision makers and managers of disbursed finance. However, their decision-making should 
not be unconditional or unbounded from effective and verifiable results. Direct access 
modalities seem to fall in the boundaries of this principle. 
As for the developed countries, also their views are present in the text on various 
accounts. The principles of efficiency and efficacy are expressly mentioned in the Governing 
Instrument and recall the North’s request that mobilized resources should be spent for their 
specific purposes and in a cost efficient manner.
97
 Efficacy and effectiveness find 
specification in the provisions on direct access, where the Governing Instrument provides an 
assurance that national administrations of developing countries should meet the Fund’s 
fiduciary standards in order to be formally accredited.
98
 Projects and programmes financed 




While a more in depth analysis of some specific features of the GCF will be conducted 
in the second part of this work, this overview of the GCF’s establishment already provides 
useful elements to situate this fund in the intricate normative and institutional framework of 
climate finance. 
A good starting point seems to be a provision of the Governing Instrument, which 
reads: 
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“The Board will steer the Fund’s operations so that they evolve with the Fund’s scale 
and maturity and will exercise flexibility to allow the Fund to evolve over time and 
become the main global fund for climate change finance.”
100
 
The legal significance of this norm is obscure, given that the COP has no delegated 
power to legally bestow the GCF with any ‘institutional primacy’ in international climate 
finance. However, such wording tells the likely rationale behind the forging of the GCF; 
namely that the Fund should progressively hold a primary role in climate finance vis-à-vis 
the other numerous institutions engaged. In terms of quantity, it is unclear what share of the 
‘Copenhagen pledge’ the GCF is expected to mobilize, although the Cancun Agreements 
provide that “[…] a significant share of new multilateral funding for adaptation should flow 
through [it]”.
101
 As for mitigation, it seems that the GCF has been deliberately designed with 
a high degree of institutional and operational flexibility. The power of the Board to set up 
different thematic windows allows for enhanced flexibility of the GCF in adapting to the 
shifting dynamics of climate finance. This is coupled with the creation of the special private 
sector facility. Bridging public with private climate finance has always been a crucial but 
daunting issue –mostly under the eyes of the financing countries. This has been for instance 
one of the areas of struggle by the GEF, which attempted some initiatives to spur 




If such flexible and scalable structure of the Fund might prove optimal to enhance size 
and effectiveness of the operations, one can better appraise the institutional role of GCF if 
two other key innovations in the UNFCCC are considered: the NAMAs process, and the 
Standing Committee to the COP. 
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101 See Decision 1/CP.16, supra note 71, para 100. 
102 In 2006 the GEF Council adopted a strategy for private sector engagement (GEF Council Doc. GEF/C.28/14) 
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As introduced above, NAMAs consist of a process aimed to communicate developing 
countries planned mitigation policies, the amount of estimated emissions reductions and, 
more importantly, the amount of international finance required for each programme. Unlike 
the case of the Kyoto Protocol, where developed countries accepted binding emissions 
targets,
103
 NAMAs are currently meant to work as non-binding targets under international 
law.
104
 Furthermore, developing countries reporting NAMAs do not have to, but might 
consider funding certain NAMAs through international finance. 
NAMAs were already envisioned in the 2007 BAP,
105
 they have been confirmed in 
Copenhagen
106
 and formally structured in Cancun and Durban.
107
 As for the relationship 
between NAMAs and climate finance, it is noteworthy that in Durban the COP laid down the 
backbone for a NAMA registry. Such registry is meant to keep record of the mitigation 
actions communicated by developing parties that seek international support. As the decision 
recalls, the registry has the purpose of matching demand and offer of climate finance.
108
 In 
the same decision the COP further notes that “[…] the financial mechanism may make use of 
information available in the registry […]”. Thus, the registry might enhance transparency 
and ease information asymmetries among states, but also between different institutions 
engaged in climate finance, including the GCF and the GEF. 
 
The second innovation is the constitution of a new body serving the COP. The 
Standing Committee on Finance is an intergovernmental body, whose scope is to coordinate 
action between the COP and the operational entities of the Financial Mechanism, and to 
promote coordination between UNFCCC- and non-UNFCCC-based climate finance 
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 The Standing Committee on Finance is therefore a consultative body to the 
COP. Rather than exercising substantive decision making, it operates through three main 
activities: 
1- The submission of draft guidance to the COP on the GCF and the GEF; 
2- The preparation of recommendations to foster coherence, effectiveness and 
efficiency of the GCF and GEF; 
3- The organization of a communication forum “[…] among bodies and entities 




Thus, the vision behind the Standing Committee on Finance seems to be the one of 
having a coordinating body of climate finance outreaching to financing entities not 
institutionally linked in the international climate regime. 
 
Several remarks can be made after having outlined the process of establishment of the 
GCF and other related mechanisms. As for finance mobilized under the UNFCCC, the 
medium term the GCF is likely to co-exist with the GEF, at least until the two find support 
and legitimacy from the COP. Yet the choice of keeping the GEF as an operational entity of 
the Financial Mechanism raises questions about its future role and the share of competence 
with the GCF. On this aspect there is no clear guidance from the COP
111
 and the GEF,
112
 
while the GCF Board is still engaged in operationalizing its Fund. The Standing Committee 
on Finance, as facilitator of coordination, has a potential role in clarifying the current 
indeterminate situation. 
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Another crucial issue is to understand the role of the GCF vis-à-vis those non-
UNFCCC institutions that are also to channel climate finance under the ‘Copenhagen 
pledge’ and long-term finance challenges.
113
 The next chapter will explain that this is 
primarily a governance issue, which requires a novel theoretical and analytical framing 
against the background of a fragmented institutional framework. Nevertheless, the GCF 
appears to act in a horizontal relationship with other non-UNFCCC climate finance 
institutions. The absence of a clear institutional hierarchy between the UNFCCC COP and 
the GCF Board on one side, and other non-UNFCCC institutions, impair the GCF at the 
outset to hold any institutional primacy under the law on the sourcing and channeling of 
climate finance. 
Being yet another intergovernmental global fund to finance mitigation and adaptation 
programmes, the GCF will be able to make a difference if its governance will garner enough 
legitimacy to enable it to source and leverage ambitious amounts of finance. Part II of this 
work will focus on these issues. 
  
                                                     




2. CLIMATE FINANCE IN THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND THE PROPOSED 
NEW MARKET-BASED MECHANISM 
The UNFCCC Financial Mechanism does not stand alone among the institutional 
mechanisms dedicated to North-South finance under the international climate change regime. 
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the first and only international instrument to impose binding 
emissions reduction goals on developed countries,
114
 complements the UNFCCC-based 
climate finance on two different tracks. On one, it engendered a market-based mechanism, 
the Clean Development Mechanism, aimed at realizing mitigation projects on the territory of 
developing countries. On the other, the UNFCCC COP, and after the Kyoto Protocol’s 
Meeting of the Parties (CMP),
115
 set up an Adaptation Fund which, as the name suggests, is 
focused on financing activities that enhance climate resilience of livelihoods and ecosystems, 
particularly in least developed countries. 
2.1. The Clean Development Mechanism 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is a market-based and carbon offset 
mechanism.
116
 It facilitates finance for mitigation projects in developing countries by 
rewarding project proponents and investors with Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs), 
which measure the verified emissions reductions or avoidance occurring during 
implementation. CERs can be used for compliance under the Kyoto Protocol as well as the 
EU Emission Trading Scheme;
117
 they are also tradable assets in the primary and secondary 
carbon market. In the institutional mapping of this chapter, the CDM represents a hybrid and 
peculiar type of climate finance. It is hybrid because both private and public entities can act 
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as project proponents, or investors in projects.
118
 It is unique, because at the moment it is the 
only market-based international climate finance scheme to have achieved ambitious levels of 
GHGs reductions. 
The CDM is one of the three market-based flexibility mechanism established under 
the Kyoto Protocol.
119
 These mechanisms ushered in a new approach to tackle problems 
caused by so called ‘tragedies of the commons’ such as global warming.
120
 According to the 
traditional argument of liberal economists who posed the theoretical foundations for these 
mechanisms, the most economically efficient way to regulate polluters’ behavior is to resort 
to a market-based, as opposed to traditional command-and-control approaches, where by 
contrast public authorities impose environmental standards, controls, and sanctions from 
their violation. Conversely, a market approach consists of ‘internalizing an economic 
externality’, meaning that what individual polluters would not account as a cost in their 
activities –nonetheless constituting a ‘social cost’– is otherwise ‘internalized’ within their 
rational economic behaviors. This is achieved by applying property rights on the externality 
and by creating a market to efficiently allocate marginal costs,
121
 under the assumption that 
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‘Chicago School’. See RH Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1; and 
H Demsetz, ‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights’ (1967) 57 The American Economic Review 347. 
122 This core caveat expressed by Coase (Ibid.) has not be taken properly into account by part of the legal 
scholarship and policy makers in the EU: see NS Ghaleigh, ‘Two Stories About E.U. Climate Change Law and 




In other words, once the public authority has set an overall target of emission 
reductions, it then assigns emissions allowances to individual polluters reflecting their level 
of emissions reductions for a given period. These allowances take the form of tradable 
permits to emit a defined quantity of pollutants. Individual polluters are then free to trade 
allowances with the only obligation of returning a number of allowances equal to their 
verified level of emissions at the end of a given period, usually a fiscal year. Therefore, 
‘virtuous’ polluters might end up with a surplus of allowances that they can sell on the 
market or bank for the following commitment period, while those emitting more than 
initially assigned will have to buy the missing allowances to be in compliance. The specific 
goal of this scheme is to reduce the aggregate abatement costs of emissions reductions, 
whilst still reaching the overall emissions reductions target. 
 
The International Emissions Trading
123
 (IET) and the rules to prove compliance via 
emissions units of the Kyoto Protocol
124
 relies on these concepts, with the peculiarity that 
individual polluters are the developed countries listed in its Annex B. Yet the two processes 
alone do not amount to a means of international climate finance as understood in this work, 
because developing countries do not participate in the IET. 
The IET and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) instead work as the demand 
drivers of CDM credits. That is because CERs can also be used for compliance and traded 
under those mechanisms.
125
 It is thus thanks to the IET that the international carbon market 
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The types of CDM projects are numerous and span across many sectors of a country’s 
economy, from forestry to metal production.
127
 Hence, only if the capital mobilized for a 
CDM project is sourced from a developed country’s budget can it then be deemed public 
climate finance. The fact that CDM projects are often funded by mixed public-private 
schemes strengthens the idea of its hybrid nature as a climate finance mechanism.
128
 
The same concept can be extended to the second baseline-and-credit mechanism of the 
Kyoto Protocol, Joint Implementation, with the only difference that this mechanism does not 
fit into the framework of this study, because only developed states and states from the ex-




Across more than ten years of activity, the CDM has created a complex system of 
transnational administration. Whilst the CMP holds the authority and guidance of the 
mechanism, technical decision-making and standard setting have been bestowed on an 
Executive Board (EB), made of states representatives elected by CMP according to regional 
representation requirements.
130
 The EB’s core tasks are to regulate on key issues for the 
functioning of the mechanism, such as approving methodologies for the calculation of 
project baselines;
131
 accrediting Designated Operational Entities,
132
 working as individual 
                                                     
126 The World Bank estimated a volume of almost USD 3 billion of the CDM primary market for the year 2011. 
See World Bank, ‘State and Trends of the Carbon Market: 2012’, May 2012, at 49, table 3 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCARBONFINANCE/Resources/State_and_Trends_2012_Web_Optimiz
ed_19035_Cvr&Txt_LR.pdf>. 
127 The UNFCCC hosts a comprehensive database of all registered projects at <https://cdm.unfccc.int>. Also 
other two institutions produce regular and updated analysis of the CDM pipeline: the UNEP Risoe Center at  
<http://cdmpipeline.org>; and the Japanese Institute for Global Environmental Strategies at 
<http://www.iges.or.jp/en/cdm/report_cdm.html>. 
128 See <http://www.cdmpipeline.org/> for detailed data on CDM project participants. 
129 See Kyoto Protocol, Article 6, which enables only states listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC to participate. The 
same Annex includes countries ‘that are undergoing the process of transition to a market economy’. These are the 
states that belonged to the USSR block before its collapse in 1990. In the previous chapter it has been noted how 
these category of states is a consequence of the application of the Common But Differentiated Responsibilities 
principle. 
130 For an in-depth analysis of the CDM internal governance see Chapter V below, at 191. 
131 Decision 3/CMP.1, supra note 116, para 5(d). 




project auditors; and deciding on the registration of projects and issuance of CERs within the 
CDM project cycle rules.
133
 Furthermore, the EB regulations display an array of different 




The CDM project cycle and the innovative features of its governance have spawned 
ample scrutiny by the literature. Concentrating just on the institutional issues and despite the 
recognition of its pioneering administrative structure,
135
 in 1998 Werksman highlighted the 
crucial question of the CDM governance.
136
 After years of implementation, criticism was 
cast on the practice of the EB in failing to exert its function in a manner compliant with 
broadly accepted administrative standards, such as efficiency, transparency, legality, etc. 
These standards were not only affected by the sluggish procedures, but also by the question 
of consistency in the decision-making practice of the Executive Board.
137
 In addition, given 
that the EB de facto affects with its decisions the legitimate interests of individual entities 
participating in CDM projects,
138
 various authors complained about the absence of a review 
mechanism of the Board’s decisions vis-à-vis CDM regulations.
139
 Some went even further 
with the hypothesis –later dismissed by practice– that private entities could initiate 




                                                     
133 Ibid., paras 35-52 and 64-66. Each project needs to pass through four steps, before the issuance of CERs: i) 
validation; ii) registration; iii) monitoring; iv) verification and issuance. 
134 CDM Executive Board Decision and Documentation Framework, EB 67 Rep., Annex 4 individuates CMP 
Decisions as hierarchically superior to three different kinds of decisions that the EB can take; it also clarifies the 
types of EB documents and their hierarchy from mandatory to non-mandatory. 
135 C Streck and J Lin, ‘Making Markets Work: A Review of CDM Performance and the Need for Reform’ 
(2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 409. 
136 J Werksman, ‘The Clean Development Mechanism: Unwrapping the “Kyoto Surprise”’ (1998) 7 Review of 
European Community & International Environmental Law 147. 
137 See Streck and Lin, supra, 422-6. 
138 As will be seen below in Chapter III, this is relevant under a public law approach to the issue. 
139 Streck and Lin, supra. See also J Werksman, ‘Defending the Legitimate Expectations of Private Investors 
under the Climate Change Regime: In Search of a Legal Theory for Redress’ (2007) 39 Georgetown Journal of 
International Law 679; and M von Unger and C Streck, ‘An Appellate Body for the Clean Development 
Mechanism: A Due Process Requirement’, (2009) 1 Carbon and Climate Law Review 31. 
140 EE Meijer, ‘International Institutions of the Clean Development Mechanism Brought before National Courts: 
Limiting Jurisdictional Immunity to Achieve Access to Justice, The’ (2006) 39 New York University Journal of 




The CMP and the EB have been sensitive to the concerns expressed by practitioners 
and the literature.
141
 This has led to a set of regulatory reforms, including opening 
participation to private actors in the context of reviews by the EB during the registration and 
issuance phase of the project cycle;
142
 a clarification on the normative hierarchy amongst the 
different instruments;
143
 and reformed terms of reference for the EB’s members to guarantee 
expertise and avoid conflicts of interests.
144
 Such improvements have not fully matched the 
suggestions coming from the literature, since a proper administrative mechanism to review 
the Executive Board’s decisions has not yet come to place. However, the fact that at the time 
of writing circa 1.5 billion CERs have been issued, corresponding to a level of about 1.5Gt 
of CO2eq reductions,
145
 showcases the success of the CDM in terms of project numbers and 
amount of mitigation finance leveraged in developing states. Yet this success is being 
recently challenged by the current downfall of the global carbon market, which has severely 
affected the demand for CERs. Its causes are due to two main factors: first, the low prices of 
allowances and regulatory changes under EU ETS, by far the biggest carbon market and the 
biggest market for CER demand; second, the slow pace in negotiations for setting up a 





The institutional and regulatory structure of the CDM represents a primer for complex 
transnational administration. If the CDM’s amount of finance is dwarfed by other channels 
within and outwith the UNFCCC,
147
 it nonetheless appears to work as a complementary and 
                                                     
141 See for instance Decision 2/CMP.5, UN Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2009/21/Add.1, 30 March 2010, para 7, where 
the CMP requests the Executive Board to improve its transparency, consistency and impartiality. 
142 See Procedure for Review of Requests for Issuance of CERs, EB.64 Report, 26 October 2011, Annex I. 
143 CDM Executive Board Decision and Documentation Framework , EB 67 Rep., Annex 4, undated. 
144 Decision 3/CMP.6, FCCC/KP/CMP/2010/12/Add.2, 15 March 2011, Annex I. 
145 CDM insights statistic as of June 2014 at <http://cdm.unfccc.int>. 
146 World Bank, State and Trends of Carbon Pricing, May 2014, at 38, 
 <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/05/28/state-trends-report-tracks-global-growth-carbon-
pricing>. 
147 See the rough estimates by Buchner et al., ‘The Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2013’, Climate Policy 




flexible means of hybrid climate finance, able to attract financial sources according to a 
different institutional model (and, perhaps, more effective) from the more traditional ones. 
2.2. The New Market-based Mechanism 
The CDM is a project-based mechanism, in the sense that emission credits are rewarded on a 
case-by-case basis and confined to a single activity –or a bundle of activities– 
148
 in a limited 
geographic area of a developing country. This approach is unlikely to be compatible with the 
demanding transformational shifts in developing countries’ economies in order to stay on 
track with a sustainable pathway of GHGs stabilization.
149
 The coupling of scaled-up efforts 
in mitigation with the cost-efficiency rationale of market-based approaches constituted a 
point of consensus at the 2007 negotiations in Bali, when the BAP roadmap included the 
consideration of marked-based approaches in mitigation policies under a new climate 
agreement.
150
 After four years of intense negotiations, the broad consensus of the BAP has 
concretized in a COP decision which ‘defines’ a new market-based mechanism (NMM), as a 
means inter alia to “[…] assist developed countries to meet part of their mitigation targets or 
commitments under the Convention.”
151
 
Thus, the attempt is to transfer the legacy and experience developed under the CDM 
under the broader UNFCCC umbrella, with the vision that the newly agreed NMM will 
apply to entire sectors of a developing country’s economy under voluntary terms. 
If these are the premises, the NMM is still under negotiations and its institutional 
nature nebulous.
152
 More specifically it is still unclear whether the NMM would constitute a 
cap-and-trade, like the IET, or a baseline-and-credit mechanism such as the CDM. The last 
COP decision on the matter seems to go for the second option, as it requests parties to 
                                                     
148 It is possible to bundle two or more similar activities under a unified procedure named ‘programme of 
activities’ under the CDM. See Decision 7/CMP.1, UN Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1, 30 March 2006, para 
20. 
149 That is, the ‘2C° target’ as outlined in the Introduction. 
150 See Decision 1/CP.13, supra note 63, para 1(b)(v). 
151 Decision 1/CP.17, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, 15 March 2012, para 83, preceded by Decision 1/CP.16, 
FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 15 March 2011, para 80. 
152 For an overview see S. Butzengeiger, et al., ‘New Market Mechanisms for Mitigation: Getting the Incentives 




consider “[r]equirements for the accurate measurement, reporting and verification of 
emission reductions, emission removals and/or avoided emissions” and “[c]riteria […] for 
ambitious reference levels (crediting thresholds and/or trading caps)[…]”.
153
 
 At the time of writing, the NMM has only been ‘defined’; an expression that leaves 
its formal establishment dubious.
154
 It is also unclear whether a NMM would be linked with 
the NAMAs mechanism. Therefore, and in a similar fashion to the linkages between the IET 
and the CDM, a UNFCCC-based NMM would also require one or more emissions trading 
schemes where NNM credits could be used for regulatory compliance. A new UNFCCC-
based IET would likely be the most likely scheme, but it might be the case that also existing 
and future regional schemes, like the European Emissions Trading Scheme, might become 
additional markets of NMM credits. 
Overall, it is too early to appraise the relevance and institutional fitting of the NMM in 
the international climate regime. Only when defined structures and operational modalities 
will be agreed upon, it will be possible to provide a significant understanding. Yet, the NMM 
is worth of inclusion in this mapping due to its potential to scale-up market-based 
approaches to mitigation finance. 
2.3. The Adaptation Fund 
The Adaptation Fund (AF) is one of the first international multilateral funds entirely 
dedicated to financing adaptation projects in developing countries particularly vulnerable to 
the adverse effects of climate change. It was first established in 2001 by a decision of the 
UNFCCC COP,
155
 yet it took almost ten years to become fully operational, due to political 
clashes on its governance and management. Differently from the SCCF and the LDCF, 
which are rooted in the UNFCCC regime and managed by the GEF, the AF is an 
international institution with legal capacity, under the authority and guidance of the Kyoto 
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Protocol’s CMP, and operated by an independent Board. Currently the AF shares the ‘global 
arena’ of international adaptation finance with the GEF and the GCF, as well as other 
institutions acting outside the UNFCCC/KP umbrella, and especially with the Climate 
Investment Funds with their Pilot Program for Climate Resilience. 
 
The AF was established with the aim of implementing both the general climate 
finance obligations on adaptation in the climate treaties, as well as a specific provision under 
the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM, which reads: 
“The [CMP] shall ensure that a share of the proceeds from certified project activities is 
used […] to assist developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change to meet the costs of adaptation.”
156
 
The Protocol thus imposes an obligatory contribution from project developers 
amounting to two percent of CERs issued for each project,
157
 which are transferred into a 
dedicated account of the CDM registry.
158
 These CERs are later monetized after being sold 
in the carbon market.
159
 In 2001 the COP decided initially that an independent fund should 
manage the resources stemming from the monetization of CERs, yet at the time the 
prevailing view on the institutional governance was to vest the GEF with the management of 
the AF, in the same fashion as the SCCF and LDCF.
160
 At later meetings this solution 
spurred fierce opposition from developing countries, which view adaptation finance and the 
share of proceeds from the CDM as fundamentally different from mitigation finance: their 
moral and political argument was that those resources should be owned at start by 
developing countries, being adaptation needs mainly caused by previous decades of 
unfettered GHGs emissions from industrialized states. Accordingly, it would have been 
                                                     
156 Kyoto Protocol, Article 12(8). 
157 Decision 17/CP.7, UN Doc UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2, 21 January 2002, para 15. 
158 Decision 3/CMP.1, supra note 116, para 66(a). Share of proceeds are not deducted at issuance when the CDM 
project takes place in a least developed country: Decision 2/CMP.3, UN Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2007/9/Add.1, 14 
March 2008, para 31. 
159 The World Bank, acting as trustee of the AF, is also the managing entity of CERs monetization. 
160 Both decisions establishing the SCCF, LDCF, and the AF call for the funds to be “[…] operated by an entity 
entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism”, which as seen at the time was only the GEF. Compare 




unacceptable to subject AF resources to the conditionalities and governance of the GEF, 





It took six years to achieve a compromise, when in 2007 the CMP decided that the AF 
should be operated by an independent Board where developing countries would have the 
major role in decision making. The AF Board would thus act outside the UNFCCC Financial 
Mechanism and under “the authority and guidance” of the CMP.
162
 While the Board’s 
functions are typical of a multilateral trust fund’s executive body, such as the GCF Council 
or the GCF Board, the same CMP decision for the first time expressly provided for means of 
‘direct access’ to funding from eligible developing countries, without the need to resort to 
international implementing agencies, which act as intermediary entities.
163
 
 This ‘institutional shift’, while favoring developing countries not only resulted in the 
creation of yet another international climate finance institution, but also considerably 
prolonged the time for actually operationalizing the AF. While the whole process was 
completed in 2011, the first AF Board decision on approval of individual projects dates 
2010.
164
 Aside from internal matters, new legal agreements had to be set up between i) the 
CMP and the GEF Council for the provision of secretariat services to the Board; ii) the 
interim trustee agreement between the CMP and the World Bank; and iii) the constitution of 
the AF Board as an entity with legal capacity.
165
 
                                                     
161 M Grasso, ‘The Role of Justice in the North–South Conflict in Climate Change: the Case of Negotiations on 
the Adaptation Fund’ (2011) 11 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 361.  
162 Decision 1/CMP.3, UN Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2007/9/Add.1, 14 March 2008. 
163 Ibid., paras 29-30. 
164 AF, Decision B.10/5, UN Doc. AFB/B.10/7/Rev.1, 11 August 2010. 
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The fall demand for CERs in the carbon markets since the second half of 2011 made 
the winding road to the AF creation even more tortuous, as this implied a reduction of the 
revenue stream from CERs monetization. The CMP attempted to alleviate the problem in 
2012 by extending the 2 percent share of proceeds also to transfers under the IET and Joint 
Implementation during Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period.
166
 Concurrently the 
Board has solicited direct donations and pledges by Kyoto Protocol parties. 
 
Despite all efforts and the increased number of national implementing entities eligible 
to apply for fund, the AF remains unsustainably funded
167
 having pooled just USD 400 
million
168
 since its establishment. Certainly, the competing presence of the Pilot Program for 
Climate Resilience, a climate finance initiative under the Climate Investment Funds, which 
has triple the resources of the AF, has contributed to this. 
 
 
3. OUTSIDE THE UNFCCC/KP UMBRELLA 
The institutional realities under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol describe but a portion 
of the climate finance landscape. Many other institutions, in fact, participate in the global 
arena of climate finance as institutional intermediaries, similarly to those entities already 
explored. As seen, the international legal regime allows for this institutional proliferation in 
climate finance: Article 11(5) of the UNFCCC allows industrialized states to opt for other 
means than the UNFCCC/KP-based funds and mechanisms to channel their financial 
support. As a consequence, also those institutions acting outside the authority and guidance 
of the international climate change regime, de facto have been not only implementing the 
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international financial obligations, but also exerting pivotal regulatory functions related to 
the building blocks of climate finance addressed in the first chapter. 
 
The purpose of this final section is to provide a non-exhaustive, yet meaningful outline 
of the multifarious institutions acting outside the UNFCCC/KP umbrella. Rather than 
addressing individual institutions as done above, here the approach will be based on the 
individuation and legal clarification of four typologies: i) Multilateral Development Banks 
(MDBs); ii) ‘bilateral’ institutions; iii) inter-institutional or private-public partnerships; and 
iv) implementing agencies. 
A methodological premise is here needed. Despite the fact that many of these 
institutions are only partially involved in climate finance, they are nonetheless a crucial part 
of this international institutional complex: it is, therefore, necessary to take them into 
account, in order understand the legal implications of a fragmented institutional landscape. 
This is corroborated by numbers: recent but only broadly indicative estimates of global 
climate finance flows found that while dedicated climate funds collectively channeled USD 
1.6 billion in 2012, the total amount of climate finance channeled by development finance 
institutions, including MDBs and bilateral entities, reached USD 121 billion for the same 
year.
169
 Therefore, the fact climate finance might constitute only a small portion of the 
finance portfolio and of the functional scopes of an institution will be disregarded. Moreover, 
only the most relevant institutions in terms of effort and presence in the climate finance 
arena will be taken into account. 
3.1. Multilateral development banks 
MDBs, often named international financial institutions or multilateral financial institutions, 
are intergovernmental organizations established with the general purpose of providing 
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financial resources for the economic development of their members.
170
 In contrast to the 
institutions acting within the international climate change regime, MDBs are legally 
established by international treaties thus belonging to the traditional institutional category of 
international organizations.
171
  Nevertheless their activity is somehow particular in the 
international sphere
172
 as they are dedicated to the specific scope of fostering economic and 
social development of ‘client countries’ mainly via capital leverage and loans, either at 
market or concessional rates. Thus, their distinguishing features are that state members –
including recipients– participate through capital shares and take collective decisions 
according to a corporate governance model. Interestingly, although none of the MDB’s 
constituting agreements expressly assigns to these institutions the task of financing climate-
related activities, an extensive interpretation of their mandates nevertheless allowed them to 
enter the climate finance arena.  
Because of their peculiar nature and multiple activities, it is difficult to square the 
MDBs institutional role in international climate finance. Rather, they seem to hold 
simultaneously a horizontal and vertical relationship vis-à-vis the UNFCCC-based 
institutions already introduced. On one hand, MDBs finance climate-related projects 
contextually to the GEF, the GCF and the AF, with the difference that they also leverage 
financial sources in international markets, therefore attracting both public- and private-
sourced finance. On the other, the World Bank –the first MDB created after the Second 
World War–
173
 serves as administrative trustee of all UNFCCC/KP funds. Furthermore, 
MDBs provide technical services to developing countries applying for funding, and act as 
implementing agencies of the UNFCCC/KP climate funds and for single climate projects. 
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172 Rodrik argues that MDBs hold two advantages: i) they suffer less from information distortion related to the 
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173 The institutions today part of the World Bank Group are the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
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The World Bank, which has extensively interpreted its mandate of international 
reconstruction and development in order to set up a wide-ranging climate finance portfolio, 
was in fact a first mover into sustainable development financing.
174
 Not only it was one of 
the constitutive entities of the GEF Pilot in 1991, but has later increasingly expanded its 
climate-related finance, especially in the area of carbon offsets once the Kyoto Protocol’s 
market-based mechanisms started functioning. The Bank set up a Prototype Carbon Fund; 
other specialized funds, such as the BioCarbon Fund and the Forest Carbon Partnership 
Facility; and other donor country-based carbon funds with the task of investing on projects 




With the increasing need of scaling up development finance, other MDBs were 
created with their constitutive agreements broadly replicating the World Bank’s features and 
pursuing the same general scope of economic development.
176
 Following the World Bank 
example, these MDBs have also extensively interpreted their mandates in order to develop 
climate-related strategies and portfolios. A traditional division between MDBs regards their 
global or regional geographical reach: broadly, the World Bank and the European Investment 
Bank are considered global MDBs while the remaining have their functions geographically 
confined to certain macro-regional areas. 
                                                     
174 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Articles of Agreement, as lately amended in 27 June 
2012, Article I(i),  
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/278027-
1215526322295/IBRDArticlesOfAgreement_English.pdf>; and D Freestone, The World Bank and Sustainable 
Development (Martinus Nijhoff 2012), at 7-14. 
175 For the list of funds see <https://wbcarbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=Funds&ItemID=24670>.  





The following table illustrates the main MDBs currently engaged in climate-related 




Table 1: non-exhaustive list of multilateral development banks active in 
climate finance and their related climate programmes 
MDBs Climate finance initiatives 
World Bank Group Carbon Partnership Facility 
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility 
MIGA Guarantees 
Specialised carbon funds 
African Development Bank Congo Basin Forest Fund 
Climate Dev-Africa Programme 
Africa Carbon Support Programme 
Asian Development Bank Clean Energy Financing Partnership Facility 
Climate Change Fund 
Water Financing Partnership Facility 
Caribbean Development Bank Basic Needs Trust Fund 
Special Development Fund 
Central American Bank for Economic 
Integration 
Green MSME Initiative 
Inter-American Development Bank Sustainable Energy and Climate Change 
Initiative 
European Investment Bank Post-2012 Carbon Fund 
Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable 
Energy Fund 
European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development 
Sustainable Energy Initiative 
Post-2012 Carbon Fund 
Multilateral Carbon Credit Fund 
Nordic Development Fund Nordic Climate Facility 
Nordic Environment Finance Corporation NEFCO Carbon Fund 
Nordic Partnership Initiative 
Nordic Investment Bank Climate Bonds Initiative 
 
Each MDB not only holds its own climate finance portfolio, but it is also engaged in 
partnership with other MDBs, bilateral agencies and the private sector. To complicate the 
scenario, MDBs often also act as implementing agencies or trustees of UNFCCC funds given 
their comparative advantage, regional expertise and capacity. All these features make 
extremely difficult to assign a clear-cut role of MDBs in climate finance because they can act 
                                                     






as i) capital-leveraging entities; ii) catalyzers of public climate funding; iii) promoters of 
market-based mechanisms; iv) public funds’ trustees; v) direct implementing agencies in 
developing countries; vi) and providers of technical expertise. 
 
At the 2005 G8 meeting in Gleneagles, top donor countries developed a Climate 
Action Plan inviting the World Bank and other MDBs to put forward a Clean Energy 
Investment Framework towards scaled-up lending to developing countries.
178
 The following 
meeting in Hokkaido ended in a joint plan of implementation of the framework calling for 
increased lending to borrowers, access to concessional funds and grants and cooperation 
between MDBs.
179
 The following period has been characterized by a constant expansion of 
MDBs efforts in climate related activities, with the Climate Investment Funds representing 
the most concrete outcome of MDB’s interaction.
180
 On the other hand, an independent study 
found that, as of 2008, over 60% of financing in the energy sector by the major MDBs did 




Among the MDBs, the World Bank has been the first to act in the field of international 
environmental finance.
182
 One of its early activities can be traced during the establishment of 
the Multilateral Fund under the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer, when it was appointed as an implementing agency.
183
 However, in the 
aftermath of the 1992 Rio UN Conference on Environment and Development and of its 
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181 S Nakhooda, ‘Correcting the World’s Greatest Market Failure: Climate Change and the Multilateral 
Development Banks’, 2008, WRI Issue Brief, at 2, <http://www.wri.org>. 
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183 See MOP Decision II/8, 1990, UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3, para 6. On the contentious relationship during the early 
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 clearer roles for the World Bank and other MDBs emerged. The lack of 
sufficient public funding from industrialized states has left a vacuum that the World Bank 
and other MDBs could fill through their financial leverage and capacity.
185
 The World Bank 
has been appointed and constantly confirmed by the UNFCCC and CBD’s COPs as the 
interim trustee,
186
 while its piloted initiative, the GEF, has been selected as the only 
operational entity of their financial mechanisms.  
After the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 and before the effective start of its 
market based mechanisms in 2005
187
 the World Bank acted as a crucial catalyzer of 
investments in offsets through its numerous carbon funds, so that currently the Carbon 
Finance Unit of the World Bank manages fifteen carbon funds or facilities.
188
 
Aside from its role as implementing agency, administrator and carbon market 
promoter, the most relevant role of World Bank in climate finance is its lending activity.
189
 
Throughout the years, the lending and crediting activity of the World Bank in climate related 
projects has resulted in a conspicuous pipeline,
190
 where the World Bank often acts as lender 
in co-financing with the GEF and other actors. These activities consist mostly of blending 
concessional and grant finance.
191
 Within the World Bank Group’s lending activities a 
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distinction is drawn between IBRD loans and IDA crediting activity, where in the latter no 
interest fees are requested for principal repayments.
192
 
Overall, MDBs are crucial actors in climate finance. The rationale of their intervention 
relies on the fact that climate change enters within the broad scopes of their mandates, as 
enshrined in their respective constitutive agreements. In addition, their high rate status as 
borrowers in the global financial market creates the possibility to leverage private capital for 
their lending and investments, with the positive effect of lowering interest rates below 
market levels.
193
 Their manifold activities (public and private) make difficult – if not 
impossible - any clear positioning in the international governance of climate finance. 
3.2. Bilateral finance and national institutions 
As noted above, Article 11(5) of the UNFCCC allows industrialized states to make use of 
their bilateral channels to comply with their financial commitments, rather than being 
compelled to channel their public sources through the Financial Mechanism. Bilateral 
climate finance today constitutes the biggest share stemming from public resources, 
amounting to an estimated amount of USD 21.5 billion average per year in the period 2010-
2012.
194
 Therefore, despite the developments in multilateral finance within and outwith the 
UNFCCC, industrialized states still appear to prefer their own administrations and to directly 
manage domestic budgets earmarked for international climate finance.
195
 
                                                     
192 An example of IDA credited project is the ‘Mozambique Climate Change Development Policy Operation’, 
consisting in a USD 50 million IDA credit Development Policy Lending (Project ID: P128434). According to the 
World Bank Group Operational Policies (OP 3.10, Annex D, < http://web.worldbank.org>), Mozambique is not 
eligible to IDA grants. This entails that the USD 50 million credit shall be repaid after a forty years’ maturity 
period without interest, with the payment of a small ‘service charge of 0.75% on the principal (see OP 3.10 37). 
The specific grant agreement is not publicly available. 
193 Steer and Mason, ‘Role of Multilateral Finance and the Environment’  
194 OECD-DAC, ‘Climate-related Aid’, May 2014, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/environment-
development/Climate-related%20aid%20Flyer%20-%20May%202014%20final.pdf>. 
195 Exemption made for the Government of UK. An independent study shows how a tiny portion of UK public 
spending in climate finance passes through bilateral means: see S Nakhooda, et al, ‘The UK. Fast-Start Finance 
Contribution.’, 2012, WRI and ODI Working Paper, <http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-
assets/publications-opinion-files/7662.pdf>, at 11-12. On another direction, the US Government seeks to increase 
the level of leveraged private capitals in its ODA climate finance flows. See T Fransen, et al, ‘The U.S. Fast-Start 
Finance Contribution’, 2012, WRI and ODI Working Paper, <http://www.odi.org/publications/6560-usa-america-




As the name suggests, bilateral climate finance is enacted between two countries, the 
contributor and the recipient, according to international foreign aid agreements
196
 and 
through the regulatory and executive role of national institutions. These are often Foreign 
Affairs Ministries, or specialized international development agencies. In some cases, national 




For the purposes of this chapter, the institutional role of bilateral entities in climate 
finance is straightforward. Indeed they represent a typical means of direct implementation of 
the financial obligations under the UNFCCC by industrialized states. In fact, under an 
international law, it is irrelevant how a state frames its internal bureaucracy and law to 
implement international obligations, unless those internal measures directly violate such 
international obligations.
198
 Nonetheless an emerging literature is evidencing the ‘donor-
bias’ characterizing the law of international development cooperation, stemming both from 
the powerful contractual position of contributors, and from the complex linkages between the 
national, transnational and international laws, which have historically limited the control and 
management of cooperation finance by recipient countries.
199
 Yet recent trends at 
international level, from the Monterrey Consensus to the likely establishment of the Third 
UN Conference on Financing for Development, are pointing towards new concepts and 
                                                     
196 P Dann and M Riegner, ‘Foreign Aid Agreements’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 
May 2011, online edition <http://opil.ouplaw.com>. Foreign aid agreements are typically executive agreements 
under public international law, which enter into force without need of ratification or other formal expression of 
states consent. 
197 For an overview of national approaches in climate finance see J Pickering, D Rossati et al., ‘Acting on Climate 
Finance Pledges: Inter-Agency Dynamics and Relationships with Aid in Contributor States’ Centre for Climate 
Economics & Policy, Australian National University, 2013 CCEP Working Paper No 1306. For instance, the 
German Development Bank, Kreditanstalt Für Wiederaufbau (KfW) is a relevant player both in climate and 
carbon finance. Similarly the French Caisse des Dépôts has an ad hoc subsidiary, CDC Climat, which deals 
exclusively with climate and carbon finance. An example of technical agency is the Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), which provides technical assistance to the German government also in its 
climate finance activities. 
198 This can be deduced a negativo from the principle stated by the PCJI that no state can adduce motives of 
domestic laws with a view of evading international obligations: in Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other 
Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in the Danzig Territory, Advisory Opinion [1932] Series A/B No 44, at 24. 
199 By way of illustration, P Dann, The Law of Development Cooperation: a Comparative Analysis of the World 
Bank, the EU and Germany (CUP 2013) at 216-218. The author individuates three normative layers made of 
foreign aid agreements, internal rules of donors on the modalities and finalities of financial transfers, and 




principles aiming at levelling the playfield between states.
200
 As will be seen in the following 
chapters, these crucial themes also shape the overhauling institutional structure of climate 
finance, as well as the internal regulations of international institutions. 
 
To provide but an explicatory overview, table 2 below –again based on a desktop 
review– lists the most relevant agencies and public entities from Annex I countries engaged 
in bilateral climate finance: 
Table 2: non-exhaustive list of Annex-I countries ministries agencies engaged 
in climate finance 
Country National institutions 
Australia AusAid 
 
Austria Austrian Development Agency 
Federal Ministry of EU and Int’l Affairs 
Belgium Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs 
Federal Trade and Development Cooperation 
Canada Canadian International Development Agency 
Denmark Danish Development Agency 
European Union EU Commission – Development and 
cooperation – EuropeAid 
Global Climate Change Alliance 
Finland Department of International Development 
Cooperation 
France Agence Francaise de developpement 
Department for International Cooperation 
CDC Climat 
Germany Federal Ministry of the Environment, Natural 
Resource Protection and Consumer 
Protection (BMZ) 
Kreditanstalt Für Wiederaufbau (KfW) 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) 
Greece Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
Ireland Irish Aid 
Italy Directorate General for Development 
Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Ministry for International Cooperation and 
Integration 
Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
                                                     




Japan International Cooperation Agency 
Japan Bank for International Cooperation 
Nippon Export and Investment Insurance 
New Energy Development Organisation 
Luxembourg Luxembourg Agency for Development 
Cooperation 
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Minister for Development Cooperation 
New Zealand New Zealand Aid Programme - Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade 
Norway Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation 
Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing 
Countries 
Portugal Portuguese Cooperation Institute 
Spain Spanish Agency of International Cooperation 
for Development 
Sweden Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Switzerland Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation 
United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
Department of Energy and Climate Change 
Department for International Development 
USA US Agency for International Development 
Millennium Challenge Corporation 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
3.3. Multilateral trust funds, public-private and inter-institutional partnerships 
The arena of non-UNFCCC institutions implementing international climate finance 
obligations is further populated by a wide array of entities of different nature. The flexibility 
in choosing the means for implementing UNFCCC obligations led countries, MDBs, UN 
agencies, and private corporations to set up flexible institutions and initiatives, often targeted 
to sectoral (e.g. deforestation or renewable energy) and specific regional areas. Again, these 






A prominent model of international institution is the multilateral trust fund. The term 
describes different kinds of financial arrangements with specific aims (e.g. climate change 
mitigation or adaptation), adopted either in binding and non-binding form under international 
law. The financial agreement often takes place between a group of contributor countries and 
a trustee; the latter being an entity tasked with the ownership of resources and the 
administration of the fund, according to a trust fund agreement, often covered under 
international law. As seen, all UNFCCC-based climate funds are multilateral trust funds, 
although they differ on many aspects, including the supervisory role of the COP/CMP and 
their internal governance.  
The multilateral trust fund model is the most recurrent also under other climate 
finance initiatives outside the UNFCCC, including those international partnerships 
comprising non-state members. From the purview of international institutional law it is 
noteworthy that not all multilateral trust funds can be interpreted as independent entities, and 
therefore as international institutions,
201
 especially when the constitutive document does not 
establish a separate executive organ for the fund’s management.
202
 Interestingly, however, 
virtually all climate-related multilateral trust funds envision some form of independent 
governance from its members, as well as administration facilities of the trustee in a way that 




Often multilateral trust funds are created contextually to a dedicated climate finance 
institution, which executes the fund via its internal governance and regulations. By way of 
illustration, the UN Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (UN-REDD) is an inter-agency UN 
partnership (between UNEP, UNDP and the Food and Agriculture Organization - FAO) 
                                                     
201 HG Schermers and NM Blokker, International Institutional Law (5 Revised. Brill 2011). 
202 See I Bantekas, Trust funds under International Law: Trustee Obligations of the United Nations and 
International Development Banks (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009) at 32, noticing that multilateral trust funds can 
range from separate bank accounts to international legal subjects. 




aimed at financing ‘readiness’ programmes and remunerate avoided deforestation in 
developing countries.
204
 The UNDP acts as trustee of its Multi-donor Trust Fund, which is 
operated by a Policy Board comprising both state and non-state entities.
205
  This case is 
explicatory in that the constitutive agreement of the UN-REDD programme is legally distinct 
from the trustee agreement stipulated between the UN-REDD creating agencies and the 
UNDP,
206
 as well as from the international agreements between the UNDP and individual 
donors. Hence the UN-REDD programme hinges on a triple layer of inter-institutional 
agreements: the first is between the constituting UN agencies, the second between the UNDP 
and the UN-REDD programme as a separate entity for trustee services, and the third between 
donors and the trustee. 
 
The case of the UN-REDD programme is significant also for highlighting inter-
institutional or public-private partnerships as other types of climate finance institution. Such 
partnerships are prompted by the need of states, international institutions and private actors 
to set up dedicated institutions with flexible governance structures or act on behalf of some 
contributor states lacking bilateral aid capacity. 
The most remarkable case in this category are the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs), 
created in 2008 as a response by MDBs to the 2005 G8 call for increased intervention in 
climate-related activities by multilateral financial institutions. Similarly to the UN-REDD 
programme, the CIFs display an international institutional structure hinging on an inter-
institutional agreement between MDBs, together with two separate multilateral trust funds, 
operated by participants committees and under the trustee services of the World Bank. While 
the CIFs were initially envisioned to work as a pilot programme to demonstrate climate 
                                                     
204 FAO, UNDP, UNEP Framework Document, 20 June 2008, <http://www.un-
redd.org/Portals/15/documents/publications/UN-REDD_FrameworkDocument.pdf>. 
205 Ibid, Annex 2. 
206 Memorandum of Understanding between the FAO, the UNDP and the UNEP, and the UNDP regarding the 





resilient development in selected recipient countries,
207
 they have been successful in sourcing 
USD 8 billion from contributing countries in less than five years of activity,
208
 thus 
surpassing by far the GEF’s dedicated combined finance in mitigation, adaptation and 
sustainable forest management.
209
 The relative success of the CIFs in mobilizing such a 
considerable amount of finance will be contextualized in the next chapter, when addressing 
the legal significance of the institutional structure of climate finance. Furthermore the 
internal governance and regulations of this partnership will be analyzed in depth in the 
second part of this work. 
 
While the CIFs are the fruit of agreement between public international entities, other 
climate finance institutions comprise also non-state actors either in their membership or in 
their executive organs. Such public-private partnerships have spawned in response to 
increased investment opportunities in mitigation due lower technology costs and to the 
demand of emissions reductions in carbon markets.  Concurrently, the same type of 
institutions opened membership also to civil society and indigenous organizations, given that 
their areas of intervention would have high impact on local livelihoods. While the UN-
REDD programme exemplifies the latter model of partnerships –because non-state 
representatives are members of its Policy Board– the Prototype Carbon Fund, established in 
1999 under the aegis of the World Bank, is one of the first public-private partnerships active 
in climate finance with the aim of proving the viability of offset emission reduction projects 
                                                     
207 World Bank, Climate Investment Funds: The Clean Technology Fund and the Strategic Climate Fund, 9 June 
2008, Doc. No 44168. 
208 CIFs, ‘Learning by Doing: the CIF’s Contribution to Climate Finance’, June 2014, at ix, 
<https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/content/cif-retrospective-full-report>.  
209 For the GEF fifth replenishment, the indicative allocation for climate mitigation amounted to USD 1.25 billion 
for sustainable forest management to USD 250 million: see GEF Evaluation Office, Evaluation of the GEF Focal 
Area Strategies, GEF/ME/C.43/Inf. 01, 17 October 2012, table 1 at 18. The level of pledges under the SCCF and 
LDFC stands to USD 227.5 and 420.8 million respectively: World Bank, ‘Status Report on the Least Developed 




in compliance with the UNFCCC and the KP.
210
 The Participants Committee of this trust 
fund comprises both government and multinational corporation representatives. 
 
As done with the other institutional types, the following table provides a non-
exhaustive list of multilateral trust funds and partnerships dedicated to climate finance based 






Table 3: non-exhaustive list of inter-institutional and public-private 
partnerships engaged in climate finance, and their constituencies 
Partnership institution (Managing/trustee 
entity) 
Members of executive bodies 
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (World 
Bank) 
States and private sector entities 
UN-REDD Programme States, UNDP, FAO, UNEP, Civil Society 
Organisations, and Indigenous People 
Organisations 
Climate Investment Funds (World Bank) MDBs and states 
Prototype Carbon Fund (World Bank) States and private sector entities 
Community Development Carbon Fund 
(World Bank) 
States and private sector entities 
Climate Public-private Partnership Fund – 
CP3 (Asian Development Bank) 
States, private sector entities, and the 
International Finance Corporation 
Congo Basin Forest Partnership and Fund 
(Africa Development Bank) 
States, Civil Society Organization, Economic 
Community of Central Africa States, African 
Development Bank, and COMIFAC 
Sustainable Energy for All (UNDP) MDBs, countries, and private sector entities 
Energy for All (Asian Development Bank) MDBs, NGOs, and private sector entities 
3.4. International implementing agencies 
To complete the overview of this chapter it is worth highlighting the role of international 
implementing agencies as a crucial sub-structure for the channeling of finance and 
implementation of climate-related projects. Their rationale stems from the fact that virtually 
all the multilateral climate funds addressed do not have the legal capacity or nor the mandate 
to design and directly implement projects in host countries. It would be virtually impossible 
                                                     
210 IBRD, Amended and Restated Instrument Establishing the Prototype Carbon Fund, Board of Executive 




for one global institution to identify, design and implement projects in different national or 
regional realities. Furthermore, project implementation requires extensive capacity in 
contracting out numerous activities, often via procurement with multinational or national 




Interestingly, the same international implementing agencies are often either MDBs or 
UN agencies, which are themselves climate finance institutions under the meaning given in 
this work. Thus, while they work as intermediaries of the finance at a horizontal governance 
level to other multilateral climate funds, at the same time they are accredited implementing 
entities under the funds’ regulatory frameworks.  
From a legal perspective, this double role of MDBs and other entities is relevant on 
two aspects whose implications will be further explored in the following chapters. First it 
adds regulatory complexity and generates both horizontal and vertical inter-institutional 
interaction given that for each project two regulatory frameworks apply: the one of the 
climate fund and the one of the implementing agency. Second and as noted in the case of the 
GEF, the application of two regulatory layers has been object of frustration by recipient 
countries and has led to alternative means of finance implementation via direct access, 
whereby it is the national administration of a recipient country that covers all the tasks 
traditionally assigned to the international implementing agency.  
 
In regards to the legal linkages between the multilateral climate funds and their 
implementing agencies, often the former display a complex accreditation process, based on 
specific requirements such as fiduciary standards or environmental and social safeguards that 
the implementing agency must already implement within its regulatory sphere. This has the 
effect of not only aligning the two regulatory layers, but also of forging an accountability 
relationship between the fund and the agency. Other normative linkages are also established 
                                                     




whenever the multilateral climate fund stipulates financial agreements with the 
implementing agency for a given project: this is indeed another point of contention between 
financing and recipient countries in that, for though channeled resources eventually end up in 
implementing a national project, nonetheless in such cases recipient governments do not 
legally own the sums.  
 
The conclusive table below lists the international implementing agencies currently 
accredited under multilateral climate funds. 
 
Table 4: multilateral climate funds and their accredited international 
implementing agencies. 
Climate finance institution / climate fund International implementing agencies 
GEF Asian Development Bank 
African Development Bank 
European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development 
FAO 
Inter-American Development Bank 




UN Industrial Development Organization 
World Bank 
GCF [not yet accredited] 
AF Asian Development Bank 
African Development Bank 
European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development 
FAO 
Inter-American Development Bank 




UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization 
World Bank 
World Food Programme 
World Meteorological Organization  
CIFs African Development Bank 




European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development 
Inter-American Development Bank 
World Bank 





Twenty years after the UNFCCC entered into force, the institutional structure of climate 
finance has developed into a complex architecture, which reflects the shifting political 
balances between industrialized and developing countries, as well as a response to the need 
of scaling up the level of finance via alternative institutional means to those under the 
international climate change regime. This chapter provided a systematic overview of the 
institutions, their rationales and setting within the global governance of climate finance, 
which prompts three general remarks. 
First, one must notice the dynamicity and institutional innovativeness within the 
UNFCCC/KP framework as a result of the shifting political balances between developed and 
developing countries. Not only have new funds and institutions been created in response to 
the specific needs and political uneasiness of developing countries with the GEF’s 
regulations and practice, but innovative means of environmental finance have been 
experimented. On one side, the CDM proved a successful means to facilitate public and 
private investment in mitigation projects in developing countries, despite depending on the 
volatile price levels of carbon markets. On the other, the Adaptation Fund was the first 
environmental fund to set up direct access modalities for accredited developing countries 
administrations, thus enhancing their ‘ownership’ of the funds compared to the more 
traditional intervention of international implementing agencies. 
Secondly and perhaps unexpectedly from a mere reading of the climate Conventions 
and their subsequent instruments, the overall picture is that the operational entities of the 




institutions, but they also mobilize considerably less resources. Non-UNFCCC institutions, 
therefore, not only act as key players in the implementation of UNFCCC financial 
obligations, but through their practice contribute de facto to the implementation and 
regulation of crucial aspects of climate finance, such as conditionalities, access and 
disbursement modalities, accountability and redress, and so on. 
Third, the multiplicity of institutions goes hand in hand with the mixed roles of MDBs 
and other international institutions acting both as climate finance institutions and 
implementing agencies of multilateral trust funds. While multiplicity and complexity are 
recurrent features in global environmental governance, such contextual and mixed roles of 
some institutions appears to be a peculiarity of climate finance governance. 
As will be seen in the next chapter, these specific features of its institutional 
governance make climate finance an area of institutional complexity, characterized by 








THE INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE OF CLIMATE FINANCE 
AND THE LAW 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Da mihi factum, dabo tibi jus (‘give me the fact, I will give you the law’).  
This Latin maxim
1
  succinctly summarizes the purpose of this chapter, which is of 
legal clarification and discovery. While the previous chapter provided a systematic overview 
of the institutional structure of climate finance, the present will delve into a legal analysis, 
motivated by the normative consequences arising from the spontaneous proliferation of 
institutions engaged in climate finance. 
The first two sections will propose a thorough interpretative and conceptual analysis 
of the current institutional structure. As the argument goes, before questioning whether 
actual legal practices are springing from this area of governance, two conceptualizations are 
necessary: first, a ‘heterodox’ approach, which resorts to ideas and conceptions outside 
international law, and which interprets climate finance institutions as entities exercising 
public authority, will be preferred to ‘orthodox’ view of states consent-based international 
law. Second, in order to overcome the problem of generality and contestability of 
‘heterodox’ theories, it will be argued that two specific dynamics take place across the 
governance of climate finance: on one hand climate finance institutions seek to promote 
complementarity with other overlapping institutions, on the other they compete in order to 
catalyze and channel finance in a context of scarce public financial resources. 
                                                     
1 Even if applies to judicial practice and the role of the judge in adversary proceedings, it can also be valid for the 
activity of jurists in general. See Western Sahara, [1975] ICJ Rep. 12, at 138 (separate opinion of Judge De 
Castro): “In the words of the traditional axiom of procedure, the court says to the Party: da mihi factum, dabo tibi 
jus. The parties put forward facts and submit the evidence that they consider favourable to their claims, and the 




Both the heterodox approach and the two dynamics will underpin the legal analysis of 
the third section, which will attempt answering the question of whether some legal practices 
(‘intimations’) promoting complementarity are present in the inter-institutional dynamics 
between climate finance institutions. 
 
 
1. INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY: CLIMATE FINANCE GOVERNANCE 
AS INTERNATIONAL COMPOSITE ADMINISTRATION 
What emerged from the outline of the previous chapter is that the institutional landscape of 
climate finance is multiple, multilevel, and heterarchical. Its multiplicity refers to the 
different nature of the entities involved.
2
 This is particularly challenging under the purview 
of international law, as it is unclear whether some of them can be regarded international 
organizations (IOs) with their ensued functional legal personality and, therefore, 
international legal subjects: it will be argued below that this is one of the ‘cognitive’ limits of 
international institutional law in encompassing certain institutional and inter-institutional 
phenomena, which justifies looking beyond the boundaries of international law. 
Climate finance governance is multilevel, because its institutions belong to 
international, national legal systems and to transnational regulatory spheres alike. 
Furthermore, this feature is inherently linked with the lack of any hierarchical relationships 
among institutions. This is a common characteristic across many areas of global governance
3
 
and in international law,
4
 meaning that there is no central authority to delegate coherently the 
executive powers and functions between the various entities. 
 
                                                     
2 Stewart, Rudyk, and Mattes, ‘Governing a Fragmented Climate Finance Regime’, in H Cisse, DD Bradlow and 
B Kingsbury (eds), The World Bank Legal Review: 3 (World Bank Publications 2011) 363-88, at 371-5. 
3 See S Cassese, “Administrative Law without the State - The Challenge of Global Regulation” (2004) 37 New 
York University Journal of International Law and Politics 663, at.670-3. From an accountability perspective see 
N Krisch, ‘The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 247, 
at 249-50. 
4 J Klabbers, ‘Setting the Scene’ in J Klabbers, A Peters and G Ulfstein (eds), The Constitutionalization of 




Three critical points can be made. Firstly, geographical and functional overlaps 
among institutions in relation to both mitigation and adaptation activities are increasingly 
relevant as the delivered amount of finance from Annex II countries should increase. Such 
intersection of institutional activities had already negative repercussions on the disbursement 
of funds and caused frustrations among developing countries and other recipient entities. To 
give some examples, in the field of adaptation finance the Adaptation Fund, the UNFCCC 
Special Climate Change Fund, the Green Climate Fund (GCF), and the Strategic 
Programmes for Climate Resilience of the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) are alternative 
finance channels that developing countries can resort to for adaptation purposes. As for 
mitigation initiatives, the panorama is made more complex due to the high number of 
thematic funds (e.g. renewable energy, energy efficiency, and avoided deforestation), funds 
investing on Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) activities,
5
 and the prominent role of 
traditional development finance by multilateral and bilateral financial institutions. Referring 
to just the main global climate funds, the GCF, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) Trust 
Fund and Earth Fund, and the Clean Technology Fund of the CIFs share the same broad 
mandates in mitigation financing. The Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest 
Degradation (REDD+) from developing countries mechanism, an emerging mechanism
6
 
aimed at avoiding carbon emissions from deforestation and unsustainable management, is 
also a common field of intervention by different institutions, including the Forest Investment 
Programme of the CIFs, the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility of the World Bank, the UN-
REDD Programme and the GEF Trust Fund. 
 
Secondly, the institutional landscape comprises other actors involved in the process of 
disbursement acting as ‘final managers’ of resources: these actors comprise private entities, 
                                                     
5 They generate tradable carbon credits according to Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
6 The UNFCCC COP has not yet established it as a fully-fledged mechanism. It is however an agenda item under 
UNFCCC negotiations for a new agreement on the climate: Decision 1/CP.16, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 




national administrations and, in particular, international implementing agencies.
7
 Their role 
has often proved contentious because at times such agencies act as climate finance 
institutions proper, thus covering a double (and sometimes conflicting) role along climate 
finance flows. 
In particular the World Bank, other regional financial institutions, the UNEP and 
UNDP are often eligible implementing agencies of various trust funds.
8
 In addition, the 
World Bank offers administrative capacity and trustee services to several funds, including 
the GCF, the CIFs and the GEF Trust Fund. While such a mixed model can offer integration 
and flexibility among entities, at the same time it can generate conflicts of interests and 





This feature and the institutional complexity stemming from the first point above 
entail the further overlapping of potentially applicable regulations for each programme or 
project. Such regulations can be found in the ‘secondary law’ of climate finance 
institutions,
10
 such as the Operational Policies of the World Bank and other multilateral 
development banks, access and disbursement modalities of multilateral trust funds, 
environmental and social safeguards of multilateral trust funds and international 
implementing agencies alike. This high level of regulatory complexity has been often 
questioned both in terms of overall efficiency in disbursement
11
 and of fairness of the 
                                                     
7 See Chapter II above. 
8 Ibid.. 
9 A Ghosh and N Woods, ‘Developing Country Concerns about Climate Finance Proposals Priorities, Trust, and 
the Credible Donor Problem’ in RB Stewart, B Kingsbury and B Rudyk (eds), Climate Finance: Regulatory and 
Funding Strategies for Climate Change and Global Development (NYU Press 2009). For the specific case of the 
GEF see J. Werksman, “Consolidating Global Environmental Governance: New Lessons from the GEF?” in N. 
Kanie and P.M. Haas (eds), Emerging Forces in Environmental Governance (United Nations University 2004) 
35. 
10 M Benzing, ‘International Organizations or Institutions, Secondary Law’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, online edition, 2007. 
11 Hutala, A and Ambrosi, P, ‘Making the Most of Public Finance for Climate Action’, World Bank issue brief, 




process vis-à-vis the often limited capacities of least developing countries in understanding 




Finally, it was noted that the majority of finance delivery takes place through 
institutions that are not ‘climate-specific’, and do not present any direct legal delegation 
from the climate treaties, but instead incorporate independently mitigation and adaptation 
finance in their broad development agenda. 
Overall, the current institutional structure of climate finance appears to be rooted in a 
pluralist model,
13
 where leges speciales of public international law –stemming from climate 
treaties and treaties establishing IOs– intersect with other normative systems, including the 
‘secondary laws’ of international institutions,
14
 national administrative laws and 
transnational regulations. While the core normative basis of action can be found in the 
climate treaties, the implementation of financial obligations is de facto delegated to 
international institutions of different kind and to national entities acting by international or 
transnational means. 
1.1. From fragmentation to regime complex 
1.1.1. Fragmentation and ‘management’ 
For international lawyers the recent developments in many areas of global and transnational 
governance have been “exciting, but also destabilizing”.
15
 
In our context and in analogy with the artistic revolutions at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, the picture coming out from the outline in the previous chapter resembles 
more a Picasso than a Raphael. Contrary to the harmonious canons of the Renaissance artist, 
here shapes are abstract, deformed, and springing from multiple perspectives. As in the early 
                                                     
12 See Chapter IV below, at 170. 
13 N Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: the Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (OUP 2012). 
14 Benzing, ‘International Organizations or Institutions, Secondary Law’, supra note 10 . 
15 J Lin and J Scott, ‘Looking Beyond the International: Key Themes and Approaches of Transnational 




twentieth century cubist artworks have shocked their contemporary viewers, the same seems 
to have happened in the last two decades, when international lawyers have been (and still 
are) reacting before the canvas of the complex governance in an increasingly globalized 
world. 
Against this background, international lawyers have initially reacted by recognizing a 
‘threat’ in the fragmentation of international law and jurisdiction.
16
 The International Law 
Commission (ILC), prompted by a report by Hafner,
17
 spent several years on identifying and 
rationalizing the “difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion” of international 
law, and concluded its work with a conspicuous report about the possible conflicts and 
interpretative techniques.
18
 Interestingly, the report reflected the major preoccupation by the 
doctrine on the issues stemming from the contemporary existence of international legal 
norms, on their conflicts, and the legal techniques available to solve them: importantly, the 
institutional dimension of fragmentation was willingly left out.
19
 
Apart from some exceptions,
20
 the ILC approach reflects the general neglect by 
international lawyers about the institutional problems of fragmentation, while concentrating 
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on either the normative and jurisdictional dimensions.
21
 Some recent scholarship on the issue 
seems to have embraced the ILC’s final view that, overall, normative fragmentation is a 
structural feature of an expanded international legal system and that it actually does not and 
should not subvert the way international lawyers make use of their interpretative 
techniques.
22





fragmentation towards desirable ends. 
The approach here departs from this latter trend. While sharing the idea of a structural 
fragmentation of international law, it is posited that its institutional dimension necessitates 
further conceptualization and discovery of extant laws rather than concentrating on how 
institutional complexity ought to be ‘managed’. The latter, in fact, is an object of political 
contestation more than legal enquiry.
25
 Therefore, in the following sub-paragraph a step back 
into the interpretation of the ‘facts’ of climate finance will be proposed. 
 
1.1.2. The regime complex of climate finance 
Looking again at the scattered picture of climate finance the problem of its geographical, 
functional and regulatory overlaps, the question of what kind of institutional fragmentation is 
taking place arises. The finding here is that it is more correct to use the concepts of 
‘institutional complexity’ and ‘regime complex’ than ‘fragmentation’. Fragmentation, in 
fact, presupposes a certain degree of original unity in a given issue area. However, as the two 
previous chapters have demonstrated, the substantive and institutional developments of 
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climate finance have never been legally framed in a unitary form or under an overarching 
normative umbrella. 
‘Institutional complexity’ and ‘regime complex’ are concepts stemming from the 
‘institutionalist’ strand of international relations theory,
26
 which as the name suggests 
originally looked at institutions as devices for states to maximize their own gains (i.e. 
reducing transaction costs) in certain cooperative areas and according to rational behavior.
27
 
A key anticipation of this scholarship before future developments in global governance was 
to envision the existence of ‘regimes’ as arenas where new modes of cooperation could take 
place. In the words of Krasner: 
“Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given 
area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. 
Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are 
specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are 
prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.”
28
 
While from a legal standpoint this definition of regime is overly broad, as it 
encompasses also non-legal phenomena, nonetheless it has the merit to provide a framework 
for understanding some salient facts of the complex governance of climate finance. In 
particular it is noteworthy that principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures are 
also object of international institutional law.  
Broadening the perspective, climate finance indeed boils down to a bundle of 
“recognized patterns of practice around which expectations converge”,29 where such 
‘patterns of practice’ are the regulations and instruments used to source and distribute the 
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finance, and the ‘expectation’  the need to scale-up finance streams, as exemplified by 
the non-binding pledge under the Copenhagen Accord. Despite the existence of the 
international legal obligations on finance under the international climate change regime, 
the previous chapter has unveiled how other international practices, often embedded into 
other regimes (such as foreign aid via bilateral agencies, concessional loans by 
multilateral development banks, or equity investment through public-private 
partnerships) are contextually effective in the same activity. 
Under these new lenses climate finance therefore appears to hinge on what has been 
recently defined a ‘regime complex’,
30
 a concept covering that “[…] continuum between 
comprehensive international regulatory institutions, which are usually focused on a single 
integrated legal instrument, at one end of a spectrum and highly fragmented arrangements at 
the other.”
31
 As the name suggests, regime complexes “[…] are loosely coupled sets of 
specific regimes”, spontaneously raising as a “[…] result of many choices […] at different 
times and on different specific issues”.
32
 Rather than trickling down solely from the 
UNFCCC, the substantive regulations applicable across different areas of climate finance 
have been originated also by institutions other than those operating the UNFCCC Financial 
Mechanism. Nonetheless, the same institutions have interacted, cooperated and at times 
joined their efforts towards similar ends. For instance, the GEF is the result of cooperation of 
three institutions (UNEP, UNDP and the World Bank), yet working under accountability and 
guidance of the UNFCCC COP. Similarly, the Climate Investment Funds are the result of the 
cooperative efforts between multilateral development banks. 









 and so does the regime complex 
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of climate finance with the ensuing issues of its geographical, functional and regulatory 
overlaps.
37
 To be sure, political scientists who have first explored this area have categorized 
different strategies for linkages, and questioned the reasons and the modes for institutions to 
conflict or cooperate between each other.
38
 
Conversely, international lawyers have only recently started grappling with the 
institutional facts deriving from regime complexes and with different methods and results. 
To come with three examples, when dealing with the institutional fragmentation of 
climate governance, Van Asselt succinctly highlights some cases of cooperation between the 
multilateral environmental agreements’ (MEAs) Secretariats and their decision-making 
bodies. However, he also recognizes that the area is under-researched and fraught with 
informality and unclear institutional mandates.
39
 
Also Karen Scott’s focus is on a similar object.
40
 Under the lens of a “governance 
strategy” of cooperation, she discovers and categorizes three types of formal institutional 
linkages that MEAs secretariats, as part of an environmental regime complex, have set 
among each other and with other entities participating to the regimes complex: namely, 
formal agreements via Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs), cooperative agreements 
amounting “full legal” or “nested arrangements”, and linkages between MEAs compliance 
mechanisms.
41
 The author’s approach unveils some neglected types of international 
environmental instruments, mostly of non-binding nature, which nonetheless contribute 
substantively to the ‘management’ of overlapping MEAs, with the coming risks of shifting 
away such management from states to international entities.
42
 Yet, clearly the author’s task is 
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to shed light on how to ‘manage’ MEAs linkages and conflicts, which, as stated above, it is a 
‘rushed step’ for a legal analysis, which would rather benefit from questioning what law is 
emerging from inter-institutional practices. 
A third approach is proposed by Ulfstein, who questions whether the institutional 
complexity stemming from increased cooperation among states should move towards forms 
of hierarchic constitutional orderings. Expectedly, given the state of affair in the 
international legal system, his answer is negative: 
“The most ambitious way of ‘constitutionalizing’ international governance would be 
to integrate existing institutions to the extent they overlap or compete. One could also 
imagine a less grand programme by retaining the institutions, but establishing a 
hierarchy between them. However, states show no inclination to move towards such a 
comprehensive international institutional system, not even within specialized regimes 
such as international environmental law”
43
 
Nonetheless the author’s final suggestions rejoin with Scott’s modes of enquiry, by 
arguing that “[a] less ambitious strategy to avoid the difficulties involved in a fragmented 
international institutional framework is to establish arrangements of complementarity”.
44
 
1.2. The limits of an orthodox approach 
While what Ulfstein defines as a ‘less ambitious strategy’ will work as basis for an enquiry 
into inter-institutional arrangements in climate finance, his ‘orthodox’ approach to 
international institutions shows several limits in grasping the facts and problems emerging 
from the regime complex of climate finance. In other words, it is posited that using the prism 
of orthodoxy in this context exposes some ‘cognitive’ restrains inherent to international law, 
which provide little understanding of the emerging normative realities of global governance. 
The lex specialis of international institutional law is indeed limited in grasping the 
institutional and regulatory practices and instruments of regime complexes as relevant legal 
facts under the law, where for the latter it is meant those events which are incapable to wield 
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any normative effect unless an existing rule of the international legal system allows for it.
45
 
To be sure, such limits are to be found on the discipline of legal personality of international 
institutions, and validity of their regulatory outputs. 
While for orthodoxy it is here meant the whole body of scholarly efforts to understand 
institutional realities from within the international legal system, this and the next sub-
paragraphs will justify why a heterodox approach –thus resorting to concepts and principles 
from outside the international legal toolbox– is better suited to ‘imbue with legal 
significance’ the same facts stemming from the regime complex of climate finance. The 
latter expression means that, while heterodox approaches have the merit of extending the 
cognitive capacity under the law, nonetheless the realities they try to address do not upgrade 
their status to fully-fledged legal facts, because there is no established modern legal system 
buttressing them. 
This is the limit of heterodoxy compared to orthodoxy, which will lead to the claim at 
the end of this chapter that, rather than ‘emergence of’, it is only possible to speak of 
‘intimations of’ inter-institutional law in global governance.
46
 
1.2.1. International legal personality of international institutions 
International legal orthodoxy is limited because it addresses the question of regime 
complexes under the lex specialis of international institutional law:
47
 namely, that body of 




The first cognitive limit of international law is that only IOs can be bestowed with 
international personality and capacity under the international legal order,
49
 meaning that by 
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reverse logic public international law does not have ‘cognition’ of other institutional entities 
than IOs. By juxtaposing such a limited extension against the types of institutions engaged in 
climate finance some entities (e.g. the World Bank) appear to be fully-fledged IOs (and 
international legal subjects), while others stand on the blurred boundaries between being IOs 
or other forms of ‘soft organization’ between states.
50
 
Despite the lack of a set definition,
51
 the pedigree of an IO is, in fact, generally based 
on three criteria: namely, that an IO i) must be generated under an international agreement; 
ii) have an organ with a will of its own; and iii) be established under international law.
52
 The 
openness and indeterminacy of these criteria are quite intuitive, and, arguably, have the 
effect of blurring the cognitive boundaries of international law, so that some scholars have 




Although the matter is very much debated, suffice here to briefly highlight three core 
points. Firstly, an international agreement need not be a treaty, but can assume different 
forms, even oral, which implies that the range of agreements establishing IOs is broader than 
under a formalist understanding.
54
 As a result, the cognitive boundary is blurred by the fact 
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that climate finance institutions not established under a treaty (e.g. the Green Climate Fund) 




Second, it is difficult to practically establish when a decision by an organ can be 
expression of its own autonomous will or the one of its members.
56
 As will be seen below, 
this has several implications on the law-making and capacity to create obligations by 
international institutions, for the reason that some cooperative agreements between states, 
even establishing decision-making organs, might be interpreted as not constituting a separate 
entity with its own will. An example in climate finance is the Forest Carbon Partnership 
Facility, or other multilateral trust funds established by the World Bank, because it is 
uncertain whether the decisions of its trust fund Committees constitute mere agreements 
between state members or a separate act by the Facility itself.
57
 Particularly in this case, to 
render the matter more uncertain, the institution does not have any legal capacity and is 
formally established by an act of the World Bank. 
Finally, it is contested whether instruments adopted by international institutions, such 
as COP decisions, can be interpreted as legally-binding under international law, particularly 
when they establish multilateral institutions.
58
 Therefore, it can be questioned whether some 
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constitutive instruments of climate finance institutions (the Adaptation Fund, for instance) 
are established under international law, as a pre-condition to be international legal subjects. 
1.2.2. Institutional regulatory outputs 
The second cognitive limit of international law vis-à-vis the realities of regime complexes 
relates to the regulatory outputs of climate finance institutions. 
Such institutions hold a relevant degree of authority, and exert executive and 
regulatory functions in the international sphere in a manner that can potentially affect the 
legitimate interests and the legal status of states and other actors. To make some examples, 
the access and disbursement regulations of multilateral trust funds, such as the Adaptation 
Fund or the GEF, impose rules on how pledged resources must be split between eligible 
recipients;
59
 the CDM rules on the project cycle –adopted by the Kyoto Protocol’s CMP and 
further regulated by the Executive Board of the CDM– impose a detailed process to be 
followed both by national administrations and private actors in order to register the project 
under the CDM and benefit from the issuance of emissions credits;
60
 finally, the World 
Bank’s Operational Policies and Bank Procedures, despite being binding only to the staff of 
the Bank, nonetheless contain ‘normative prescriptions’ which, when implemented, can 




Such exercise of authority and the ensuing normative nature of institutional 
regulations do not constitute legal facts under the purview of general international law, 
because the latter does not attribute legal validity to the ‘secondary law’ of international 
organizations. Of course, under international institutional law and in specific treaties 
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constituting IOs it is well possible that member states recognize as binding certain regulatory 
outputs: yet, popular cases aside,
62
 this is an exception in international practice. 
To be more specific, the ‘cognitive’ limit of international law in relation to 
institutional regulatory outputs can be further divided into two issues. The first is the 
potential international law-making role that climate finance institutions might exert when 
setting standards on and between states. The second relates to their capability of generating 
legal obligations in international law. Distinguishing between law-making by an institution 
and the possibility of forging international legal obligations between such institution and 
other international entities is crucial to avoid confusion between two very distinct 
phenomena.  
 
As the very first sentence of a landmark book on the subject states, international law-
making: 
“[…] is about the constitutive processes of contemporary international law -how 
international law is made. It does not give an account of the traditional sources or 
theories of international law, but identifies the processes, participants and instruments 
employed in the making of international law. It examines the mechanisms and 




An important aspect of international law-making is its general character: if not exactly 
amounting to ‘international legislation’,
64
 international law-making should nevertheless be 
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Understood in this way, climate finance institutions could in theory act as law-makers 
via their regulatory activity, by participating in the formation of international legal standards 
in climate finance. However, as noted in the first chapter, reality shows that the applicable 
international law on the matter is still very general compared to its implementation via 
diffused institutional regulation. Furthermore, the practices and regulations of its institutions 
are so diverse in form and content that a single pattern of collective law-making cannot be 
found, so that they can hardly support the interpretation of general international obligations 
or even serve as valuable evidence of emerging opinion juris and practice. 
 
As to the second issue, the creation of obligations under international law can be 
ascribed to a fact or an act that the international legal system recognizes as having legal 
validity and obligatory force.
66
 Differently from the practices of international law-making, 




In this regard, it is evident that the regulatory instruments of climate finance 
institutions can hardly contain international obligations, while only a small number of these 
institutions - recognized as IOs, such as the World Bank and other multilateral development 




Some international legal scholars seek to overcome this second ‘cognitive’ limit of 
international law by theorizing that the regulatory instruments of international institutions 
can nevertheless amount to a form of ‘soft law’. Yet, by doing so, they end up merely 
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describing the processes of law-making from other angles, and, therefore, fail to extend the 
boundaries of international law in terms of its ‘cognition’ of external facts. 
Amongst its various meanings,
69
 here the term ‘soft law’ refers only to the nature of 
the ‘secondary law’ of an international institution:
70
 such as decisions, recommendations, 
guidelines and policies of an executive body acting within its constituted powers.
71
 Those 
who claim for the existence of ‘soft law’ as a ‘quasi-legal’ source of public international law 
broadly argue that, though the hard sources of international law do not encompass the 
secondary law of international institutions, secondary instruments can nevertheless hold 
“some normative significance”.
72
 One notable case is, for instance, the United Nations 
General Assembly’s resolutions, which can work as evidence or interpretation of existing 
law,
73
 as opinion juris of general international law
74
 or as a preparatory step to further 
codification by a future treaty.
75
  
If applied to the object of this work, the concept of ‘soft law’ is useful to understand 
the complexity of the regulatory processes taking place in climate finance: indeed, the 
operational policies, access modalities, eligibility criteria, etc., adopted by climate finance 
institutions are de facto complied with by state and non-state actors, and are often converted 
into contractual obligations between the financing institution and the recipient state. 
However, if that is its contribution, the ‘soft law’ idea in this context eventually boils 
down to a descriptive effort. As in the case of viewing international institutions from a law-
making perspective, ‘soft law’ does not provide useful cognitive tools under the law to 
                                                     
69 Boyle, ‘Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law', supra note 58. 
70 M Benzing, ‘International Organizations or Institutions, Secondary Law’  Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law’, online ed., 2007. 
71 Usually, a further distinction is traced between acts having ‘internal’ or ‘external’ validity of an IO. See A 
Broches, ‘International legal aspects of the operations of the World bank’ (1959) 98 Recueil des Cours 297, at 
302. Contra see Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-makers, supra note 65, at 63.  
72 Boyle, ‘Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law’, supra note 58, at 902. See also PM 
Dupuy, ‘Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment’ (1990) 12 Michigan Journal of International 
Law 420, at 435; and AT Guzman and TL Meyer, ‘International Soft Law’ (2010) 2 Journal of Legal Analysis 
171, at 173. 
73 Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law, supra note 63, at 226. See also Legality of the threat of 
the use of force, Advisory Opinion, [1996] ICJ Reps, para 70. 
74 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, [1986] ICJ Reps. 14, para 
188. 
75 RR Baxter, ‘International Law in “Her Infinite Variety”’ (1980) 29 International & Comparative Law 




address the issue of the authority and regulatory effects of the activities of climate finance 
institutions. 
1.3. Heterodox propositions 
1.3.1. A cursory mapping 
If those are the limits of international law under an orthodox view against the realities of the 
expanding authority and regulatory activities of international institutions, it is also true that 
international lawyers and legal theorists have seamlessly tried to fill the gaps by resorting to 
heterodoxy, by integrating or aligning the orthodox view to principles and concepts taken 
from outside the toolbox of public international law. 
 
Admittedly, the swathes of heterodox frameworks are vast even on the more specific 
questions of this chapter. To provide but an inchoate mapping, heterodox doctrines seek to 
fill this gap in two main ways. On one hand, they rely on different streams of international 
relations, focusing on states’ compliance to multilateral regimes and global regulation;
76
 on 
the relevance of ‘government networks’ and the ‘hard impact for their soft law’;
77
 or on ‘the 
practice of legality’ by all concerned actors, where law-making and compliance are 
considered as part of a single comprehensive ‘jurisgenerative’ process.
78
 On the other hand, 
heterodox scholars have adopted innovative theoretical frameworks, transferring discourses 
of other legal systems or branches of the law to global governance. In particular three recent 
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attempts directly tackle the issue of the expanded authorities of international institutions:
79
 
the Global Administrative Law (GAL); the Informal International Law-making (IN-LAW); 




The GAL strand has been incepted by a seminal article in 2005,
81
 generating a wealth 
of scholarly studies and debates.
82
 The starting point of GAL is that “[...] much of global 
governance (particularly global regulatory governance) can usefully be analysed as 
administration.”
83
 Accordingly, the cornerstones of modern domestic administrative laws 
(legality, reason giving, review of administrative decisions, etc…) find progressive 
application in a “global administrative space”
84
 populated by international, domestic and 
transnational regulatory actors. Administrative law principles in the global sphere are 
justified by the practice of global administrative entities and according to the need of 
securing accountability and efficacy of global administration.
85
 A clear consequence of GAL 
is that it unbundles the action of global administrations from states’ sovereignty and their 
consent,
86
 by way of different expressions of ‘publicness’ that work as monads or micro-
administrative regimes.
87
 GAL authors do not claim for the existence of a monolithic and 
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independent legal system, rather they argue that practices of ‘publicness’ are emerging 
among different regulatory regimes. 
 
The IN-LAW research project
88
 adopts a different approach to the study of regulatory 
processes in international governance. Pauwelyn
89
 remarks that the law-making character of 
modern governance processes is informal on three stances, when paralleled to international 
law: namely on i) its outputs, ii) processes and iii) actors. Therefore, IN-LAW aims to go 
beyond the traditional sources of international law, law-making institutions, and concepts of 
international legal personality.  
With such features, the proponents of IN-LAW frame a peculiar relationship between 
the informality of governance instruments and international law. In contrast to the idea of 
‘soft law’, they argue that the watershed between the legal and non-legal should be 
maintained in abstract. However, “[…] since international law is not defined with reference 
to formalities, the informal nature of IN-LAW should not automatically disqualify it as 
international law.”
90
 Rather, two options are on the table: either merger and acquisition by 
international law of parts of IN-LAW (including some forms of ‘secondary law’ of IOs), or 
entrenchment of international law, as a legal system overwhelmingly based on states “thin 
consent”, opposed to the “thick consensus” of contemporary stakeholders and regulators in 
global governance.
91
 Arguably, the first option would entail a theoretical rethinking of the 
sources of international law, while the second re-proposes mutatis mutandis a similar 
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The third and final approach put forward by some German scholars stresses the need 
to focus on the exercise of international public authority (IPA) in its many forms, which, as 
seen, constitutes the starting point for exposing the ‘cognitive’ limits of international law in 
climate finance governance. It is posited that the IPA approach is extremely helpful to 
address the normative relevance as law of the institutional dynamics occurring in regime 
complexes, such as the one of climate finance, particularly when they suggest the use 
‘international composite administration’ as a viable concept. 
As Von Bogdandy, Dann and Goldmann put it, the gargantuan literature on 
governance is deficient from a public law perspective, where for public law is meant the law 
directing and limiting the exercise of power towards individuals and other public or private 
entities. Public law beyond the state should also include elements of constitutional, 
administrative, and international institutional principles.
93
 Hence, if one interprets the many 
instruments and decisions adopted by international institutions as a manifestation of public 
authority –as the power to unilaterally modify the individual freedoms and legal status of 
groups, and other collective entities–
94
 it is possible to vest with legal significance their 
normative role both outside and inside the formal sources of international law. More 
specifically: 
“[…] international institutional law should […] (1) reconstruct the exercise of 
international public authority by using comparative perspectives on the administrative 
scholarship; (2) develop a constitutionalist framework and proposing standards for 
critique concerning the procedures, instruments and accountability of international 
institutions when engaging in the exercise of public authority; and (3) reflect 
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The third point on the purposes of an IPA approach to international institutional law 
well suits the conceptual needs raised in the context of climate finance as regime complex. 
Indeed this is valid on two levels.  
First, the ‘publicness’ of the climate finance regime complex is justified not only by 
its foundational international legal obligations in the UNFCCC, but also –when these 
obligations do not apply (e.g. multilateral development banks)– by the public nature of the 
institutions sourcing and distributing the finance, where this nature can be deduced from the 
constitutive instruments and the subjects constituting each institution. 
Second, the problem of geographic, functional and regulatory overlaps among climate 
finance institutions, coupled with the limit of the ‘regime complex’ idea as merely 
descriptive from a legal perspective, do call for a ‘systematic reflection’ on the inter-
institutional dynamics occurring in the field with the intent of ascertaining or discovering 
emerging legal patterns. This ‘systematic reflection’ will be done in the next section 2 below 
in this chapter. 
 
Before that, the following sub-paragraph will argue that the concept of ‘international 
composite administration’ –as developed by IPA scholars– is better suited to provide an 
understanding of the legal significance of the governance of climate finance. 
1.3.2. International composite administration 
Above it has been argued that the multilevel, multiple and heterarchical nature of the 
institutional structure of climate finance constitutes what the international relations 
scholarship defines a ‘regime complex’. Here a legal conceptual framework will be adopted: 
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The concept, which stems from scholarly attempts to frame the complex 
administrative structures of the EU model, seeks to provide a descriptive framework to 
“facilitate understanding the operations conducted within and by […] multi-layered 
structures.”
97
 As the authors define it: 
“Composite administration takes place when a plurality of legally independent public 
authorities pursues aims of public concern as a common task. These authorities are, in 
contrast to those of a federal State, not part of a comprehensive body politic. […]The 
common operation is principally based on the idea of a division of labor. Hence, 
functional cooperation and organizational separation form structural principles on 
which a composite administration rests.”
98
 
The systematic outline of the previous chapter highlighted these very features in 
climate finance, which, after being incepted under an international convention, is currently a 
understood as a ‘common task’ shared by multifarious institutions. 
 
A second trait of international composite administrations is codependence: 
“Standards, be they binding legal acts or soft law requirements, are not only 
developed, but also implemented in a cooperative way. Especially implementation as 
composite administration is characterized by manifold forms of interaction with 
respect to the exchange of information, procedural alliances or even forms of 
institutional combinations in order to ensure implementation and to avoid the 
prisoners' dilemma. In effect, while the organizations are legally separate, their 
exercise of public authority can often not be attributed to one level.”
99
 
For though the overlapping regulatory frameworks show that there is scarce 
cooperative development of standards in climate finance, nonetheless the interaction between 
the institutions has produced ‘procedural alliances’ and ‘institutional combinations’. Two 
examples are the Global Environment Facility and the Climate Investment Funds, which are 
the combined efforts of independent UN Agencies and multilateral development banks 
respectively. 
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The vantage point of international composite administration is its legal significance 
under the idea of the exercise of public authority beyond the state, because: 
“[t]he concept does not focus on powers, organizational structures or the relation of 
legal norms as such, but rather on bureaucratic cooperation and the interaction of 
institutions in the exercise of public authority. At the same time, one should note that 
the concept does not focus on processes within one organization but encompasses the 
entirety of cooperation between international institutions and member States.”
100
 
As argued in the previous chapter,
101
 the common goal of scaling up climate finance 
under the Copenhagen Accord and the openness of the UNFCCC provisions justifies treating 
institutions of different nature both in their horizontal and vertical relationships as part of 
one single cooperative effort. 
 
Yet, despite institutional structure of climate finance matches the idea of an 
international composite administration, there are two shortcomings that, taken together, call 
for discovering and addressing the specific dynamics occurring among these institutions. 
First, the idea of ‘international composite administration’ is too general to represent 
more than a promising starting point for legal analysis. Indeed, the recognition that an area of 
governance as an international composite administration necessitates further investigation 
and discovery of the legal instruments and practices under each identified area of 
governance. To be sure, the limit of generalization is present in all the heterodox approaches 
outlined here: indeed each one aspires to provide an overarching framework able to 
encompass institutions, regulatory instruments, and governance realities very different from 
each other. Furthermore, their added value as frameworks to overcome the ‘cognitive’ limits 
of international law faces strong limitations: as argued above, if international law does not 
recognize as legal facts certain institutional realities and events of global governance, to a 
certain extent the same limit applies to heterodox frameworks, because they are still 
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incapable to engender fundamental principles able to recognize ‘facts with legal 
significance’ as legal facts proper of a modern legal system. 
A second shortcoming of this concept is that it is admittedly under-theorized outside 
the realm of EU law and governance, and that the principles of composite administrations in 
the EU, such as the one of subsidiarity, cannot be found in other areas of governance, 
including climate finance.
102
 Indeed, the very authors of the IPA framework have not gone 
further than providing some examples of international composite administrations at the 
international level, and an initial (and again too broad) taxonomy of instruments used by 





2. INTER-INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS IN CLIMATE FINANCE 
With regards to climate finance, the increasing level of complexity and institutional interplay 
in its composite administration has led to discontent among states, recipient entities and local 
groups, as well as to dispersal of financial resources between numerous under-funded 
channels.
104
 Whilst on the legal plane this translates into the issue of geographical, 
functional and regulatory overlaps described above, there are also practical consequences for 
the sustainability of this institutional model in delivering ambitious and transformative 
results. 
It is posited that two specific dynamics occur among climate finance institutions at 
each level of the composite administration: on one side, states, and institutions strive to 
secure a certain level complementarity of their activities, so that, when overlaps occur, a 
reasonable ‘division of labour’ is promoted. On the other hand, the limited public financial 
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resources raised by industrialized countries bring the same institutions to compete: the ones 
that prove more legitimate and efficient also catalyse more financial resources to the 
detriment of parallel institutional realities, which as a consequence tend to become under-
funded and marginalized channels of finance. Complementarity and competition constitute a 
conceptual ground
105
 specific for this area and useful to direct and streamline an analysis of 
emerging legal patterns in the field. The two separate dynamics are constantly pursued by 
climate finance institutions and interact both in a proactive and conflicting manner. 
2.1. Complementarity 
The idea that in areas characterised by institutional complexity a certain degree of 
complementarity should be reached is far from new, even among international lawyers. 
Inspired by the novel IOs established after the Second World War, in his lectures at the 
Hague Academy in 1950, Jenks recognized not only that ‘co-ordination’ between IOs was an 
emerging problem, but also that international lawyers should increasingly focus on… 
“[…] the law of inter-organizational relationships, which presents problems 
comparable in difficulty and importance to those which faced constitutional lawyers 
and political scientists when they were confronted with such new devices in the art of 




While after more than half a century the issue has been overlooked by international 
lawyers, complementarity is nonetheless an ever-recurring term in international policy 
instruments. To come with two examples directly relevant to the field of climate finance, the 
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2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness dedicates a whole section to the problem under 
the rubric ‘Complementarity: more effective division of labour’.
107
 
Similarly, the final resolution of the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable 
Development recognizes that: 
“[…] greater coherence and coordination among the various funding mechanisms and 
initiatives related to sustainable development are crucial. We [the participant states, DR] 
reiterate the importance of ensuring that developing countries have steady and predictable 




In the development of climate finance the term ‘complementarity’ re-surfaced in 2010, 
during the rounds of negotiations for the Green Climate Fund, which took place in a separate 
Transitional Committee. The issue became a specific agenda within the Committee, which 
recognized that the extant ramification of climate finance initiatives, coupled with the 
creation of another fund, would require enhancing “[…] clear roles, avoid duplication of 
efforts, share best practices, and promote synergies.”
109
 Among the many, a submission by 
the US delegate to the Transitional Committee is particularly revealing of the importance and 
the approaches envisioned by the US as a contributor of climate finance: 
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 “The United States supports the goal of a coherent and well-coordinated climate 
finance architecture. The various channels for climate finance should have clear roles, 
avoid duplication of efforts, share best practices, and promote synergies. […] Even 
with the creation of the GCF, other channels for delivering climate finance will 
continue to be important. The GEF, the multilateral development banks, bilateral 
agencies, UN agencies, and private sector investment vehicles will all play a role. If 
we want to improve coordination among these actors, we should focus on doing so 
from the bottom up. We could explore ways to promote better coordination among 
major bilateral and multilateral channels, to get these institutions working better 
together and interacting more frequently. Various models for coordination among 
finance channels already exist in other development sectors at the operational, 




While, according to a policy perspective, the goal of complementarity boils down to  
strategies or ‘models’ of bottom-up, top-down or horizontal coordination, on the legal plane, 
the same term somehow echoes the well-established legal construct of administrative 
competence in municipal systems.
111
 However, competence is embedded in the rule of law 
and the principle of legality of domestic systems, and relies on the presence of a central 
authority and judiciary able to solve possible overlaps among administrations, not to name a 
constitutional order. Being a composite model, climate finance governance lacks such a 
centralized structure with the result that complementarity currently represents no more than a 
dynamic, a desired goal pursued by international institutions and states.  
Finally, it is worth distinguishing complementarity from coordination: the latter is just 
one of the means to achieve the former. In fact, it is not guaranteed that by fostering 
coordination between institutions, substantial complementarity can be achieved. This is a 
point that the scant international legal scholarship on the matter seems to have missed
112
 and 
that a parallel with the construct of administrative competence is able to clarify. On one side, 
co-ordination is a practice of interaction between overlapping entities which can take 
numerous forms, such as inter-institutional bodies, a set of specific directives given from an 
                                                     
110 Transitional Committee, Submission by members of the Transitional Committee, Internal Reference Doc. No 
5, 8 July 2011, at 48, <http://unfccc.int/cancun_agreements/green_climate_fund/items/5868.php>. 
111 Similarly, Schermers and Blokker, International Institutional Law , at 1085. 




administration of higher hierarchy to lower administrations, etc… Conversely, competence 
indicates a administrative sphere pre-defined by law, which if manifestly violated by the 
administration, can even lead to the nullity of the administrative act.
113
 Interestingly, the 
doctrine of ultra vires acts of IOs in international law chimes with some features of the 
competence construct. 
2.2. Competition 
Competition is the other Janus head of the composite administration of climate finance. 
Facing a limited amount of resources, inevitably the various institutions acting in the global 
arena of climate finance compete in order to gain regulatory spheres and administer flows of 
public finance. 
 
While institutional competition has been intuited and briefly addressed by 
international lawyers,
114
 the same phenomenon is debated among political scientists, 
particularly in the context of how international institutions seek to promote their legitimacy 
in horizontal or polycentric models of governance. By way of illustration, Black argues that 
forms of competition in the sharing of regulatory powers occur between state and non-state 
regulators at the national and transnational levels: lacking a legitimate basis provided by 
public laws, non-state regulators “[…] may have to ‘compete’ with other regulators in other 
jurisdictions in order to attract business, and they may overlap or otherwise have to 
coordinate with other regulators in the same jurisdiction […].”
115
 Referring to the very realm 
of international institutions, Buchanan and Keohane adopt ‘comparative benefit’ as a key 
determinant of institutional legitimacy at global level: 
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“The legitimacy of an institution is called into question if there is an institutional 
alternative, providing significantly greater benefits, that is feasible, accessible without 
excessive transition costs, and meets the minimal moral acceptability criterion.”
116
 
Arguably, if actors take into account comparative benefits, than this inevitably leads to 
a certain degree of institutional competition. The experience with the Global Environment 
Facility and its implementing agencies described in the previous chapter indeed showcases 
how the rationale of basing the share of implementation on the different ‘comparative 




The quest of asserting legitimacy in a competitive institutional realm is also relevant 
for the law and will work as basis for the second part of this work, when a legal analysis of 
regulatory factors affecting legitimacy will be conducted according to a comparative analysis 
between some climate finance institutions. 
 
On the legal plane, institutional competition is a dynamic that can be explained with 
reference to the internal regulatory processes of each institution and how they relate with 
national and subnational actors.
118
 The multiplicity of institutions brought about different 
independent processes, in the sense that each institution has developed its own internal 
regulations related both to its internal governance (decision making process, membership, 
legal status, etc.), and to external actors, especially recipient entities. The latter category 
addresses issues such as access and disbursement modalities of multilateral funds, 
conditionalities, fiduciary standards, redress mechanisms and transparency. 
Institutional competition is a conceptual paradigm applicable mostly to these vertical 
relationships fulfilling the often opposite interests of contributor and recipient countries. The 
more an institution is able to offer a regulatory process that is clearly framed, transparent and 
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participatory, the more a potential recipient country or non-state entity is brought to choose 
that institution among diverse options. In a similar manner, a contributor would be keener to 
channel its resources to processes that better suit its interests of securing a result-based and 
efficient disbursement according to clear fiduciary standards.
119
 
Institutional competition not only works as a comparative tool between the different 
levels of legitimacy among institutions. It also explains how innovative processes are 
developed and migrate from an institutional experience to another. 
Cross-fertilization driven by competition is exemplified, for instance, by the issue of 
direct access to funds. As seen in the previous chapter, direct access refers to the possibility 
for a climate finance institution to accredit a national administration as an implementing 
agency of funded projects. The national administration needs to comply with the institution’s 
fiduciary standards in order to be eligible for direct access. The beneficial aspect of this 
process –strongly claimed by developing countries during negotiations– is that it avoids the 
overlapping of institutional intermediaries from the sourcing to the delivery of finance, thus 
bypassing traditional multilateral implementing agencies such as development banks and UN 
agencies. Modalities for direct access have been first developed within the regulatory 
framework of the Kyoto Protocol’s Adaptation Fund,
120
 but progressively migrated to other 
institutions, including the recently established Green Climate Fund.
121
 
2.3. The interplay between complementarity and competition 
Given the absence of a central authority ‘governing’ the channeling of climate finance, the 
‘complementarity need’ potentially yields increased efforts of coordination between 
institutions. Coordination can take both formal and informal avenues: for example, in the 
first case, through inter-institutional agreements or, in the second, relying on the work of 
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epistemic communities of experts.
122
 Coordination can also lead to more substantive 
solutions, such as the adoption of common rules regulating the areas of competence among 
institutions, which are akin to administrative models in domestic systems. It is exactly in this 
latter case that it is possible to spot tensions with the current trend of institutional 
competition. 
Indeed, as a result of institutional competition and broad agreement between states on 
the dispersed architecture of climate finance,
123
 scholars and policy makers do not envision 
in the short and medium term any centralization of the management of international climate 
finance.
124
 The diversity of processes is likely to work as restraining force for substantive 
common legal frameworks. In other words, the more an institution is capable of being more 
competitive through innovative and effective processes satisfying key countries’ interests, 
the more it will be unwilling to see its sphere of competence formally constrained by 
common rules of coordination, since they would limit its activities for the benefit of a 
competing institution.  
 
A positive side of institutional competition is that it brings flexibility and innovative 
dynamics to the system through learning-by-doing and cross-fertilization between parallel 
institutional processes. A clear example is, again, the one of direct access: started as an 
access modality of the Adaptation Fund, it has been implemented in the Enabling Activities 
programme of the GEF, and constitutes a mode of access to the Green Climate Fund.
125
  
Cross-fertilization might go hand in hand with complementarity, because the creation of 
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similar regulatory instruments within institutional processes can increase coherence and 
harmonize the system. 
Overall, it appears that, in the international composite administration of climate 
finance, complementarity and competition play both together and against each other. On one 
side, institutional competition limits the creation of a systemic legal framework on 
competences; on the other, complementarity can be fostered by the flexible dynamics of 
competition through regulatory cross-fertilization. 
 
 
3. INTIMATIONS126 OF LAW 
“To read the debate about fragmentation as if it had to do only with coherence in the 
abstract is to be mistaken about what is actually at stake. Special regimes and new 
organs are parts of an attempt to advance beyond the political present that in one way 
or another has been revealed unsatisfactory.”
127
 
This critical argument by Koskenniemi and Leino was a reaction to those international 
lawyers who viewed in the fragmentation of international law a threat to the coherence of the 
international legal system. Yet it is also an valuable statement in the context of climate 
finance governance and its institutional complexity. 
Overall, the path followed in this chapter led to find that, more than a lack of legal 
coherence, international law lacks the cognitive tools to usher into its framework certain 
events of global governance. In addition, both the idea of international composite 
administration and the discovery of the dynamics of complementarity and competition shed 
light on how such ‘special regime is advancing beyond its political present’ under the legal 
conceptualization that climate finance institutions are exercising public authority. 
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Importantly, the concept of international composite administration is also useful to 
ascertain the existence of ‘intimations’
128
 of law in the ways climate finance institutions 
interact by seeking complementarity or competing between each other. The previous sections 
explained why it is not possible to claim a proper ‘emergence’
129
 of law under heterodox 
approaches: namely, because the events of global governance which such approaches 
recognize as relevant, nonetheless cannot yet amount to fully-fledged legal facts under a 
legal system. The word ‘intimation’ is more apt in this context, because it expresses just the 
very initial springing of normative realities transforming into a ‘kind of law’, whose concept 
and ‘secondary norms’
130
 are still very much debated. 
This final section analyses some examples of inter-institutional endeavors under the 
law. Even though some significant patterns are present, nevertheless the broader picture 
shows an inter-institutional governance still dominated by a high degree of experimentalism 
and informality. The section will highlight some significant legal developments in terms of 
instruments and processes, and highlight the residual role of UNFCCC principles in fostering 
complementarity among institutions. 
3.1. The formalization of inter-institutional processes of coordination 
The international composite administration of climate finance is engendering some formal 
means to promote complementarity among the various administrations. Since (at least) the 
launching of the 2007 UNFCCC Bali Action Plan,
131
 states and climate finance institutions 
alike have been concerned with promoting means of coordination, having in the background 
years of experience with the inter-institutional competition among GEF agencies and the 
overlapping role of bilateral agencies and multilateral development banks.
132
 There are two 
methodological criteria useful to discover and address the various means of inter-institutional 
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129 See Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’, supra note 81.  
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coordination: the first is referring to the type of instrument adopted by states or institutions, 
the second, instead, looks at the ‘place of origin’ , the substantive provisions for coordination 
and, potentially, complementarity. By place of origin it is meant the entity or entities which 
initiate and bring about such formal means within or outside an international composite 
administration. 
This second solution is more promising under the heterodox view adopted here. 
Indeed, focussing on the type of instrument adopted –such as memoranda of understanding, 
COP decisions, or ‘secondary laws’
133
 of an institution– is meaningful only to understand its 
normative relevance vis-à-vis international law. Conversely, heterodox approaches are less 
concerned with the type of instrument because their normative –and possibly legal– effects 
take place regardless the instrument adopted. In particular, the IPA framework is centered on 
the idea that international institutions do affect the legitimate interests of states and non-state 
actors via their authority. 
 
With such methodological premise, three main patterns are currently emerging: i) 
processes that are external to the administrations acting in this composite model; ii) 
unilateral initiatives by individual climate finance institutions; and iii) direct inter-
institutional coordination engendered by the institutions part to the composite administration. 
3.1.1. External processes 
Given the absence of a central global authority in climate finance, it is perhaps no surprise 
that bodies and entities, not taking part directly to the management of finance streams, have 
nonetheless set up formal means to address institutional overlaps. 
 
                                                     




A clear example is the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF), established in 2010 by 
the UNFCCC COP.
134
 The Committee is a consultative inter-governmental body with the 
task of assisting the COP “[…]in exercising its functions with respect to the financial 
mechanism of the Convention in terms of improving coherence and coordination in the 
delivery of climate change financing”.
135
 The SCF was set up contextually to the Green 
Climate Fund, most likely as a reaction to concerns expressed by some COP Parties about 
the concurrent role of the Global Environment Facility and the Green Climate Fund as 
operational entities under the UNFCCC Financial Mechanism: as seen in the previous 
chapter, the two institutions can potentially overlap on all three levels of administration 
(geographical, functional and regulatory). 
While the SCF is competent to prepare the draft guidance –later adopted by the COP– 
to the operational entities of the Financial Mechanism,
136
 it also must carry two tasks 
relevant for promoting complementarity with institutions acting outside the UNFCCC 
framework. Because the COP and SCF lack any authority on non-UNFCCC institutions, 
both the activities are related to information exchange: the first task consists of maintaining 
“[…] a forum for the communication and continued exchange of information among bodies 
and entities dealing with climate change finance in order to promote linkages and 
coherence”; the second is to prepare a biennial assessment and overview of global climate 
finance flows in order to provide clarity on the state of the art.
 137
 
Despite being at its first stages, it is possible to notice the ‘soft function’ of the SCF in 
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Other examples of external processes are the activities aimed at promoting 
transparency and standards in accounting for climate finance flows. 
At the beginning of this work it was noted how no legal or accounting definition of 
‘climate finance’ currently exists, with the result that each climate finance institution adopts 
its own definition and means to report its climate-related activities. This is a case of 
regulatory overlap in the composite administration, because more regulations on accounting 
for the same phenomenon exist internally to each institution. 
In order to overcome such transparency and information gaps, the Development Co-
operation Directorate of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD-DAC), whose main task is to gather statistics related to foreign aid via its Creditor 
Reporting System (CRS), has developed a set of ‘climate change mitigation and adaptation 
markers’, which donor countries can use for accounting and reporting to the OECD.
139
 The 
markers, as well as reporting, are made on a voluntary basis, but they have been generally 
complied with by aid donor countries.
140
 
A shortcoming of the OECD-DAC CRS and the ‘climate markers’ is that they are not 
open to international institutions, but only to donor member countries. Furthermore, they do 
not report some key elements of aid, such as the types of conditionalities, financial 
instruments, etc. 
In response to these shortcomings, a public-private partnership, the International Aid 
Transparency Initiative (IATI), has set up a voluntary standard to report aid flows.
141
 The 
IATI standard covers additional aspects of the aid, which are not taken into account by the 
OECD-DAC CRS and, importantly, are open to any international entity engaged in 
channelling resources for development. Interestingly, the Adaptation Fund, the Global 
Environment Facility, and several multilateral development banks are members of IATI and 
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make use of the standard.
142
 In this way an external entity has promoted via its voluntary 
standard a means to address regulatory overlaps in the composite administration. 
3.1.2. Unilateral initiatives 
Unilateral initiatives to enhance complementarity stem primarily from the secondary laws of 
each climate finance institution. 
One common technique is to grant observer status to other competing institutions 
during the meetings of decisional bodies. When observer status is granted in a reciprocal 
manner, this creates the potentials for virtuous cooperation and, possibly, complementarity. 
For instance, the rules of procedure of the GEF Council allow the GEF CEO to ‘invite 
representatives of other organizations and entities […] to attend or observe the Council 
meetings’.
143
 The rules of procedure of the Participants Committee of the Forest Carbon 
Partnership Facility (FCPF) contain a similar provision, coupled by a list of permanent 
observers in the FCPF Charter. Being the FCPF a climate finance institution active in the 
field of forest carbon mitigation, it is expressly stated that relevant international 
organizations, representatives from the UN-REDD Programme and from the UNFCCC 
Secretariat should be invited to serve as observers to the Participants Committee meetings.
144
 
Also the UN-REDD Programme in the rules of procedure of its Policy Board allows for ex-
officio observers to the meetings of its Policy Board, including representatives from the 




Other initiatives of complementarity are contained in the programming processes 
which some multilateral institutions develop in consultation with recipient countries. 
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A significant case stems from the World Bank’s Procedures (BPs) on Country 
Assistance Strategies (CAS). As will be seen below, these strategies are a key component in 
the complex access and disbursement modalities of the World Bank. A CAS is a 
programming process aimed to identify “[…]key areas in which Bank Group support can 
best assist a country in achieving sustainable development and poverty reduction”
146
, where, 
climate change constitutes a relevant component. The World Bank BPs require that its staff 
“coordinates closely with relevant Bank Group units, development partners (IMF, regional 
development banks, bilaterals, etc.), and other sources of expertise to elicit informed views 
on the key issues to be highlighted in the CAS”.
147
 In addition “[t]he Bank collaborates with 
development partners to seek greater coherence across institutions and alignment of 




Another similar initiative related to the phase of national programming for climate 
finance is regulated under the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs). Both the establishing 
documents of the two separately-managed trust funds
149
 require that the competent 
multilateral development bank conducts “[…] a joint mission, involving other relevant 
development partners, to discuss with the government, private industry and other 
stakeholders”
150
. Interestingly, the regulations of two sub-programmes under the Strategic 
Climate Fund provide an innovative means to promote complementarity by delegating to the 
recipient country the coordination of different climate finance institutions in the process of 
national programming. 
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Hence, under the Forest Investment Programme it is envisioned that the competent 
multilateral development bank should develop the Terms of Reference for the joint mission 
together with the recipient developing country. In particular: 
“[t]he [recipient] Government will lead and coordinate the mission(s), which should 
include key government, non-government, including indigenous peoples and local 
communities; and private sector stakeholders as well as other development partners, 
including the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, UN-REDD (where relevant) and 
bilateral development agencies/ banks” […]“Such collaboration should strengthen 
ownership, serve to identify activities of other development partners that can 
contribute to the objectives of the Investment Strategy, mobilize co-financing for FIP 
programs and projects, ensure harmonized policy support and promote 
complementarity with activities of other development partners”
151
 
Similarly, the specific guidelines on joint missions under the Pilot Programme for 
Climate Resilience require that: 
“The joint mission process will include consultations and collaboration with relevant 
UN and bilateral donor agencies active in the country, private sector, national civil 
society and other stakeholders in the design of a PPCR program to assist the 
government to enhance the climate resilience of their national development plans, 
strategies and financing.” […] “During the mission it will be explored how to use the 
PPCR to build a partnership framework for integrating climate resilience into national 
processes, including those that engage other development partners.”
152
 
The innovative character of these joint missions is that while one climate finance 
institution (the CIFs) sets down by regulation the broad framework of their implementation, 
the detailed process is agreed with and formally managed by the recipient country 
government. In the context of complementarity, it is noteworthy that also recipient 
governments take part to the specific legal framing of how coordination should be sought at 
the national level. 
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3.1.3. Inter-institutional initiatives 
The third category comprises all those initiatives agreed between climate finance institutions 
themselves, which are based on either broad inter-institutional frameworks for coordination, 
or some specific joint programmes, or can even result into the creation of brand-new climate 
finance institutions. 
 
The latter case is marked by the very establishment of the CIFs. As noted in the 
previous chapter, the CIFs are the result of a call by the G8 in 2005 to streamline climate 
finance into the cooperative activities of the most prominent multilateral development banks. 
Indeed, after years from their establishment, the CIFs are currently a key player in the 
composite administration of climate finance. Therefore, while they constitute a successful 
legal mean to secure complementarity among multilateral development banks, they 
nonetheless add up to the number of the participants of the composite administration.  
 
The CIFs also enshrine in their governance structure a case of inter-institutional 
framework for coordination. In fact, its Multilateral Development Bank Committee holds 
several functions which facilitate complementarity between the potential overlaps between 
multilateral development banks. As the name suggests it is a body comprising banks’ 
representatives with the broad aim of facilitating “[…] collaboration, coordination and 
information exchange”.
153
 The Committee is responsible inter alia for: “[…] identifying 
specific areas of MDB cooperation to harmonize their climate change programs and actions 
[…]”; “serving as a forum to ensure effective operational coordination, exchange of 
information and experience among the MDBs;” and “liaising with other development 
partners, including bilateral development agencies/banks, for purposes of promoting co-
                                                     




financing of activities through an annual consultation between the MDBs and development 
partners, including bilateral development banks”.
154
  
From these provisions it emerges how this inter-institutional body facilitates 
complementarity both within the CIFs (between participant multilateral development banks), 
and with other climate finance institutions as potential co-financers of projects and 
programmes. 
 
Other inter-institutional frameworks of cooperation are emerging and arguably 
represent some initial efforts to set down clearer modalities of coordination. These 
frameworks are rarely established under formal instruments. Rather, they stem from joint 
arrangements
155
 and mostly from informal meetings between representatives of the interested 
institutions.
156
 These frameworks often generate broad approaches, general areas of 
cooperation and platforms for coordination, while still leaving an ample margin of discretion 
to single institutions. Recalling the dynamics occurring in climate finance, it seems that these 
emerging practices aim to strike a balance, favoring complementarity but still guaranteeing 
ample institutional competition. 
 
A case where informal coordination eventually led to formalized inter-institutional 
instruments is the collaboration between the CIFs’ Forest Investment Programme, the Forest 
Carbon Partnership Facility and the UN-REDD Programme in developing finance and 
capacity building for deforestation activities under the Reducing Emissions from Forest 
Degradation and Deforestation in developing countries (REDD+) mechanism. 
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Noticing that the three climate finance institutions partially overlap under their 
functional and geographical scopes, the executive bodies of each institution mandated their 
respective secretariats to envision joint options for “[…] enhancing systematic cooperation 
and improving efficiency, and seeking coherence in support of REDD+ countries efforts”.
157
 
The most relevant result of this first joint meeting was to decide to establish REDD+ 
Common Delivery Platforms in each recipient country seeking finance from multiple sources 
in the development and building up of REDD+ activities, where representatives of the 





Another example is the MoU between the EU Commission, the European Investment 
Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
159
 for the 
establishment of a strategic partnership in several regions of interest.
160
 The MoU aims at 
streamlining the coordination process among institutions operating on the same programmes 
and projects. It promotes this on several levels (technical, financial and review); as for 
institutional coordination, it establishes a High Level Steering Group to give guidance at 
headquarter and regional level with the clear mandate of avoiding duplication of efforts and 
competition.
161
 In terms of formalized cooperation mechanisms, the process initiated under 
this MoU applies only to certain activities or to specific regions, rather than covering all the 
possible overlapping competences between the institutions. 
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A similar mechanism in the field of climate finance is the Action Plan on UNEP/GEF 
complementarity.
162
 In October 1998 the GEF Council requested its implementing 
agencies
163
 to ensure complementarity between GEF activities and their regular programmes. 
As requested, UNEP prepared –and the GEF Council endorsed– a joint Action Plan. Among 
the various measures, the report lists two tools to achieve complementarity: a strategic 
partnership with the GEF Secretariat and enhanced collaboration among GEF implementing 
agencies.
164
 Differently from an inter-institutional MoU, this Action Plan appears to be a list 
of non-binding commitments by UNEP, which has only been endorsed by the GEF.  
 
Finally, Examples of joint programmes among climate finance institutions are plenty 
and difficult to track in their entirety. It is most likely that they constitute the main mean of 
cooperation among institutions, depending on the varying capacities and comparative 
advantages that each institution can offer. The most evident case of complementarity is when 
two or more climate finance institutions co-finance individual projects,
165
 or set up national 
and regional programmes with broader or sectoral scopes.
166
 In these cases, complementarity 
is sought on the basis of individual institutional strategies, rather than according to more 
comprehensive sharing agreements among institutions. 
3.2. Recognizing UNFCCC principles 
If the above cases provide evidence of ‘intimations’ of legal processes promoting 
complementarity, some climate finance institutions, acting outside the UNFCCC/KP 
umbrella have also established some linkages with the international climate change regime 
                                                     
162 Action Plan on Complementarity between the activities undertaken by the United Nations Environment 
Programme under the Global Environment Facility and its Programme of Work, 30 March 1999, GEF/C.13/5. 
163 At the time the World Bank, the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP), and the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP). 
164 Action Plan, supra note 162, paras 23-35. 
165An example is the project: “Efficient lighting and appliances” (World Bank Project ID: P106424). The total 
cost of almost USD 715 sees the contribution by the IBRD (USD 250 million), GEF (USD 7 million), and the 
Climate Technology Fund (USD 50 million), with the remaining finance sustained by the Mexican Government 
and private investors. 
166 The Regional Climate Change Programme, for instance, is co-financed by the UK Department for 
International Development and the Swedish International Development Agency and aims to develop 




by formally recognizing its constitutive principles. In the context an international composite 
administration, these linkages have at times the effect of transplanting legal principles into 
the activity of an institution. Arguably, rather than exerting direct effects on the substantive 
regulations of each institution, the recognition of these principles can promote the 
harmonization of certain rules and practices. 
By unpacking the combined provisions of Article 3 of the UNFCCC, five principles 
emerge: i) a commitment to act for the benefit of present and future generations ii) on the 
basis of equity, and iii) in accordance with the common but differentiated responsibilities 
and respective capabilities of states. In addition, the same article recognizes iv) a right to 
sustainable development by all countries, and v) the obligation for developed states to take 
the lead in combating global warming. 
The legal effect stemming from an acceptance of UNFCCC principles does not 
translate directly into specific rules enhancing complementarity. Rather, if adopted in a 
systemic way by all non-UNFCCC institutions involved in channeling climate finance, 
UNFCCC principles would serve as a basic, but yet significant linkage. Importantly, this 
linkage would not only take place between institutions, but also between principles grounded 
under a special international legal regime and the constitutive instruments on one side, and 
secondary laws of international institutions on the other. 
 
In demonstrating this linkage, the constructivist theory of international law by 
Brunnée and Toope is significant. As the authors put it, referring also to the complex law-
making under the UNFCCC, “[...] international law must be grounded in shared 
understandings elaborated through communities of practice, and more specifically a practice 
of legality.”
167
 This sentence relates to an ‘interactional’ conception of international law, 
where its process of formation is iterative and relies on a common understanding and 
reciprocity among law-makers and the passive subjects of the law. The authors’ conception 
                                                     




of interactional law offers a good understanding of some peculiar legal phenomena at the 
international level, because it recognizes the presence of law despite the lack of authority, 
systems of sanctions and formal legal sources. 
This approach in our specific realm sheds light on the role that UNFCCC principles 
can play on framing the activities and regulations of climate finance institutions. Rather than 
having direct effects on coordination, a practice of legality can be fostered with a common 
recognition, understanding and application of the UNFCCC principles by all climate finance 
institutions. In the absence of specific rules of coordination, a practice of legality would, 
thus, set a common legal ground from which institutions can base their authoritative 
activities and practices towards increased harmonization. 
 
It is noteworthy that the progressive formation of this shared understanding at times 
concretizes in a formal adoption of decisions, recommendations or guidance about the 
acceptance of UNFCCC principles in their activities. Indeed some constituting instruments 
of climate finance institutions have already acknowledged the central role of the UNFCCC 
legal principles on different degrees. The CIFs Trust Funds constituting document not only 
recognize the UNFCCC as the “appropriate forum for policy setting”, but also remarks that 
“The CIF acknowledges in its design the principle of “common but differentiated 
responsibilities” to addressing climate change”; and that “[t]o prevent any potential undue 
effect on the UNFCCC negotiations, the advice of Parties and other stakeholders […] will 
continue to be sought and incorporated.”
168
 The UN-REDD Programme Framework 
Document does not refer to UNFCCC principles but highlights its complementary role with 
the UNFCCC in regards to REDD+ capacity building. It also stresses the collaboration with 
many institutions working on developing theREDD+ mechanism, including the FCPF, and 
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 Also the GEF Council recognizes in its first operational strategy the guidance 
role and its accountability relationship with the UNFCCC COP.
170
 
On a lower degree of linkage with the UNFCCC, the FCPF Charter only contains the 
general goal of “ensur[ing] consistency with the UNFCCC Guidance on REDD”,
171
 while the 
Instrument of the IBRD Carbon Partnership Facility reiterates that sentence, but it conditions 





Among the entities engaged in channeling climate finance, it generally appears that 
multilateral development banks and bilateral institutions have not established formal 
linkages with or recognized UNFCCC principles. Given the difficulty in accessing internal 
legal documents disciplining their policies, it can be supposed that the lack of linkage might 
be due to their only partial involvement in climate finance and, as a consequence, those 
institutions do not see a compelling need to adopt specific legal linkages with the UNFCCC 
legal framework. As for multilateral development banks, none of their constituting 
agreements envisions any such kind of linkage. The Asian Development Bank does not 
incorporate UNFCCC principles in its climate change strategy.
173
 The Inter-American 
Development Bank broadly states its interest in lending resources for activities implementing 
MEAs obligations and that projects or programmes should abide multilateral obligations, 
without however stressing that the bank itself should follow those obligations.
174
 Also the 
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European Investment Banks’ environmental principles, while devoting an entire sub-section 
to climate change, do not set linkages with UNFCCC principles.
175
 
With regards to bilateral institutions, their lack of express recognition of UNFCCC 
principles might depend on the fact that, having their respective countries ratified the 
Convention, their activities are already bound by those principles. It is noteworthy, however, 




In setting express legal ties with the UNFCCC principles, non-UNFCCC climate 
finance institutions contribute to a process of recognition and, potentially, to a ‘practice of 
legality’ across the international composite administration. However, this hardly translates 
into substantive laws to avoid institutional overlaps. 
3.3. Critical remarks 
 In an international composite administration comprising numerous institutions which 
compete for the management of scarce public resources, it is remarkable finding increased 
efforts to set up formal frameworks of inter-institutional complementarity. Climate finance 
institutions, states and other non-state entities recognize that under the current institutional 
complexity there is a need to harmonize the linkages and overlaps between institutions. This 
is true also from a legal standpoint: if climate finance institutions exercise public authority, it 
is also under their reasonable prerogatives and duties the task of setting up means promoting 
complementarity. 
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As the above cases show, these frameworks are brought about by institutions and 
entities both outside and within the international composite administration; they are set up 
via a wide range of instruments, such as, memoranda of understanding, COP decisions, 
voluntary standards and guidelines, etc.; furthermore, they vary on their substantive contents 
and ‘strategies’ to promote complementarity. 
 
Although these frameworks might appear varied and embryonic, they nonetheless 
constitute ‘intimations’ of law under the heterodox lens of an international composite 
administration. While the theoretical underpinnings for recognizing such frameworks as 
fully-fledged legal facts are still highly contested, such progressive formalization also signals 
a passage from normative to legal engagements with the peculiarity that  –in sharp contrast 
with international law– no formal sources for these ‘intimations’ exist. 
To give some examples, under the ‘external processes’ typology, the IATI initiative 
demonstrates how the formal participation and acceptance of external voluntary standards by 
some climate finance institutions translates into a legal standard within the ‘secondary law’ 
of each institution. The World Bank CAS and the CIFs system of joint missions reflect how 
the ‘secondary law’ of an international institution unilaterally sets up standards of 
engagement with other competing institutions on a country basis. Finally, all the inter-
institutional initiatives outlined above show how, on different degrees of specificity, climate 
finance institutions compel themselves to participate and coordinate via inter-institutional 
bodies, or other functional engagements. 
 
Despite these cases of formalization, one must nonetheless notice the overwhelming 
level of informality of these engagements, which indeed challenges the capacity to ascertain 
their legal significance. Informality certainly allows institutions to be flexible and resolve 
their overlaps on individual cases with a high degree of discretion. Yet, at the same time, this 




While the literature has already expressed such concerns in the context of transgovernmental 
networks of national administrations,
177
 here the issue is transposed to the global level, where 
the inter-institutional dimension comprises both national and international entities. The 
growing informality of coordinating processes in climate finance is making such institutions 
unconstrained by any meaningful legal check, for how embryonic this might be. 
This angle of the accountability issue of international institutions is reflected by a 
general remark by Goldmann: 
 
 “[…] the tendency of international institutions to increase their autonomy makes the [principle of implied 
powers] likely to prevail, and international institutions arrogate competencies not explicitly provided for in 
the founding instrument. This development has serious repercussions for national power balances.”178 
 
While the principle of states’ (and IOs) consent in international law works as a 
restraining force to shape any comprehensive principle of inter-institutional coordination,
179
 
under a heterodox perspective the same issue gains more relevance, because of the function 
and the authority exercised by climate finance institutions. To put it bluntly, being global 
administrative bodies, climate finance institutions should acknowledge that their informal 
engagements in cooperation might raise accountability concerns by interested actors, 
especially in the cases where such engagements frustrate the interests of state and non-state 
actors to the adequate, predictable, effective and verifiable channelling of climate finance. 
Accountability from informality does not infer that climate finance institutions should adopt 
a hard set of inter-institutional regulation under formal agreements: applying what Kingsbury 
and Casini argued in the context of fragmentation, informality “[…] is not much a problem, a 
solution, or an analytic idea: it is simply a feature”.
180
 Hence, as a feature, it should prompt 
                                                     
177 AM Slaughter, “The Accountability of Government Networks” (2000) 8 Indiana Journal of Global Legal 
Studies 347; and Pauwelyn, ‘Informal International Lawmaking: An Assessment and Template to Keep It Both 
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178 Goldmann, ‘Inside Relative Normativity: From Sources to Standard Instruments for the Exercise of 
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legal scholars to further explore how such informality relates with the authoritative role of 






This chapter sought to provide some evidence and critical arguments to the question of 
whether legal developments are occurring within the international composite administration 
of climate finance. As often happens, the answer is mixed. 
First of all, a conceptual re-framing of these practices under a legal perspective was 
necessary, because the ‘orthodox’ approach under international law does not view as legal 
facts the relevant institutional practices in climate finance. The resulting and more apt 
framework relied on the combined ideas that, overall, the institutional structure of climate 
finance constitutes an international composite administration, where numerous and different 
institutions act in a heterarchical structure. In addition, the same institutions seek to promote 
complementarity against the background of a competitive realm made of scarce public 
financial resources. 
 
The analysis of the different practices and instruments adopted by both external 
entities and climate finance institutions has showed the existence of some ‘intimations’ of 
law, difficult to trace due to the high levels of informal engagements and lack of 
transparency in discovering relevant instruments. 
The results of the analysis are further limited by the very approach adopted. Indeed, 




theory adopted is still contested and hardly able to build those principled ideas that shape 
modern legal systems. This justifies using the expression ‘intimations’ of law. 
 
In the ample debate of global governance, this chapter has also sought to demonstrate 
that, in response to the high level of complexity of contemporary global governance, lawyers 
can indeed apply their traditional methods of discovery, rather than resorting to concepts and 
ideas of other social sciences. This is not to dismiss the relevance of these sciences in 
understanding human phenomena; rather, it is a claim to raise attention on how in times of 











THE LEGITIMACY OF CLIMATE FINANCE INSTITUTIONS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The second part of this work will shift its focus from the governance of the whole regime 
complex to the legitimacy of some selected international climate finance institutions.
181
 The 
reason for this shift stems from a parallel reading of the previous findings, namely that the 
interplay between institutional competition and complementarity is also a manifestation of 
the ‘different legitimacies’ that individual climate finance institutions enjoy.
182
 On one side, 
climate finance institutions benefit of increased collective legitimacy when they seek 
cooperative arrangements to promote complementarity. On the other, acting in a competitive 
realm with scarce resources, they engender internal regulations and mechanisms, which 
promote or lower their individual legitimacies vis-à-vis relevant actors like states, civil 
society organizations, private enterprises, individuals, and so on.  
The legitimacy of climate finance institutions assumes crucial importance for two 
concurrent reasons. Firstly, legitimacy underlays the effectivity
183
 of the climate finance 
complex as a whole, particularly against the background of the future challenges of long-
term finance under the UNFCCC. In order to successfully work as financial intermediaries 
for development, namely to catalyze money and deliver them towards effective climate 
activities in developing countries, it is desirable that the whole range of actors engaged or 
                                                     
181 They are the Global Environment Facility, the Adaptation Fund, the Green Climate Fund, the Clean 
Development Mechanism, the World Bank (IBDR and MIGA), and the Climate Investment Funds. The rationale 
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affected by these institutions recognizes as legitimate the whole institutional complex of 
climate finance. 
Secondly, the same applies to the ‘individual legitimacies’ of each climate finance 
institution as the general and the individual levels are necessarily interlinked. As to be 
explored in detail below, the connection stands in that the overall legitimacy of an 
institutional complex comprises the various balances between the different levels of 
legitimacies of individual institutions. 
If the legitimacy of the whole climate finance complex is indeed contested and 
relevant, by viewing the issue from a historical perspective, the various institutional 
reshuffles and proliferation throughout twenty years of climate finance appear to find their 
cause not only in the changing political and geopolitical balances,
184
  but also in the 
legitimacies that not just states but the whole range of involved actors attribute to each 
institution. Such a view sheds more light on the reasons for the mushrooming of numerous 
and underfunded mechanisms in climate finance: specifically, the main cause is that the 
existing institutions have not been properly balancing the political claims of the all the actors 
engaged and some legitimacy factors. 
 
With the aim of providing an understanding of these individual legitimacies and their 
interplay, the second part of this thesis is divided in two chapters. This chapter’s main task is 
to provide a solid theoretical and methodological ground for a legal analysis of institutional 
legitimacy, while the following will delve into a comparative analysis of selected climate 
finance institutions. 
The challenging question of this chapter is how to conceptualize and justify a legal 
analysis of the legitimacy of international institutions in a way that can provide useful and 
reliable insights. Being a highly-explored area of legal and political philosophy, and other 
social sciences, rather than proposing yet another theory of legitimacy this chapter will frame 
                                                     




its conception of legitimacy based on actual claims stemming from official documents of 
UNFCCC negotiations and climate finance institutions. 
In anticipation to what will be discussed later, this thesis will ground a comparative 
analysis between various international institutions on the concept of ‘process legitimacy’ –
intended as that legitimacy related to the bundle of regulations and mechanisms which shape 
institutional inputs and outputs. Four regulatory factors affecting the legitimacy of climate 
finance institionswill be carved out from empirical contestations: i) internal governance; ii) 
access and disbursement modalities; iii) participatory processes; iv) and accountability 
mechanisms. The factors also reflect broader principles of democracy and fairness in 
governance as framed by the legal scholarship. 
Furthermore, the final section of this chapter will address some methodological issues 
questioning the limits of a legal analysis of institutional legitimacy. 
Overall, the findings will serve as lynchpin for the following comparative analysis. 
 
 
1. CONCEPTUALIZING INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY 
Legitimacy is an ‘essentially contested concept’:
185
 we acknowledge its existence, but 
disagree on the ways it applies to our complex social realities. To be sure, virtually all 
political theorists and lawyers accept the idea that legitimacy consists of the acceptance of 
authority from its subjects; what is contested is how such acceptance is manifested, and how 
legitimate authority ought to be exercised. 
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Given the fluidity of this concept, here the most fruitful approach is to progress by 
approximations and differentiations, bearing in mind that the ‘themes’ of legitimacy can be 
numerous and of different nature. 
Because scholars traditionally distinguish between either social and formal, and output 
and input legitimacy, the same approach will be proposed here against the background of the 
contemporary legal scholarship on global governance. Moreover, the analysis will focus 
primarily on the legitimacy of institutions, rather than on the legitimacy of the rules enacted 
by the same institutions. 
1.1. Social and formal legitimacy beyond the state 
Contemporary international political and legal writings on legitimacy often adopt Weber’s 
final work, ‘Economy and Society’ (1922), as a starting point for their analysis, although the 
entrance of legitimacy into the lexicon of modern political and legal theorists can be traced 
back at least at the time of the Restoration after the Congress of Vienna in 1815.
186
 Weber’s 
account of legitimacy is purposely broad and aimed at covering the many possibilities of 
social organization. In a nutshell, for Weber legitimacy is a social phenomenon consisting of 
the acceptance of domination by a given society or group,
187
 where the dominating entity can 
be either an individual, a restricted group of people or the government of modern states. 
Legitimacy can be based on many reasons: customary, ideal, or of personal advantage. Yet, 
at the center of Weber’s origin of domination stands the belief of its legitimacy purported by 
the subjects to whom such domination is directed.
188
 Weber attempts to divide domination 
(authority) into three types: rational, traditional and charismatic. Of those three he 
specifically calls the former also “legal authority”, which rests “[…] on a belief in the 
                                                     
186 Interestingly, even at that time there was a sheer divide between politicians and philosophers on the formation 
and use of legitimacy. While the French diplomat Talleyrand –aligned with the ideals of the Holy Alliance– made 
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the same time legal philosophers like von Rotteck invoked the doctrine of legitimacy to justify the political 
regimes established by revolutions and the rightfulness of constitutional limitations to power. See WM Plochl, 
‘The Philosophy of Legitimacy’ (1943) 3 Jurist 64, at 67. 
187 M Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, vol. I (Guenter Roth and Claus Wittich 
(eds), Bedminster Press 1968), at 212, defining ‘domination’ as “[…] the probability that certain specific 
commands (or all commands) will be obeyed by a given group of persons.” 




legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue 
commands”.
189
 Legal authority thus recognizes legality as a crucial factor, in that it is the set 





The individuation of ‘belief’ and ‘procedure’ as the core elements for the formation of 
legitimacy, although criticized for their ‘value-less’ content,
191
 still underpins contemporary 
conceptualizations in international legal and political scholarship.
192
 
The re-formulation of those two components of legitimacy in international law comes 
with various labels. Here social and formal legitimacy can be adopted as two distinguished 
yet related factors.
193
 On one side, formal legitimacy expresses the need that authority shall 
base its commands on a defined procedure set by the law,
194
 while social legitimacy reflects 
the broad and empirical dimension of general acceptance (belief) by society of a given 
authority.
195
 A different understanding of formal legitimacy in international law –partly 
shying away from the Weberian dichotomy of ‘belief’ and ‘procedure’– is offered by liberal 
scholars who, despite re-proposing the social/formal dimensions, also claim that the latter is 
something more than a mere justification of authority via norm-making procedures, but is 
instead based on objective reasons depending on pre-chosen values such as “[…] fairness, 
justice, consent and so forth.”
196
 For instance, the value of ‘fairness’ is adopted by Franck to 
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Dyzenhaus, ‘Hermann Heller and the Legitimacy of Legality’ (1996) 16 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 641. 
192 A Boyle and C Chinkin, The Making of International Law (OUP 2007), at 24-35. 
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Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?’ (1999) 93 
The American Journal of International Law 596, at 601; A Buchanan and RO Keohane, ‘The Legitimacy of 
Global Governance Institutions’ (2006) 20 Ethics & International Affairs 405; implicitly, Anthony D’Amato, ‘On 
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State: A View from International Relations’ in C Joerges, I Sand and G Teubner (eds), Transnational Governance 
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justify a liberal and more democratic legitimacy of international law;
197
 others, like 
Petersman, instead point at human rights as a means to foster the legitimacy of the increased 
authority of international institutions.
198
 This understanding of formal legitimacy, which will 
be further examined below, sheds some light on the linkage between the social and formal 
dimensions of legitimacy: the existence of good reasons that qualify as ‘fair’ and ‘just’ a set 
procedures behind the exercise of authority contribute also to the formation of the social 
belief by affected actors that such authority is legitimate.  
 
Since the early nineties international legal scholars have questioned the basis of 
legitimate authority at the international level, as a reaction to two concurrent phenomena: the 
rapid expansion, and fragmentation of international law after the end of the Cold War across 
many areas of human activities; and the parallel proliferation of global governance 
institutions bestowed with the authority to take decisions and regulate directly or indirectly 
states and individuals.
199
 Thus, scholarly attention has progressively focused on the 
legitimacy of international organizations like the World Trade Organization,
200
 the Bretton 
Woods institutions,
201
 the UN Security Council,
202
 international human rights treaty bodies 
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 and many other institutions of contemporary global and transnational 
governance, including the European Union and the G-20.
204
 At the core of the problem stood 
an alleged misalignment between an international legal system based on states consent and 
sovereign equality
205
 with a new ‘geology’ of governance, necessitating ‘new’ sources of 
legitimacy.
206
 As Kumm puts it, the issue is particularly relevant for democratic polities 
because, while at the international level only states (and other few types of groups or entities, 
including IOs) can be deemed legal subjects, “[…] in constitutional democracies the state is 
merely the institutional framework through which citizens govern themselves.”
207
 The 
consequence of this finding is that the contemporary international legal system and its 
institutions need additional sources of legitimation to state consent, which would reflect and 
enhance a reciprocal relationship between their expanded legal authority on one side, and the 
numerous ‘new’ direct or indirect subjects such as individuals, multinational corporations, 
NGOs, indigenous people on the other. 
 
Already from this quick sketch, it is possible to situate legitimacy theorizations of 
international law in the context of climate finance institutions. In fact, both their legal 
provenance
208
 and executive role as an international composite administration
209
 raise 
question of whether such institutions do actually engage in effective legitimating 
relationships not just with states, but also with the whole range of actors whose interests are 
affected by their activity. In particular, despite they do not all clearly enjoy a ‘hard legal 
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nature’ under international law,
210
 it can hardly be denied that climate finance institutions 
enjoy full formal legitimacy. Could such institutions be established by a treaty, a COP 
decision, or an inter-institutional soft agreement, in any case there is always some legal 
process leading to their constitution and justifying their activity. 
Therefore, the legitimacy issue of climate finance institutions is rather of social 
nature, and related to that complex formation of the belief that an institution enjoys 
legitimacy vis-à-vis its actors: although less clear than the case of formal conceptions, there 
is indeed a relevant legal dimension also in the understanding of social legitimacy, which the 
distinction below between output and input legitimacy is able to clarify. 
1.2. Input and output legitimacy 
Another vantage point to view the complexities of legitimacy is to distinguish between its 
input and output components. This distinction arose within the political and legal scholarship 
in the context of the legitimacy of the EU’s governance, which was (and still is) criticized for 
lacking a meaningful democratic engagement with its different polities.
211
 Accordingly, in a 
democratic setting the input side of legitimacy requires citizens to be meaningfully involved 
in the policy decisions of an authority through institutional and regulatory processes; by the 
same token, output legitimacy relates to the quality and effectiveness of the authority in 
achieving the goals set forth by input processes.
212
 The added value of this distinction is that 
it clarifies the ex ante and ex post moments of legitimacy, where the former take place before 
a relevant decision or norm is adopted and the latter are verified after the same is enacted. 
In addressing the legitimacy of climate finance institutions, this distinction is helpful, 
because it traces the boundaries between the different stages of legitimation, and also helps 
to individuate their relevant regulatory factors. For instance, input legitimacy from 
participant states is sought through the possibility of reviewing project approval decisions, 
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often affecting enterprises, groups and individuals. By way of accountability mechanisms 
such decisions can be reconsidered and in case changed according to more legitimate results; 
the same legitimacy –but granted by civil society groups, NGOs and individuals– is 
dependent on participatory processes, such as the granting of observer status during 
meetings, or active participation in national programming. Output legitimacy can instead 
vary, for instance, depending on how decision-making is bound by internal regulations to 
distribute climate finance across eligible activities and countries; or it can be affected by the 
membership and voting rules of executive organs like the Global Environment Facility 
Council or the Green Climate Fund Board. 
 
To be sure, the input/output distinction has been further criticized for not being 
reflective of the whole process of legitimization: for instance, Schmidt notices that the input 
and output dimensions not only might work one against another, but also do not take into 
account what she calls the ‘throughput’ of institutional legitimacy.
213
 It might as well be that, 
by increasing participatory input, output results remain mediocre or may even worsen, 
therefore lowering the overall level of legitimacy; another possibility is that political 
balances within an institution might lead to tradeoffs about whether to enhance output 
legitimacy at the expense of input legitimacy.
214
 As to the second claim and with referral to 
the EU governance, the ‘throughput’ dimensions therefore describes “[…] what goes on 
inside the ‘black box’ […], in the space between the political input and the policy output 
[…]”,
215
 where the ‘black box’ consists of all those complex processes of interactions 
between all actors engaged in the EU governance. 
Another line of criticism is exemplified by Kratochwil, who argues that despite the 
utility of separating between input and output components , an analysis based on such 
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distinction must face the difficulty “[…] to designate ex ante the factors that make a specific 
outcome ‘legitimate’.”
216
 In particular, the author’s skepticism goes to those legal theorists, 
like Franck, who view in the fairness and reasonableness of the law-making process (thus an 
input component) a sufficient condition for output legitimacy:
217
 according to Kratochwil, 
that is only true if we presume that procedural values actually work as legitimating factors.
218
 
That is not to say that such presumptions are necessarily wrong, rather they serve to set the 
different rules of legitimacy’s ‘grammar’ from the one of legality. While this point will be 
analysed further below, the following Kratochwil’s constructivist argument appears 
convincing in regards to the regulatory factors of legitimacy: 
“[Legitimacy] serves thus as a conversation stopper, by providing reasons for the 
presumptions of why a decision or a law ought to be supported, but it is also a 
‘conversation opener’, when, for example, the legitimacy based on procedural grounds 




The input/output conception of legitimacy provides useful conceptual boundaries to 
identify key regulatory factors affecting the social legitimacy of climate finance institutions: 
rather than focusing on the legitimacy of the rules engendered by such institutions,
220
 this 
distinction instead frames the assessment of legitimacy in institutional terms. In other words, 
the focus on the stages and processes of the exercise of authority looks at those rules related 
to the internal regulatory processes of an institution, regardless of whether those processes 
have been adopted by the institution (authority) itself or other constituents (e.g. member 
states). Moreover, the two integrating positions exemplified by Kratochwil and Schmidt 
allow for further clarifications on the inevitable limits of an analysis of social legitimacy 
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according to regulatory factors alone: because they will be object of detailed analysis, the 
final section of this chapter will delineate these limits. 
The input/output distinction allows us to understand the social legitimacy of climate 
finance institutions as dependent on those internal regulatory processes, which are either 
aimed to receive external knowledge and express policy and technical views (input), or to 
frame and re-evaluate institutional decisions (output) throughout the whole decision-making 
process or project cycle. To be sure, institutional input and output components need not to be 
formally established by regulation, as they can well be expressed by informal means.
221
 Yet 
the focus on regulatory processes internal to an institution finds justification here because of 
their normative nature: regardless of their ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ nature, institutional regulatory 
processes follow the logic and language of law and, therefore, can be subject to an 
interpretative and qualitative legal analysis geared to understand their impact on the social 
legitimacy of an institution.
222
 As a result, it is possible to adopt some of these regulatory 
processes as regulatory factors for an analysis of social legitimacy. 
 
 
2. DISCOVERING REGULATORY FACTORS FROM LEGITIMACY 
CHALLENGES 
The regulatory factors of climate finance institutions, potentially affecting input and output 
legitimacy, are numerous and can span from constitutive issues (e.g., founding principles, 
membership, legal personality and relationship with external entities, etc.) to issues related to 
their external engagements. Selectiveness is therefore inevitable, if the purpose here is to 
provide a meaningful comparative analysis of individual legitimacy of climate finance 
institutions. 
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In the specific case of climate finance institutions the following factors are the most 
useful for the purposes of an analysis of social legitimacy:  
1– internal governance and decision-making procedures; 
2– access and disbursement modalities;  
3–  participatory processes for external actors; and 
4–  accountability mechanisms. 
The first and third factors reflect the input dimension of legitimacy, because they both 
contribute to inform the type and quality of institutional activities which will later have 
external effect. To give a concrete example, individual decisions on projects approvals are 
inevitably dependent on the inputs received through decision-making powers and decisional 
processes distributed between organs and within the executive body of a climate finance 
institution. By the same token, virtually all climate finance institutions have mechanisms 
which provide fora of engagement with the wide range of its external actors, including 
groups and individuals directly affected by climate finance projects. Potentially, and to 
different degrees, such mechanisms of participation allow each institution to meaningfully 
receive knowledge, data and views on particular topics and, therefore, to perform informed 
decision making.  
The second and fourth factors are instead reflective of output legitimacy. 
Accountability mechanisms, such as the delegation relationship between climate finance 
institutions and their delegating entities, as well as mechanisms that allow external subjects 
to ask reviews of certain decisions, also contribute to input legitimacy, because they are 
aimed at the revision of decisions or standards after their implementation. By the same 
token, internal regulations on access and disbursement provide quantitative restraints on the 
shares of funding assigned to each developing country, before these are eventually 
channeled: therefore, they work as basis for output legitimacy, since they affect or are 




2.1. The legitimacy challenges for climate finance institutions  
If those are the four regulatory factors to be adopted in the next chapter’s analysis, there is 
nevertheless the need to justify how they have been individuated and why they are the most 
significant in the context of climate finance. Providing a solid basis for this is admittedly 
difficult, because inevitably linked to the substantive component of institutional legitimacy, 
which, as seen, stems out from a belief in authority from all the involved actors. In other 
words, if those regulatory factors are crucial, it must be because their presence and quality 
within the regulatory sphere of the institution is important for the formation of social 
legitimacy. 
Despite the practical difficulties to carry on a thorough empirical analysis of actors’ 
perceptions, the four regulatory factors have clearly stood at the center of discussions, 
contestations and policy proposals, during the various negotiations, reviews and 
establishment processes of climate finance institutions. This implicitly emerges from the 
analysis of a mix of UNFCCC negotiating documents, reports of independent reviews of 
climate finance institutions, and personal exchanges and interviews done to experts and 
practitioners in the field, which, for though they cannot be claimed to have scientific validity 




2.1.1. The relevance of the four regulatory factors at general level… 
Perhaps the most significant of these sources are the reports of negotiations for the 
establishment of the Green Climate Fund under the UNFCCC. Following the formal 
establishment of the fund by a COP decision,
224
 representatives of states, multilateral 
development banks, multilateral climate funds, and interested NGOs gathered under a 
                                                     
223 The analysis is based on a desktop review of publicly available i) UNFCCC documents and COP and CMP 
decisions; ii) internal evaluation reports of the five climate finance institutions under analysis in the next chapter 
(The World Bank Group, the GEF, the GCF, the Adaptation Fund, the Climate Investment Funds and the Clean 
Development Mechanism); and iii) reviews from independent think thanks and NGOs. Both the interviews 
reports and private exchanges are on file with the author. 




Transitional Committee for the Green Climate Fund, in order to adopt a draft for the funds’ 
Governing Instrument.
225
 This Transitional Committee was undoubtedly a unique forum 
where all actors engaged in climate finance could express their views on the state of the art 
of institutional aspects of climate finance. 
The public submissions by states representatives and the reports of informal 
consultations during the meetings of the Transitional Committee give a clear picture of the 
claims and importance of the four regulatory factors. For instance, at the first meeting the US 
representative stressed the need to set “clear benchmarks for accountability” in the Green 
Climate Fund; she also highlighted the importance of access and disbursement modalities 




At the same meeting Argentina raised a crucial issue of internal governance by 
claiming that “[…] [t]he architecture of the Fund should be equitable and effective to ensure 
that the financial mechanism governance does not replicate the financial access limitations 
and under-representation of developing countries in International Financial Agencies.”
227
 
Australia instead stressed the importance of granting more meaningful representation of the 
private sector within the GCF governance.
228
 
Access and disbursement modalities and informal governance again stood at the center 
of informal negotiations, as it is reported that “[…] a number of representatives called for 
dedicated funding/fixed percentages to be set aside within the GCF for special category 
groups such as SIDS [Small Island Developing States, DR]. […] It was noted that such an 
                                                     
225 Ibid., para 109, and Appendix III for the Terms of Reference for the Design of the Green Climate Fund. 
However, only state parties had the right to vote within the Transitional Committee, while non-state actors, 
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under a Technical Unit of the Committee. It is noteworthy that the representative of the Republic of the 
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Submission by members of the Transitional Committee, Internal Reference Doc. No 4, 7 June 2011, at 8, 
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226 Transitional Committee, Submission by members of the Transitional Committee, Internal Reference Doc. No 
1, 25 May 2011, at 16-7. 
227 Ibid., at 19. 




approach could help deal with the problems many SIDS face in accessing finance on an 
individual basis.” Further, contestations against the role of the World Bank in the internal 
governance of the future GCF took place, because, despite its efficiency in disbursement, 




The issue of the role of the World Bank and other implementing agencies in the 
internal governance and access modalities was taken up in following consultation, where 
developing states made clear that direct access was necessary to reduce the “[…]transaction 
cost that was being charged by the Multilateral Implementation Entities in undertaking 
projects in the developing countries.”
230
 With reference to the World Bank, India claimed 
that “[…] a clear separation between the trusteeship functions and the operational functions 




Calls about the need to establish accountability mechanisms for the GCF appeared 
only in general form and most likely with the consensus of every participant,
232
 as all 
countries did in the context of participatory processes. France, for instance, recognized that: 
“[r]egarding the other stakeholders (civil society, private sector, indigenous 
communities) it will be important for the legitimacy of the Fund to ensure that these 
actors are properly involved. But it shouldn’t necessarily imply for them to get a 
permanent seat in the Board. They would rather participate to the Board’s council as 
‘active observers’ with the possibility to intervene on main issues and submit their 
views to the council members”.
233
 
 From the developing countries’ side, Samoa stated that “[t]he core democratic 
principles of transparency and accountability as well as public/stakeholder participation  in 
                                                     
229 Transitional Committee, Informal Consultations on Workstream III for representatives from Small Island 
Developing States, Internal Reference Doc. No 2, 26 May 2011 at 3-4. 
230 Transitional Committee, Submission by members of the Transitional Committee, Internal Reference Doc. No 
6, 8 July 2011, at 5. 
231 Transitional Committee, Submission by members of the Transitional Committee, Internal Reference Doc. No 
5, 8 July 2011, at 40. 
232 Belize and Canada, for instance, respectively recognized accountability as a founding principle of the GCF: 
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decision-making in the GCF need to be considered throughout the funding cycle and the 
organizational and operational structures of the GCF.”
234
 
The European Commission followed suit deeming indispensable a set of procedures that 





Further evidence of the general relevance of the factors is given by a recent report of 
the UNFCCC work programme on long-term finance: an inter-governmental consultative 
process addressing the more substantive aspect of how to source, scale up, and effectively 
mobilize the amounts of climate finance needed in the long period. Although the work 
programme was centered on other policy aspects, its final report recognizes the crucial 
importance of direct access and disbursement modalities to foster ‘country ownership’ of the 
finance, as well as the importance of participation of civil society and private sector 




If those above are claims from state representatives, scholars and NGOs have also 
been concerned with issues related to the four factors. Hence, Ghosh and Woods argue that 
the current institutional landscape of climate finance is dominated by institutions whose 
internal governance mainly reflects the dominant role of developed states (e.g. the World 
Bank, the GEF, and other MDBs), and that this hampers the trust of institutional actors, in 
particular developing states and civil society.
237
 Schalatek expresses concern about the lack 
of inclusive participatory mechanisms in climate finance, voicing out minority groups and 
                                                     
234 Ibid, at 18. 
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237 A Ghosh and N Woods, ‘Developing Country Concerns about Climate Finance Proposals Priorities, Trust, and 
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the people most affected by climate change, such as the poor, women, and children.
238
 
Treating also about the legitimacy of climate finance institutions, but not from a legal 
perspective, Ballesteros et al. adopt accountability as one of the interacting factors of 
legitimacy.
239
 Accountability mechanisms and enhanced transparency are deemed crucial for 
the future of climate finance by Stewart et al.
240
 
Moreover, NGOs have also been particularly sensitive to the issue of transparency. 
The current lack of a harmonized scheme to account for climate finance
241
 has spurred calls 
for more transparent activities by climate finance institutions in order to build trust from both 




2.1.2. … and at the individual level 
Although the analysis provided very scattered and uneven results, evidence of the relevance 
of the four regulatory factors can be found from different documents and reports pertaining 
to single climate finance institutions. 
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To start with the GEF, its Overall Performance Studies (OPSs), prepared every five 
years by an Internal Evaluation Office, provide many useful elements. The fifth and latest 
OPS dedicates entire sections and special reports to issues of internal governance, 
participatory processes and access and disbursement. To report but some of the findings, 
regulatory gaps have been identified in the decision-making process of the project cycle, so 
that “[…] the key stakeholders in the GEF partnership perceive the GEF project cycle to be 
lengthy and bureaucratic.”
243
 Still regarding internal governance, issues have been raised in 




As to participatory processes, a specific report on the GEF’s engagement with civil 
society organizations found that “the GEF Policy for Public Involvement is outdated, not 
systematically implemented and largely ineffective […]”, and “[e]vidence supports a general 
lack of CSO engagement in the design phase –going against both the Policy for Public 
Involvement and good practice in project management.”
245
  
On access and disbursement modalities the OPS criticizes the GEF’s regulations based 
on reserved allocations for each eligible country, against the alternative of allocation 




Other documents related to individual institutions also exemplify the relevance of the 
factors. For instance, an overall independent evaluation report of the Climate Investment 
Funds found that at least two of its programmes lack participatory processes of multi-
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stakeholder governance involving also civil society organisations at different levels of the 
project cycle.
247
 The internal governance of the same funds has been criticized on several 
accounts and in particular for the World Bank’s multi-functional and pervasive role and the 
lack of control over funds in the disbursement phase by developing countries.
248
  
State parties to the Kyoto Protocol have recently decided to put under review the 
composition and membership of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, 
thus addressing an issue of internal governance.
249
 The CDM has also been criticized for 
lacking an accountability mechanism available to project proponents for the protection of 
their legitimate interests against the international regulations.
250
  
Finally, in reviewing the effectiveness of the Adaptation Fund, an independent report 
highlights the importance of the fund’s governance unusually balanced towards developing 
countries, the high level of inclusiveness of its participatory processes, as well as the 
“symbolic value” of the its direct access modalities.
251
 
2.2. Situating the four regulatory factors of legitimacy in the legal scholarship 
While the reported material shows the relevance of the four regulatory factors from an 
empirical account, the same standards find also solid justifications from current theoretical 
debates in the legal scholarship. In particular, the terrain here is the one –briefly addressed 
above in conceptualizing substantive and formal legitimacy– of providing a theoretical 
justification of the legal authority of global governance institutions.
252
 As seen, the question 
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applies also to climate finance, inasmuch its institutional structure constitutes an 
‘international composite administration’
253
 spanning across different legal regimes and 
potentially affecting the interests of a wide range of actors. 
It is easy to imagine that such a crucial scholarly debate has produced a vast and 
diversified literature on the topic: that is why the purpose here is just to sketch out how 
different theories recognize as relevant for legitimization processes the four factors. 
2.2.1. Democracy 
Two regulatory factors (participatory processes and accountability mechanisms) are 
generally seen by the legal scholarship as a means to promote democracy and democratic 
values from domestic systems to international and supranational governance.
254
 This is 
particularly the positions of international constitutional law theorists:
255
 as they broadly 
claim that the international legal sphere is engendering some forms of institutional 
centralization and normative hierarchy, such as the UN, the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), international human rights regimes, jus cogens etc., they also recognize the need to 
enhance democratic relationships between diverse global polities and those international and 
supranational institutions  managing complex global affairs. Yet there are obvious obstacles 
for transplanting the traditional forms of representative democracy at the global level, with 
the result that constitutionalists tend to look at other forms of democratic engagement, 
among which the diverse participatory processes created by international institutions appear 
as a promising start for enhanced legitimization. This view is, for instance, articulated by 
Peters when she envisages the participatory model –opening up the institutions’ gates to 
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NGOs, civil society organizations and other interested constituencies– as potentially 
transferrable (and in part already implemented) at the global level.
256
 
In contrast to the proponents of democracy under constitutionalism, also the pluralist 
strand accepts democratic standards, yet according to a model that better reflects the realities 
of climate finance. Pluralists do not see any clear manifestation of constitutionalism in the 
international sphere, but rather an intertwined mix of different legal systems and 
constitutional regimes which can either conflict or coexist. As Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, 
put it: 
“[…] global society is a "society without an apex or a center.” [quoting Niklas 
Luhmann, DR] Following the de-centering of politics, there is no authority in sight in 
a position to undertake the coordination of societal fragments. […] Following the 
collapse of legal hierarchies, the only realistic option is to develop heterarchical forms 




As already claimed in the previous chapter,
258
 this broad account reflects the specific 
realities of climate finance, where as previously seen institutions of different legal 
provenance (international, soft, and national) are engaged into the administrative activity, 
which find its basis in an international treaty but does not envision any strong hierarchical 
nor centralized institutional structure. As a consequence, the pluralist view is able to project 
a clearer image of the role of participatory and accountability processes in legitimizing 
institutional activities, in the sense that they indeed promote legitimization, but primarily in 
favor of the one institution that engenders such mechanisms and not automatically for the 
whole regime complex of climate finance. 
This point, which will be recast in the next section, is implicit in Krisch, who 
highlights two crucial aspects in regards to accountability: 
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“First, accountability structures typically rely on a clear identification of an institution 
or actor answerable for a given action. As responsibility is shared among various 
institutions, this identification becomes increasingly difficult, and the resulting 
‘problem of many hands’ often prevents the imposition of negative consequences for 
undesired behaviour. Secondly, a plurality of sites typically leads to a dispersal of 
public attention. Unable to concentrate on a single locus of decision-making, public 
participation becomes diluted and ever more virtual.”
259
 
Here accountability is recognized as an important factor of legitimacy, but the disperse 
models of governance imply that for our purposes the most meaningful way is to test 
accountability on individual basis for each institution.
260
 To be sure, accountability is seen as 
potential means of democratic legitimacy also by the constitutionalist strand.
261
 While 
accountability, in its abstract form, acts as a meta-principle or a framing concept, the notion 
of ‘accountability mechanisms’ rather points at the positive regulatory factor under the 
authority of an international institution: this notion will be further explored in the next 
chapter. 
2.2.2. Fairness 
The concept of fairness, as notably framed by Franck in the field of international law,
262
 
better fits the needs of an overhauling theoretical device than democracy, when we shift to 
the two remaining factors related to institutional legitimacy in climate finance: international 
governance, and access and disbursement modalities. 
Franck’s concept of fairness in international law is double-faceted. On one side, “[…] 
to be effective, the [legal] system must be seen to be effective. To be seen as effective, its 
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decisions must be arrived at discursively in accordance with what is accepted by the parties 
as right process.”
263
 In Franck’s view, fairness guarantees legitimacy because of a general 
acceptance of a process leading to accepted authoritative decisions and law-making. If in this 
sense it appears as a neutral concept, Franck’s fairness nonetheless assumes moral contours, 
as its second facet is strongly linked with distributive justice considerations. Following his 
argument, it is insufficient to claim that a law (or an institution in our case) is fair because it 
represents the outcome of a right process. If a law “[…] distributes burdens unfairly, [it] is 
likely to provoke resistance, even from some of those who benefit.”
264
 Thus, despite being 
shaped through right processes, a law must contain some additional elements of moral and 
political nature to be legitimate. 
  
Under this conceptualization, the two regulatory factors - ‘internal governance’ and 
‘disbursement modalities’- can be seen as internal processes which can promote legitimacy if 
they are perceived as fair by the actors engaged. 
Yet, in contrast to the other two input-based factors, no extensive debate exists in the 
legal scholarship about the relationships between internal governance and decision-making 
procedures in international institutions and their legitimacy;
265
 the same is even more evident 
for the more specific factor of access and disbursement modalities in international financial 
institutions. 
The importance of internal governance rules and decision-making procedures for the 
legitimacy of institutions, for instance, is briefly touched upon by Boyle and Chinkin in 
addressing the role of consensus in multilateral law-making: they point out that the process 
of law-making, which embraces both issues of membership and decision-making procedures, 
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is particularly relevant for the legitimation of those international bodies which do not grant 
universal membership –such as the UN Security Council.
266
 They also confirm Franck’s 
fairness-based conception when, with referral to the institutional decision-making procedures 
of the IMF and the WTO, they stress that “[…] how decisions are taken within the process of 
law-making and by whom may be one of the more important elements of legitimacy […].”
267
 
Schermers and Blokker follow suit by recognizing that the equitable representation of 
interests in non-plenary organs of IOs is of fundamental importance for their legitimacy.
268
 
On a similar note, D’Aspremont and Brandebaere notice the increasing challenges of 
social legitimacy for international financial institutions stemming, amongst other issues, 
from the departure from the “traditional equality” in voting rights in favor of weighted vote 
systems in their executive bodies.
269
 Finally, and in the very specific realm of environmental 
financing, Matz provides a clear framework to understand legitimacy in relation to decision-
making procedures: first she argues that states equality in international financial institutions 
should be balanced with the diverging interests between donor and recipient states. 
Secondly, she questions whether the shift to weighted voting is likely to negatively affect the 
legitimacy of international financial institutions, especially in the case where the practice of 





Shifting to the output factor of access and disbursement modalities, there is no 
extensive legal scholarship addressing the role of such distributive rules within international 
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 Nonetheless, this legitimacy standard is adopted by Ballesteros et 
al., when they question the relationships between power, responsibility and accountability in 
climate finance institutions: in particular they resort to the specific case of the GEF’s 
allocation frameworks to claim how the way they are designed by regulatory processes 




There is a further element qualifying the two based factors as reflective of fairness 
needs in institutional processes. As Franck specifies, distributive justice and, therefore, a 
fairness-based analysis necessitate a “moderate scarcity” of what is at stake.
273
‘Power’ and 
‘money’ are the respective ‘moderately scarce’ resources for these two factors in climate 
finance. In fact, in internal governance processes power is ‘moderately scarce’, in the sense 
that for any institutional reality there is always need to distribute power among the 
competing actors in a way that a ‘fair’ distribution can bolster institutional legitimacy. 
Equally, access and disbursement processes relate to the ‘moderate scarcity’ of the money, 
which a climate finance institution is tasked to channel in a ‘fair’ manner. As argued in the 
next Chapter, this conception will be helpful to determine the quality and therefore the 
impact of those two regulatory factors on legitimacy. 
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3. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND LIMITS OF A LEGITIMACY ANALYSIS 
BASED ON REGULATORY FACTORS 
After stating the empirical and theoretical rationales for adopting the four factors as 
indicative of social institutional legitimacy, this final section attempts to answer three final 
methodological questions: i) how can we gauge, using those identified factors, the level of 
legitimacy that an institution enjoys for each of them and as a whole?; ii) what are the limits 
of such legal analysis?; and iii), in particular, how do the four factors interact between each 
other in the formation of social legitimacy? 
3.1. Standard of review 
As to the first question, no precise yardstick exists, but the outcomes from the comparative 
analysis will rather provide a clearer picture of the ‘interplay of legitimacies’
274
 between 
institutions acting in the same regime complex. In other words, the legitimacy level of a 
climate finance institution can be better understood in relation to the legitimacy of other 
institutions acting in the same field. Hence, in a way this view is a corollary of the concept of 
institutional competition described in the previous chapter: if climate finance institutions 
tend to compete against the background of limited financial resources, then, to the extent that 
one is more competitive than another, this means that it will also enjoy stronger legitimacy 
from the interested actors. 
 
Conceptually, an assessment of legitimacy operates differently from one based on 
legality. As Bodansky remarks, “[…] legitimacy is a matter not of all or nothing, but of more 
or less”,
275
 meaning that, while a legality assessment is structured on the ‘legal/non-legal’ 
binary logic,
276
 legitimacy plays instead along a spectrum of many nuanced values. To put it 
bluntly, an institution can be ‘more or less’ legitimate in exercising its authority, but such 
                                                     
274 The expression and concept is taken from L Boisson de Chazournes, ‘Changing Roles of International 
Organizations: Global Administrative Law and the Interplay of Legitimacies’ (2009) 6 International 
Organizations Law Review 655. 
275 Bodansky, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance’ , at 623. 




authority can only be exerted legally or illegally according to a positive normative 
benchmark.
277
 Bringing this general remark to the realm of climate finance, it is virtually 
uncontested that its institutions enjoy full legality of their authority,
278
 as it is empirically 
evident that none of them is perceived as fully illegitimate. 
Hence, this core difference between legality and legitimacy requires a specification of 
how an analysis based on regulatory factors can offer relevant outcomes to draw conclusions 
on the legitimacy of selected institutions. 
 
On this matter the literature appears surprisingly scant, yet a seminal piece by 
Buchanan and Keohane is a promising starting point. The authors attempt to “[…] articulate 
a global public standard for the normative legitimacy of global governance institutions”,
279
 
by claiming that such standard is needed to provide an additional moral reason why an 
international institution should enjoy normative legitimacy.
280
  
Shifting away from the already explored standards of ‘states consent’ and ‘global 
democracy’, the same authors enlist several ‘desiderata’ characterising legitimacy standards, 
among which one appears particularly pertinent here: 
“[the standards of legitimacy] must provide a reasonable public basis for coordinated 
support for the institutions in question, on the basis of moral reasons that are widely 
accessible in spite of the persistence of significant moral disagreement—in particular, 
about the requirements of justice governance institutions.”
281
 
Following this morality-based argument, the same authors identify three core factors 
affecting institutional legitimacy at global level. The first, as they call it, is a level of 
                                                     
277 At institutional level, this issue conflates to the question of detailing the boundaries of power of international 
institutions. See J Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law (2nd edn, CUP 2009), at 53-73. 
278 Although, as seen in the previous Chapter, it is unknown under what legal system some international 
institutions can derive their authority. 
279 Buchanan and Keohane, ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’, supra note 15, at 406. 
280 Ibid., at 409. Such reason is conceived additional to states’ self-interests. This moralistic conception of formal 
legitimacy belongs to a particular strand of liberal thought and tends to blur the boundaries with substantive 
(sociological) legitimacy: in fact, moral reasons can also form a ‘reasonable belief’ that an institution is 
legitimate, without addressing the question of the normative basis for such legitimacy. A close look at Buchanan 
and Keohane’s work shows such confusion between formal and social legitimacy: see for instance at 412. 
281 Ibid., at 417 (emphasis added). The other desiderata more or less correspond to the democratic and fairness-




“minimal moral acceptability” of institutional legitimacy, which should correspond to the 
avoidance of committing “serious injustice”, particularly in violating human rights.
282
 The 
second is “institutional integrity” understood as an institutional activity that does not divert 
from or go against the institution’s original functions.
283
 Finally, the third and more 
important factor here consists of “comparative benefit”, which entails that “[t]he legitimacy 
of an institution is called into question if there is an institutional alternative, providing 
significantly greater benefits, that is feasible, accessible without excessive transition costs, 
and meets the minimal moral acceptability criterion.”
284
 
Although the authors do not further specify the nature and implications of this latter 
factor, measuring legitimacy according to comparative benefits well suits the specific case of 
climate finance, because it leads to a relational approach between the different legitimacies 
of each institution. The aptness of this approach derives from the institutional structure of 
climate finance at the global level: an international composite administration, where the 
internal processes of each institution are able to alter the balances of comparative benefits, 
and lead accordingly to institutional success or proliferation. 
 
Therefore, in answering this first question, in the context of climate finance the best 
legal method to gauge the legitimacy levels, stemming from an analysis of regulatory factors, 
is to view the whole matter as interplay among individual legitimacies.
285
 In other words, 
once qualitative elements from the comparative analysis will be expounded from the various 
factors, the analysis shall focus on how such elements affect the individual legitimacy of an 
institution in relation to all the others under analysis, in order to provide overall arguments of 
legitimacy among those institutions.  
                                                     
282 Ibid., at 419. 
283 Ibid., at 422. 
284 Ibid.. The authors further remark that the concept should not be confused with optimal efficacy and efficiency. 




3.2. The limits of a legal analysis 
If at this point a clearer picture emerged of how to conduct a legal analysis of institutional 
legitimacy, there is nonetheless the need to remark some limits concerning the assumptions 
and the interactions between the four regulatory factors. 
To start from the assumptions, the fact of embarking into a normative analysis indeed 
presupposes the morality and reasonable acceptance of the standards adopted. While the 
selection of the four factors springs from actual contestations in the various fora, it 
nonetheless relies on a certain idea of political morality, which is not immune from 
contestations.
286
 This is exemplified by comparing the similar claims from political theorists 
like Buchanan and Keohane on one side, and legal scholars like Franck. As seen, the former 
indeed adopt a set of standards which are expression of a minimum and reasonable morality 
among global actors. Yet their standards are not normative: “serious injustice” violations 
from the institution, its “institutional integrity”, and the possibility of opting for other 
institutional alternatives, can take forms not necessarily relevant to the legal sphere. By 
contrast, Franck’s construction of fairness as a principle of legitimacy, which is primarily 
normative, sees the synergy between a normative/procedural (‘right process’), and a 
moral/political (distributive justice) component. While none can dispute the moral nature of 
distributive justice, it is more difficult but crucial to spot that the reliance on regulatory 
processes for the formation of the legitimacy component is also based on a moral 
assumption, namely that the various actors will believe as legitimate a given regulatory 
process, if it is framed according to ‘right’ expectations.
287
 
Arguably, the same type of assumptions can be found in the four factors of legitimacy 
adopted. As seen, being all four expressions of process-based legitimacy, they also hinge on 
                                                     
286 This is in essence the criticism that critical legal scholars bring against lawyers engaging with legitimacy. See 
M Koskenniemi, ‘Miserable Comforters: International Relations as New Natural Law’ (2009) 15 European 
Journal of International Relations 395, at 409, asserting that the shift to legitimacy does not have any normative 
content, but instead justifies political choices already taken.  
287 In commenting Franck’s book, also Simpson is of a similar view, labeling such a way of assuming moral 
standards as “[…] an intuitive, unconvincing, and perhaps contradictory liberal populism.” Simpson, ‘Is 




political and moral rationales (‘fairness’, ‘promotion of democratic values’, and so on). 
Hence, when addressing the internal governance of each institution, the assumption will be 
that the more its governance reflects developed or developing countries interests, the more it 
will be perceived legitimate by one group or another; and the same applies to access and 
disbursement modalities. By the same token, participatory and accountability mechanisms 
are presumed to enhance institutional legitimacy from non-state actors, affected groups, 
NGOs, etc. Although based on reasoned arguments, these assumptions cannot be fully stated 




This finding leads to the further question of addressing the relationships between the 
four factors in their capacity to affect the legitimacy of a climate finance institution. Such 
relationships are indeed complex, because they eventually depend on the different interests 
and expectations of all relevant actors. For instance, while we can assume that well-
structured participatory and accountability processes enhance the legitimacy vis-à-vis 
external actors, it may as well be that the same processes can eventually slow-down and 
affect decision making at a point that actors would perceive the institution as not meeting its 
goals, with the result of reducing its output legitimacy.
289
 Similarly, a set of access and 
disbursement modalities designed to enhance the ‘country ownership’ of the funds, while 
likely to meet the legitimacy expectations of developing countries, might at the same time 
work against the contributors’ interest in the effective management of resources, if sound 
fiduciary standards are not adopted by the institution and implemented by national 
administrations. 
 Eventually, the relationships and balances between the four regulatory factors depend 
on the importance and prominence of the different actors’ interests and can vary according to 
                                                     
288 See also Kratochwil, ‘On Legitimacy’, supra note 36, at 302, who notes that  “[…] we also consider decisions 
legitimate when we approve of the specific result, even if the latter has a rather defective pedigree of procedural 
correctness.”  
289 On the uneasy balance between input and output factors in legitimacy see: Schmidt, ‘Democracy and 




each institutional reality. For example, an institution, displaying an internal governance 
favoring contributor states, will be more likely to enhance its legitimacy, if it also engenders 
some processes favoring the ‘country ownership’ of the recipient. Conversely, when the 
executive organ of the institution grants equal decision-making power between contributing 
and recipient states, then some processes favoring control of resources, like increasing the 
management of international implementing agencies, or stricter fiduciary standards, can 
enhance legitimacy from contributing states. 
 
Because these interconnections are as numerous as the complex political engagements 
between interests and actors, and because they are essentially of political or moral nature, the 
following analysis will have to rely on a further assumption –or better a simplification– that 
such relationships between regulatory factors will be addressed only when the findings will 
reveal obvious unbalances of interests, the risk being otherwise of entering into political and 




Legitimacy is a vital component for the effectivity of the regime complex of climate finance, 
as well as for individual climate finance institutions. Against the background of an 
institutional complex where each institution strives to foster its individual legitimacy against 
other competitors, the authoritative character of climate finance institutions has also led to 
several contestations and concerns about their legitimacy. 
From an analytical point of view, this work will investigate the individual legitimacy 
of some relevant climate finance institutions with a view of discovering how their 
legitimacies interrelate. Hence, this chapter has set some methodological and theoretical 






As a first step, it claimed that, rather than formal, the contested legitimacy of climate 
finance institutions is social and, therefore, related to that complex formation of belief in the 
validity of the authority. 
It then relied on the broad distinction between the input and output types of legitimacy 
which proved useful to focus on the legitimacy of institutional processes, rather than on the 
legitimacy of the rules enacted by the institutions. The distinction also paved the way for 
singling out four regulatory factors for the following comparative analysis: 
1– internal governance and decision-making procedures;  
2– access and disbursement modalities;  
3–  participatory processes for external actors; and 
4–  accountability mechanisms. 
 
The discovery of these factors is supported by empirical contestations from different 
actors (states, NGOs, and international institutions), and in different contexts, such as 
international negotiations or independent evaluations of single climate finance institutions. 
Importantly, these factors also reflect two major strands of international legal 
scholarship dealing with the issue of legitimacy in international law. On one side the third 
and fourth factors (participatory processes and accountability mechanisms) are reflection of 
democratic oppositions brought against global governance architectures; on the other, the 
two remaining (internal governance and access and disbursement modalities) reflect those 
claims seeing in procedural fairness a fundamental device for legitimacy. 
 
Finally, even if these regulatory factors reflect both the empirical and theoretical 
contestations of legitimacy, the chapter also considered the standard of review to be used 




On the first aspect, it has been argued that, because of the competing relationships 
between climate finance institutions, any individual legitimacy should be understood in 
relation to the others, so to frame a complex ‘interplay of legitimacies’, able to give also 
evidence of the regime complex of climate finance as a whole. 
The limits of this analytical approach relate to the fluid relationship that each standard 
has with the complex processes of social legitimacy, of which law is admittedly but one 
component. Therefore, the findings for each standard will rely on the assumption that they 
indeed are capable to affect the different interests of actors (contributor, recipient country, 










A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to ground the previous reflections and concerns about the 
legitimacy on a comparative analysis of selected climate finance institutions. It will unfold 
and distill regulatory elements that promote or restrain the legitimacy of an institution from 
its actors. However, before delving into the comparative analysis some methodological 
issues should be addressed. 
Firstly, the comparative analysis targets six institutions: the Global Environment 
Facility, the Adaptation Fund, the Clean Development Mechanism, the Green Climate Fund, 
the Climate Investment Funds, and the World Bank. The rationale of such selection stands 
on the fact that a thorough investigation of internal processes of all climate finance 
institutions would require an extraordinary empirical exercise and effort. Selectivity, 
however, requires methodological reasons for cherry-picking viable institutions. In this study 
two rationales are used. The first, more practical, relies on the relevance of the selected 
institution in terms of quantity of managed financial resources; the second, instead, relates to 
the importance attributed to the institution as to its innovative governance and centrality in 
climate change negotiations. While the five institutions all fall within the boundaries of these 
selective rationales, they nevertheless express institutional realities of very diverse legal 
nature and scope. Hence, the risk falling into a comparison of very different institutions is 
mitigated by the uniting characteristic that they are engaged into the very same activity of 
climate financing, by belonging to the same international composite administration. 
The different nature of the institutions prompts a second premise: that some regulatory 




instance, access and disbursement modalities regulations, typical of multilateral trust funds, 
are not present in market-based institutions as the CDM. 
Thirdly, the four regulatory factors conceptually overlap. By way of example, 
participatory processes and accountability mechanisms, in a way can also be part of internal 
governance and decision-making mechanisms, because of their potential to affect decisions 
and review of institutional acts. 
With such premises, the chapter is divided in four parts, each dedicated to one 
regulatory factor adopted in the previous chapter. Each part is sub-divided in a detailed 
analysis of ‘secondary laws’, and a comparative appraisal of how the regulatory factor is 
shaped and applied by each institution. The next, concluding, chapter will instead address the 
overall significance of this comparative analysis in conjunction with the findings in Part I. 
 
 
1. INTERNAL GOVERNANCE AND DECISION MAKING 
As discussed in the previous chapter, except for few general works and several case studies,
1
 
the legal aspects of internal governance of international institutions and their decision-
making has not attracted much attention in the legal scholarship. This might be due to the 
main focus by international lawyers on the more directly relevant consequences of 
International Organizations (IOs) as subjects of international law: hence, prominence has 
                                                     
1 AE Boyle and C Chinkin, The Making of International Law (OUP 2007); Alvarez, International Organizations 
as Law-makers; DD Bradlow, ‘The Reform of the Governance of the IFIs: a Critical Assessment’ in H Cisse and 
others (eds), The World Bank Legal Review: 3 (World Bank Publications 2011) 37-58; J Klabbers, An 
Introduction to International Institutional Law (2nd edn, CUP 2009), 153-65; A Reinisch, ‘Governance Without 
Accountability?’ (2002) 44 German Yearbook of International Law 270; I Venzke, ‘International Bureaucracies 
from a Political Science Perspective – Agency, Authority and International Institutional Law’ in A Bogdandy et 
al. (eds), The Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions (Springer 2010) 67-98; and J von 
Bernstorff, ‘Procedures of Decision-Making and the Role of Law in International Organizations’ (2008) 9 
German Law Journal 1939. On case studies of individual institutions see, for instance, MA Livermore, 
‘Authority and Legitimacy in Global Governance: Deliberation, Institutional Differentiation, and the Codex 
Alimentarius’ (2006) 81 New York University Law Review 766; M Smrkolj, ‘International Institutions and 
Individualized Decision-Making: An Example of UNHCR’s Refugee Status Determination’ in A Bogdandy and 
others (eds), The Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions (Springer 2010), 165-93; and A Lang 




been given to more traditional matters like responsibility, treaty-making capacity, privileges 
and immunities, and membership. 
Here the internal governance of an institution is conceptualized both in a broad and a 
narrow way. It is broad in the sense that the analysis will embrace the composition of organs, 
scope and structure of each institution, as well as the various decision making rules within 
each organ. It is narrow, because other elements that might fit within the concept of ‘internal 
governance’: informal engagements between bodies, constituencies and external actors will 
be set aside,
2
 because they regard dynamics that are not relevant under a legal analysis. 
1.1. The Global Environment Facility 
The backbone of internal governance rules of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) is its 
Instrument,
3
 adopted in 1994 at the end of a thorough set of reforms that transformed the 
GEF from a World Bank’s pilot to a fully-fledged and more independent entity.
4
 The GEF is 
the operational entity of various Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs)
5
 and, with 
regards to its liaison with the UNFCCC, both the treaty
6
 and a bilateral Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) between the COP and the GEF
7
 provide that the institution is under 
the guidance and accountable to the COP. The GEF Instrument sets up the GEF Council and 
its Chief Executive Officer (CEO), the GEF Assembly, a Secretariat, and a Scientific and 
Technical Advisory Panel (STAP).
8
 These GEF organs have been originally supported by 
three implementing agencies, which are also founding entities who adopted the instrument.  
These agencies are the World Bank,
9
 the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and the UN 
                                                     
2 For an understanding of formal and informal governance dynamics of an institution see RW Stone, Controlling 
institutions: international organizations and the global economy (CUP 2011), 11-48. 
3 Instrument Establishing the Global Environment Facility, Geneva, adopted on 16 March 1994, 33 ILM 1273, as 
amended [hereinafter the ‘Instrument’ or the ‘GEF Instrument’]. 
4 For a historical account, see Chapter II above, at 50. 
5 Ibid. 
6 UNFCCC, Article 11(1). 
7 Decision 12/CP.2, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.1, 19 October 1996, Annex. 
8 GEF Instrument, Section III. 
9 For the purposes of this Chapter, the term ‘World Bank’ refers only to the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development and the International Development Agency. As seen, the World Bank Group also comprises the 
International Finance Corporation, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, and the International Center 




Development Programme (UNDP). In order to make more effective and expand the choice 
and implementation modalities of its finance, the GEF has enlarged the number of 




1.1.1. The GEF Assembly 
The GEF Assembly is the representative body of all Participant states, comprising both 
contributors and recipients of the GEF Funds. It gathers every three years to evaluate 
operations and decide on the general policy strategies of the Facility.
11
 It also approves 
amendments to the Instrument by consensus, after recommendation of the Council. Aside 
from this last substantive prerogative, the Assembly primarily works as a forum of 
discussion and stock-taking of GEF’s activities and its reviews are taken into account by the 
Council when develops its working programmes.
12
 Each meeting is structured in a plenary 
and a series of thematic roundtables where participants can express their views, subsequently 
summarised by an elected Chair.
13
 
1.1.2. The GEF Council 
The Council is the GEF’s executive body. It is responsible for two crucial activities: i) it 
approves individual project proposals for funding; and ii) adopts the internal operational 
policies, regulations, strategies and working programmes, in line with the guidance provided 
by the various Conferences of the Parties (COPs) of Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
(MEAs).
14
 The Council is an inter-governmental body made of 32 members, elected by 
Participant States according to constituency groupings: 16 members belong to developing 
countries, 14 to developed ones and two to states from economies in transition.
15
 The 
election of constituency representatives –whose mandate is for three years– is a staged 
                                                     
10 See http://www.thegef.org/gef/gef_agencies. 
11 GEF Instrument, para 14. 
12 Ibid., para 15. 
13 See for instance, the latest GEF Assembly’s ‘Summary of Roundtables’, GEF/A.4/CRP.1/Rev.1, 26 May 2010. 
14 GEF Instrument, para 15. 




process based on consultations among participants. While geographical representation and 
commonality of environmental concerns constitute the criteria upon which developing 
countries should elect their constituency representatives, the main criterion for selection of 
contributing representatives is the amount of finance pledged at each GEF’s replenishment.
16
 
Being the place of actual decisions on finance disbursement, the GEF Council has a 
peculiar decision-making procedure which in part resembles the Board of the Executive 
Directors of the World Bank.
17
 The consensus rule is the first step to each decision followed 
by a formal vote at request of one Council member: the peculiarity is that such vote is based 
on a double weighted majority, as the necessary threshold to be reached for a positive vote is 
60% of participants at the Council meeting representing, at least, 60% of GEF Trust Funds’ 
total financial contributions.
18
 The same rules of procedure apply for the GEF Council 
meeting as the decisional body of the Least Developing Countries Fund and the Special 
Climate Change Fund of the UNFCCC, with only difference that non-participating states’ 
representatives can attend only as observers.
19
 
1.1.3. The GEF Agencies 
The realization of GEF financed projects and programmes requires extensive capacity at 
national and sub-national level where activities are implemented. While the GEF bodies have 
the responsibility to regulate and decide on the disbursement of funds, the actual 
implementation of projects is delegated to two types of agencies. First, other IOs aside from 
the original three agencies (UNEP, UNDP and the World Bank) have been appointed 
through time by the GEF Council as eligible entities to apply for individual projects 
                                                     
16 Ibid., Annex E. Constituency representatives are elected by consensus, see Rules of Procedure for the GEF 
Council, 3 November 1994, GEF/C.1/3/Rev.1 as amended in November 2006, para 7. 
17 See the relevant section on the World Bank below. 
18 GEF Instrument, para 25(b) and (c). In addition, the GEF Council’s rules of procedure envision a decision-
making activity without formal meeting. This is a flexible solution that allows the GEF CEO to seek specific 
approval by the Council on urgent matters. See Rules of Procedure for the GEF Council, supra, paras 43-7. 






 Secondly, and in addition to these international organizations, the GEF has also 
recently expanded the accreditation of implementing agencies to other international and 
national entities that demonstrated capacity
21
 to support developing countries in applying for 
GEF finance.
22
 Differently to the case of direct access, where developing countries 
administrations are accredited to apply under specific programmes, in this recent policy it is 
other non-state entities of national or international nature that are accredited.
23
 
1.1.4. The CEO, the Secretariat, the Evaluation Office and the STAP 
A peculiar institutional figure of the GEF is its CEO, appointed by the Council for a term of 
four years.
24
 Apart from directing Council meetings together with the Chairperson, the CEO 
heads the GEF Secretariat and holds a key decisional role in the project cycle.
25
 The 
Secretariat is a ‘functionally independent’ entity logistically supported by the World Bank: 
in other words, while its offices are physically located in the World Bank’s headquarters, the 
staff responds to the directives of the CEO and the Council. 
Because the GEF relies on a result-based model of management, its Council 
established an independent Evaluation Office
26
 carrying on different types of performance 
reviews. The more important of these are the Overall Performance Studies, implemented 
since the pilot phase of the GEF,
27
 which are prepared to inform each replenishment process 
of the GEF Trust Fund. 
                                                     
20 Currently they are the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the Inter-American Development 
Bank, and the UN Industrial Development Organization. See <http://www.thegef.org/gef/gef_agencies>. These 
agencies formally entered into Financial Procedures Agreements with the World Bank, which acts as a trustee of 
the GEF. 
21 This was done according to a specific accreditation process. See GEF Council, Accreditation Procedure for 
GEF Project Agencies, GEF/C.39/8/Rev.2, 18 Novebmer 2010. 
22 See GEF Council, Report on the Pilot Accreditation of GEF Project Agencies, GEF/C.44/09, 21 May 2013. 
23 While still passing through the accreditation process, for instance, GEF project agencies include the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature, the World Wildlife Fund, as well as national entities like the 
Fundo Brasileiro para a Biodiversidade or the Chinese Foreign Economic Cooperation Office. See supra, at 2-3. 
24 GEF Instrument, para 21. 
25 See section 1.1.4 below. 
26 See GEF Council, Terms of Reference for an Independent Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, 29 July 2003,  
<http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/TOR%20ME%20-%2007.29.03.pdf>. 
27 The first evaluation was carried by the three GEF agencies, see Global Environment Facility: Independent 




Scientific data and advice to the GEF Council on the various environmental areas of 
interest is provided by a Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel (STAP)
28
 comprising six 
members appointed by UNEP’s Executive Director in consultation with the other GEF’s 
Implementing Agencies. The role of the STAP is to offer strategic advice on global 




1.1.5. GEF Replenishments and the Trustee 
The GEF Trust Fund pools contributions made by industrialized states, which take place 
every four years through a separate replenishment process. Despite not explicitly regulated in 
the GEF Instrument,
30
 the cyclical replenishments of the GEF Trust Fund are of special 
importance for an understanding of the governance of this institution, given that they take 
formally place outside the GEF constituted bodies,
31
 and through a negotiating process that 
only recently opened its participation to non-contributing States and non-governmental 
entities. During replenishment negotiations, participant states find agreement on the share of 
individual pledges to the funds, and on several strategic and policy issues for the following 




The existence of a replenishment negotiating process separate from the competence of 
GEF Assembly is sign of a governance structure still balanced more towards contributing 
states than recipients. Despite steps towards opening participation to recipient countries 
during replenishments negotiations, it is unclear how procedurally such participation feeds 
                                                     
28 GEF Instrument, para 24. 
29 See the latest Terms of Reference to the STAP in GEF Council Decision, GEF/C.31/4, 14 May 2007, Annex I, 
paras 11-21. 
30 It is only provided that the Trustee is responsible to gather resources after a decision of the GEF Council. See 
GEF Instrument, para 10 and 20(e). 
31 But are still regulated by the GEF Council. 
32 See, for instance, the latest in GEF Council, Summary of Negotiations: Fifth Replenishment of the GEF Trust 




into the strategic programming, since no particular rules of procedure for replenishment 
negotiations apply. 
Another peculiar aspect of the governance of many multilateral climate funds is that 
administrative and financial management of transactions between the funds and other entities 
is carried by an external trustee working for the fund. The GEF and all the other funds 
analyzed in this chapter have appointed the World Bank as a trustee. Although this choice 
can be interpreted as a sign of the ubiquity of the World Bank in the management of public 
climate finance, its role is substantially limited by the terms of the trustee agreements with 
the various funds bodies. For instance the bilateral agreement between the GEF and the 
World Bank clarifies that any approval of commitment from the GEF Trust Fund to other 
entities is dependent on the approval by the GEF Council or its CEO,
33
 meaning that the 
World Bank does not have any decision-making power on disbursement. 
1.2. The Adaptation Fund 
As outlined in Chapter II,
34
 the Adaptation Fund finds its legal basis in the Kyoto Protocol. 
More specifically, it is provided that a share of proceeds from offset activities under the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
35
 should contribute also to “[…] assist developing 
country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to 
meet the costs of adaptation.”
36
 Through a series of decisions the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol (CMP) provided that the Adaptation 
Fund should work under the guidance and be accountable to the CMP.
37
 Two years later it 
                                                     
33 See the GEF – World Bank’s Financial Procedures Agreement, 8 February 2002, 
<http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/document/IBRD%20FPA%20Feb%202002.pdf>; 
among other tasks, the CEO has the executive authority to filter initial project funding proposals and to provide 
the final endorsement at the end of the project cycle, after approval of the GEF Council. See GEF, ‘Policies and 
Procedures for the GEF Cycle’, November 2008, paras 3-7, and 15, 
<http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/GEF%20Policies%20and%20Procedures%20for%20
GEF%20Project%20Cycle.pdf>. 
34 See at 79. 
35 On the nature and functioning of this mechanism in the context of climate finance see above, at 67. 
36 Kyoto Protocol, Article 12(8). 




established an Adaptation Fund Board (AFB) as the decision-making body of the fund acting 
under the authority and guidance of the CMP.
38
 
Compared to the GEF, the institutional governance of the Adaptation Fund is less 
articulated and mainly expressed by the activity and design of the AFB. While the functions 
of a plenary organ are exerted by the CMP, the AFB is responsible inter alia for developing 
strategic priorities policies, guidelines and for deciding on the approval of individual 
projects.
39
 An original task of the AFB is to manage the monetization of CDM credits as 
allocated by the Executive Board of the CDM.
 40
 As seen this source of revenues has been 
virtually replaced by direct contributions after the plummeting of the CERs price in the 
carbon market.
41
 The AFB comprises 16 members representing Kyoto Protocol Parties 
according to a balanced representation of regional and economic groups,
42
 which assigns 
roughly a 69 percent of representation to developing countries.
43
 Consensus is the general 
decision-making rule, but when this cannot be reached a two-thirds majority of the attendees 
can pass decisions.
44
 Arguably, then, both the rules on composition and decision-making of 
the AFB give a prevalent decisional role to developing countries. 
The AFB has its own Secretariat, currently located ad interim within the GEF 
Secretariat.
45
 Probably, such a choice is due to secure a coordinated management with the 
other two UNFCCC-based adaptation funds, the Special Climate Change Fund and the Least 
Developed Countries Fund.
46
 Hence, not only the Adaptation Fund Secretariat is physically 
                                                     
38 Decision 1/CMP.3, UN Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2007/9/Add.1, 14 March 2008. 
39 Ibid., para 3. 
40 The share of proceeds amounts to 2% of Certified Emissions Reduction units (CERs), issued by the Executive 
Board of the CDM for each registered project. 
41 See above Chapter II, at 80. 
42 Decision 1/CMP.3, supra note 38, para 6. Two representatives from each of the five UN regional groups; one 
representative from small island developing States; one from least developed countries; two from Annex I and 
two from non-Annex I countries to the convention. UN regional groups comprise the African Group; the Asia-
Pacific Group; the Eastern European Group; the Latin American and Caribbean Group; and the Western 
European and Others Group: see at <http://www.un.org/depts/DGACM/RegionalGroups.shtml>. 
43 See <https://www.adaptation-fund.org/about/the-board>. 
44 Decision 1/CMP.3, supra note 38, para 12. 
45 Decision 1/CMP.4, UN Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2008/11/Add.2, 19 March 2009, Annex II; this interim provision 
has been extended until the 2014 CMP: see Dec.4/CMP.8, UN Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/13/Add.2, 28 February 
2013, para 5. The previous agreement was to have a Secretariat functionally independent, yet within the 
UNFCCC administration (Decision 1/CMP.3, supra, para 18). 




located in the World Bank’s headquarters, but –as it is for the GEF– the Bank also acts as 
trustee of the AF. 
Given its limited technical capacity and geographical presence, also the Adaptation 
Fund relies on the work of implementing entities, which file proposals and implement 
financed projects. Contrary to the GEF and the GCF, no international implementing agency 
directly participated in the design of the AF. This has likely left the AFB with some margin 
of discretion as to the modalities of engagement with implementing agencies. The basic 
choice was to allow both national and international entities to apply through an accreditation 
process and according to its own fiduciary standards.
47
 Currently, accredited implementing 
entities can be national, regional or multilateral. While the last two include multilateral 
development banks, other international organizations and funds,
48
 the accreditation of 
national administrations as eligible entities to tap into the Adaptation Fund represents a form 
of direct access and an innovative mean of resources disbursement in climate finance. 
1.3. The Clean Development Mechanism 
As the nature and the functioning of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) are 
different from the ones of other climate finance processes, the same stands for its governance 
which reflects a hybrid character of a mechanism combining public management and private 
sector’s implementation through carbon market incentives.
49
 The functioning of the CDM 
hinges on a central supervisory body, the Executive Board (EB), and on the participation of 
public and private entities for the approval, implementation and monitoring of carbon 
mitigation projects in developing countries. The various steps that lead an individual project 
proponent to realize a mitigation activity and earn verified Certified Emissions Reductions 
                                                     
47 See AFB, Operational Policies and Guidelines for Parties to Access Resources from the Adaptation Fund, no 
date, paras 27-39, <https://www.adaptation-fund.org/policies_guidelines>. 
48 The current multilateral agencies are: the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, 
UNDP, UNEP, the World Bank, the World Meteorological Organization, the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development, the UN Food Programme, and the UN Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization. See 
<https://www.adaptation-fund.org/multilateral-implementing-entities>. 




(CERs) are determined by detailed regulations on the CDM project cycle,
50
 aimed at 
guaranteeing that the project contributes to the sustainable development of the country and 
generates actual emissions reductions.
51
 
1.3.1. The Executive Board 
The EB is the supervisory body of the CDM established by the CMP
52
 and covering 
numerous and crucial functions within the CDM project cycle. Among such functions, the 
EB approves new methodologies to assess the baselines and additionality
53
 of project 
typologies; decides on the registration of each project in the CDM pipeline and on the 
issuance of CERs to project participants, once emission reductions are verified; it directly 
regulates substantive and procedural aspects of the mechanism; and it is competent on 
deciding about requests for reviews raised for individual projects.
54
 
The EB comprises ten states representatives (and ten alternates) from Kyoto Protocol 
Parties with a mandate of two years and nominated according to a procedure guaranteeing 
geographical balance in the composition.
55
 The decision-making rule is consensus with the 
supplementary exercise of a three-fourths majority of the EB meeting participants, if 
consensus on single items cannot be reached. The quorum for the validity of EB meetings is 
two-thirds of the members, while both a majority of Annex I and non-Annex I country 
                                                     
50 For a comprehensive overview of the CDM project cycle see M Netto and K Barani Schmidt, ‘The CDM 
Project Cycle and the Role of the UNCCC Secretariat’ in D Freestone and C Streck (eds), Legal Aspects of 
Carbon Trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen, and Beyond (OUP 2009) 213-30. 
51 These are the two core principles of the CDM. See Kyoto Protocol, Article 12(2). 
52 Decision 3/CMP.1, UN Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1, 30 March 2006, para 5. 
53 A CDM baseline represents the business-as-usual emissions occurring for a given activity in the absence of a 
CDM project, while the concept of additionality consists of the requirement that emissions reductions would not 
take place without a CDM project. The concept of additionality as historically applied by the EB has been 
contested in several aspects. See A Michaelowa, ‘Interpreting the Additionality of CDM Projects’ in D Freestone 
and C Streck (eds), Legal Aspects of Carbon Trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen, and Beyond (OUP 2009) 248-271, at 
249; and C Streck, ‘Ensuring New Finance and Real Emission Reduction: A Critical Review of the Additionality 
Concept’ (2011) 2 Carbon and Climate Law Review 158. 
54 Decision 3/CMP.1, supra note 52, para 5. On the role of requests for reviews as an accountability mechanism, 
see below section 4.2. 
55 More specifically, “[…] One member from each of the five United Nations regional groups, two other 
members from the Parties  included in Annex I, two other members from the Parties not included in Annex I, and 




representatives must be present.
56
 EB members must hold sufficient technical expertise, take 
an oath of service and declare their conflict of interests for individual decisions.
57
 
Given the different functions and role of this body in respect to the executive bodies of 
other climate funds, the CMP has bestowed the EB with peculiar regulatory powers that 
affect both states and private actors, as independent auditors, projects proponents and 
investors.
58
 As a consequence, through years of practice the EB has generated a conspicuous 
amount of regulation specifying the standards laid down in CMP decision and addressing 
several substantive aspects. Importantly, it also adopted an internal rule clarifying the 
hierarchy of its classes of decisions and regulatory instruments.
59
 
1.3.1. Designated National Authorities and Designated Operational Entities 
A unique feature of the CDM is the inclusion of national authorities and private entities in 
the governance structure. Because the CDM is a voluntary mechanism seeking to promote 
sustainable development in developing countries, the modalities and procedures adopted by 
the CMP require that participating countries nominate a Designated National Authority 
(DNA) to confirm the national sustainable development requirements for each project and to 
issue letters of approval of proposed projects before the EB decides on their registration.
60
 
Thus, DNAs can potentially apply a preliminary filter as to the viability and compliance of 
proposed projects with national environmental and sustainable development laws of the host 
country. Contrary to the case of the national implementing entities in the Adaptation Fund, 
DNAs do not need to comply with any fiduciary or environmental and social standards, 
because they do not manage the financial resources mobilized for CDM projects. 
                                                     
56 Respectively, Ibid., paras 15 and 14. 
57 See Ibid., para 8(e) and (f). 
58 C Streck and J Lin, ‘Making Markets Work: A Review of CDM Performance and the Need for Reform’ (2008) 
19 European Journal of International Law 409, at 416. 
59 See CDM Executive Board Decision and Documentation Framework, EB Rep. 67, Annex 4. Decision classes 
divide in i) Regulatory decisions; ii) Operational decisions; iii) and Rulings. Instead, the different types of 
instruments adopted are a) standards; b) procedures; c) guidelines; d) clarifications; e) ruling notes; f) information 
notes; and g) forms. 




Designated Operational Entities (DOEs) are private audit companies, which are 
accredited by the CMP under recommendation of the EB and are delegated with the task of 
securing that certain requirements are fulfilled by project developers during various phases 
of the project cycle. Differently from DNAs, DOEs need to fulfill special accreditation 
standards that promote independence and integrity of such entities.
61
 The EB is responsible 
to monitor whether compliance with such requirements is maintained by each DOE and in 
case it can recommend the CMP to suspend or withdraw DOEs from accreditation. Finally, 
CDM regulations state that DOEs are accountable to the CMP and that in their activity they 
must comply with the national law of the country hosting CDM projects.
62
 
1.4. The Green Climate Fund 
As a brand new institution of the UNFCCC COP, the GCF has been set up to become a key 
player in long-term climate finance under the umbrella of the pledge made by industrialised 
countries to deliver a significant share of the ‘Copenhagen pledge’.
63
 At the time of writing 
the GCF is yet to become operational, although its Board has been adopting several decisions 
on key aspects for the future functioning of this institution. This means that any appraisal of 
the components and indicators of legitimacy of the GCF here is inevitably partial and might 
become outdated after future decisions and practice. Yet from the basic documents founding 
and framing the work of the GCF it is possible to grasp some defining features. In fact, the 
general structure of the GCF governance somehow replicates the one of other multilateral 
climate funds, by bestowing core executive functions on a Board, while administrative, 
financial management and implementing functions are respectively carried by an 
independent Secretariat, a trustee, and various implementing entities. 
                                                     
61 Ibid., Appendix A. The standards are specified by an EB decision: see CDM Accreditation Standard for 
Operational Entities, EB Rep. 67, Annex 5. 
62 Ibid, at paras 26 and 27(c). 




1.4.1. The GCF Board 
The COP decision establishing the GCF sets up a Board comprising 24 states representatives 
(and 24 alternates) shared in equal number between developing and developed countries.
64
 
The Governing Instrument of the GCF
65
 specifies that the 12 Board’s seats for developing 
countries shall be distributed according to geographical constituencies.
66
 The Board is 
accountable to and shall follow the guidance of the COP. It also has “full responsibility” for 
funding decisions.
67
 GCF Board members are elected for a three years term and should 
match minimum expertise and technical skills in the area of climate change and development 
finance.
68
 The affairs and meetings of the Board are directed by two co-Chairs, respectively 
nominated by the two developed and developing countries’ constituencies. 
Decision-making procedures are only broadly defined in the Governing Instrument: 
while the basic rule of decision-making is consensus, the same document leaves to the Board 
the definition of further procedures in case of lack of consensus on individual items. Being 
crucial for the functioning of the GCF, the matter is still under negotiations within the GCF, 
with the options being either a weighted and qualified majority vote according to states 
contributions, or simple qualified majority of the participants.
69
 
The COP assigned an ample set of functions to the Board, which are found also in 
other multilateral funds, such as approving the necessary regulatory tools for 
operationalizing the fund, including access modalities, funding structures, project cycle 
procedures, and social safeguards and fiduciary principles. A particular task, however, is the 
possibility for the Board to establish additional ‘thematic windows’ of finance apart from 
adaptation and mitigation, in this way leaving the Board with some discretion on how to 
                                                     
64 Decision 1/CP.16, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 15 March 2011, para 102. 
65 Adopted by the COP in Decision 3/CP.17, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, Annex. [hereinafter the GCF 
Governing Instrument]. 
66 Three members from Asia-Pacific states; three from African; three from Latin American and Caribbean; one 
from Small Island Developing states; one from Least Developed Countries; and one from developing countries 
not belonging to any of those constituencies. See Ibid., para 11. 
67 Ibid., para 5. 
68 Ibid., para 11. An important innovation is the adoption of the principle of gender balance in the composition of 
the Board. 
69 See L Schalatek, Setting the Course: the Third Meeting of the Green Climate Fund Board, Heinrich Böll 




structure its disbursement channels,
70
 and to enter into inter-institutional arrangements with 
the aim of promoting complementarity with other parallel funds and financing mechanisms.
71
 
1.4.2. The GCF Secretariat 
The GCF is seconded by an independent Secretariat headed by an Executive Director elected 
by the Board. While resembling the figure of the GEF CEO, the Governing Instrument does 
not expressly assign to the Director any role in decision making on funding issues. 
Differently to the case of the GEF and the Adaptation Fund, the future GCF Secretariat will 
be based in the headquarters of the fund in Songdo in the Republic of Korea. However, in 
view of its full establishment, currently the GEF Secretariat is providing ad interim 
secretarial services. The GCF Secretariat is vested with administrative, legal, and financial 
management functions:
72
 differently from the GEF, the GCF is conferred with legal 
personality and legal capacity limited to the exercise of its functions.
73
  
1.4.3. The Private Sector Facility 
As the pledge on long-term finance made by industrialized states envisions that part of the 
yearly USD 100 billion should come both from public and private sources,
74
 the UNFCCC 
Parties have been careful in including in the governance structure of the GCF a Private 
Sector Facility.
75
 While it is provided that the facility “[…] will promote the participation of 
private sector actors in developing countries, in particular local actors, including small- and 
medium-sized enterprises and local financial intermediaries […]”,
76
 it is still uncertain 
whether it will constitute just an additional access modality or if some level of participation 
                                                     
70 GCF Governing Instrument, para, 18.  
71 Ibid., para 34. 
72 Ibid., paras 19-23. 
73 Ibid., para 17. 
74 Decision 1/CP.16, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 11 March 2011, para 99. The COP “[…] agrees that, in 
accordance with para 1(e) of the Bali Action Plan, funds provided to developing country Parties may come from a 
wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources.” [emphasis 
added75 GCF Governing Instrument], paras 41-44. 
75 GCF Governing Instrument], paras 41-44. 








1.4.4. The trustee and the evaluation unit 
In the same fashion to other multilateral funds, the GCF will rely on the World Bank to 
provide administrative services as a trustee of the Fund. In this regard, the Governing 
Instrument also states that the trustee services shall be subject to review on a three year 
basis.
78
 In addition and in similar fashion to the GEF, the Instrument also establishes an 
independent evaluation unit to carry periodical reviews on the performance of the fund.
79
 
1.5. The Climate Investment Funds 
The Climate Investment Funds (CIFs), forged in 2008 in the aftermath of the Bali Action 
Plan, represent a unique collaborative effort by the major Multilateral Development Banks 
(MDBs) to pilot concerted climate finance under a peculiar governance structure.
80
 
The CIFs have been established by a recommendation of the Board of Executive 
Directors of the World Bank
81
 and follow a bi-headed structure with the presence of two 
parallel Committees governing two separate funds, the Climate Technology Fund (CTF) and 
the Strategic Climate Fund (SCF). The rationale for this dichotomy is due to the different 
aims and administrative and governance requirements.
82
 The CTF’s scope is to “provide 
scaled-up financing to contribute to demonstration, deployment and transfer of low-carbon 
technologies with a significant potential for long-term greenhouse gas emissions savings.”
83
 
On the other hand, the SCF supports the piloting of “new development approaches or to 
scale-up activities aimed at specific climate change challenge or sectoral response through 
                                                     
77 The recent options brought to the Board do yet not address this issue. See GCF, Business Model Framework: 
Structure and Organization, GCF/B.04/08, 10 June 2013, paras 11-21. 
78 See GCF Governing Instrument, paras 24-7. After the interim period, the new trustee will be appointed 
according to a bidding process. 
79 Ibid., paras 59-62. 
80 See also Chapter II, at 95. 
81 See Minutes of Meeting of the Executive Directors of the Bank and IDA, 19 August 2008, M2008-0052, para 3. 
82 See World Bank, Climate Investment Funds: The Clean Technology Fund and the Strategic Climate Fund, 9 
June 2008, Doc. No 44168, para 21. 






 In other words, while the CTF targets long-term emissions reductions 
programmes in middle income countries, the SCF is envisioned as a flexible ‘umbrella fund’ 
to finance specific programmes. Currently the SCF branches off into a Forest Investment 
Programme, a Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience and a Programme for Scaling-Up 
Renewable Energy in Low Income Countries.
85
 
1.5.1. The CIFs Committees 
Both the CTF and SCF are governed by their own Trust Fund Committees (TFCs) 
comprising 18 members: eight representatives from contributor countries,
86
 eight from 
recipient countries, a senior representative from the World Bank, and a representative of the 
other partnering MDBs as identified by the MDBs Committee.
87
 Committee participants –
elected for a period of 18 months– are divided between decision making and non-decision 
making members: accordingly, only states representatives can express consent or dissent on 
specific agenda items.
88
 The decision-making rule is consensus, while there is no provision 
on majority vote with the consequence that, when objection is expressed by a Committee 
member, the matter is either rejected or postponed.
 89
 Both the Committees are chaired by 
two members, one from the contributor and one from the eligible recipient countries’ groups. 
The CIFs Committees are vested with functions similar to the other funds under 
analysis in this chapter. While they are responsible for approving general portfolio decisions 
and for deciding on the finance of individual projects and programmes,
90
 a distinguishing 
                                                     
84 Ibid., para 6. 
85 See <https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/node/3>. 
86 To become a donor country Committee member a minimum contribution to the Trust Fund is needed. 
87 See respectively the Governance Framework for the Clean Technology Fund, November 2008, as amended in 
December 2011, para 19, <https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/keydocuments/CTF>; and Governance 
Framework for the Strategic Climate Fund, November 2008, as amended in December 2011, para 14, 
<https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/keydocuments/SCF> [hereinafter ‘CIF Governance Framework 
Documents’]. Interestingly, the membership of the CTF-TFC is also given to representative of recipient countries, 
when the Committee decides on projects proposed for that country. 
88 Ibid., respectively para 20, and 15. 
89 Ibid., respectively para 27 and 22. The quorum of the meeting is two-thirds of the decision making members. 
There is also the option of adopting decisions without physical meetings, based on a non-objection procedure. See 
Rules of Procedure of the Meetings of the Trust Fund Committee of the Climate Technology Fund and the parallel 
for the Strategic Climate Fund, November 2008, as amended in December 2011, 
<https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org>.  




feature is that specific access modalities procedures, fiduciary standards and environmental 
and social safeguards are applied by each MDB competent on the project.
91
 
Given that the SCF is divided in sub-programmes, three additional sub-Committees 
have been created to match the different participation of contributing and recipient countries. 
Yet, whenever matters with relevance to both the CTF-TFC and the SCT-TFC are proposed, 
joint meetings of the two committees are convened.
92
 
1.5.2. The MDBs Committee 
The MDB Committee of the CIFs was recalled in a previous part of this work as an example 
of an inter-institutional effort to promote complementarity.
93
 As the name tells, the MDB 
Committee is the body within the CIF governance where representatives of participating 
MDBs meet to promote general coordination, information exchange and monitoring of 
specific programmes and projects.
94
 In particular, the MDB Committee is responsible inter 
alia for the identification of specific areas of cooperation among MDBs and the alignment of 
their programmes with the ones of the CIFs.
95
 The MDB Committee does not have any 
decisional role in the governance framework, but, given that the specific policies and 
operational modalities of each MDB de facto apply to CIFs programmes, its existence is 
crucial in guaranteeing coordination and compatibility of those regulations with the CIF’s 
aims. Another particular feature of the MDBs Committee is that it is responsible for 
reviewing recommendations prepared by the Administrative Unit:
96
 arguably, this 
prerogative allows the MDBs Committee to substantially inform the work and decisions of 
the Trust Fund Committees. 
                                                     
91 World Bank, Climate Investment Funds, supra note 82, para 26. 
92 This is not envisioned in the founding documents but done in practice.  
93 See Chapter III above, at 136. 
94 CIF Governance Framework Documents, supra note 87, para 34. 
95 Ibid. 




1.5.3. The Administrative Unit, the Partnership Forum and the Trustee 
Both administrative and trustee services of the CIFs are provided by the World Bank. Aside 
from typical administrative services, the CIFs Administrative Unit can also make 
recommendations on “programme criteria and priorities” to the two CIFs Committees.
97
 The 
Governance Framework documents do not specify the level of legal independence of the 
Administrative Unit from the rest of the World Bank, hence it can be questioned whether de 
facto it is the World Bank to recommend the CIFs Committees on substantive issues. 
A peculiar body of the CIFs is the Partnerships Forum, which works as a periodic 
stakeholder meeting open to different kind of governmental and non-governmental entities. 
Its significance in terms of opening to participation will be addressed below in the relevant 
part of this chapter. 
1.6. The World Bank 
In terms of personnel number, mobilised finance and pervasiveness in different regions of 
the world, the World Bank dwarfs all the other institutions in this comparative analysis. As 
seen in the first part of this work,
98
 the World Bank Group, a group of five different legal 
entities,
99
 was the IO created in the aftermath of World War II with the task of assisting the 
reconstruction, development and stabilization of states economies in difficulty. Originally, 
the idea at the Bretton Woods conference was to create a bank to support countries that at 
that time were severely affected by the devastation of the war. Through the years, the Bank –
also through the legal opinions of its General Counsel– extended its mandate so as to cover 
                                                     
97 Ibid., para 37(b). 
98 See Chapter II, at 84. 
99 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Agency 
(IDA), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and 
the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). A reminder is that throughout this 




other areas of intervention for the purposes of international development.
100
 The mandate 
extended to the promotion and protection of the environment.
101
 
In sharp distinction with the other institutions addressed above, the World Bank is not 
a fund or a mechanism of hybrid finance. Like the other MDBs active in climate finance, it is 
a financial institution that leverages capitals by different means, including (and especially) 
by borrowing in global financial markets through its highly rated bonds.
102
 From what it is 
emerging in this section, the World Bank is also the trustee and promoter of virtually all trust 
funds for climate financing under scrutiny here, including funds dedicated to carbon 
finance.
103
 Moreover, it also provides logistical support to the AF and personnel 
administrative support to the Secretariats of the GEF and the CIFs, with the only difference 
that the latter are not formally independent from the World Bank’s administration. 
As a consequence, both for its size and its nature of an international financial 
institution this results in a different and complex governance structure which hinges on three 
main bodies: the Board of Governors, the Board of the Executive Directors and the President 
of the World Bank. 
1.6.1. The Board of Governors and the Board of Executive Directors 
The Articles of Agreement of the World Bank state that “all the powers of the Bank shall be 
vested in the Board of Governors”.
104
 The body comprises a member and an alternate for 
each of the Bank’s members to serve for a period of five years, meeting at least once a year. 
                                                     
100 IFI Shihata (ed), The World Bank Legal Papers (Brill 2000), 160-73. 
101 D Freestone, The World Bank and Sustainable Development (Martinus Nijhoff 2012), 9-10, who notices that 
this was done by interpreting an environmental mandate of the Bank according to the aim of mobilising capital 
for “productive purposes”, according to Article I(i) of the Bank’s Articles of Agreement. 
102 For general information, see <http://go.worldbank.org/LAG4BZ1VD1>. 
103 For the structure and list of the World Bank’s funds see Chapter II above, at 81. 
104 Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Washington DC, 
adopted on 27 December 1945, entered in force on 27 December 1945, 2 UNTS 39 [hereinafter ‘the Articles of 
Agreement’], Section 2(a). The amended and updated version is <http://go.worldbank.org/WAUZA5KF90>. See 
also the Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association, approved for submission to 
Governments by the Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on 26 
January 1960, 439 UNTS 249. The amended and updated version is <http://www.worldbank.org/ida/articles-
agreement/IDA-articles-of-agreement.pdf>. The IBRD and IDA share the same governance and body 
composition although being two different entities. Boards’ membership and Presidency of the IBRD is extended 
ex officio to the IDA to the extent the IBRD member is also a party to the IDA. In addition, the IDA shall not 




Given that currently the IBRD’s membership counts 188 states and the IDA 172, in order to 
guarantee a more effective governance, almost the totality of the powers of the Governors 
has been delegated to the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors.
105
 
The latter is the organ that meets on a continuous basis to conduct the general 
operations of the Bank.
106
 Currently, the Board counts 25 Executive Directors and alternates 
in charge for a term of two years,
107
 five are appointed by each of the members with the 
largest number of capital shares, and the other 20 are elected by the remaining members 
divided in 20 constituencies,
108
 according to voting procedures adopted by the Board of 
Governors during its annual meetings. 
Being a capital-based institution, a crucial aspect of the World Bank’s governance is 
its regulation on voting both for the Board of Governors and for the Board of Executive 
Directors. While the general rule of decision making is the majority of the votes,
109
 the 
quantity of votes that can be cast by a member are equal to the sum of ‘basic votes’ equally 
distributed among all members, plus the ‘share votes’ which amount to the sum of the capital 
stock shares owned by each member.
110
 If that is so for the Board of Governors, the Articles 
of Agreement specify that Executive Directors can instead cast a number of votes equal to 
the sum of basic and share votes related to their constituency.
111
 Such a sophisticated 
weighted majority vote assigns different levels of voting powers to Governors and Executive 
                                                     
105 The crucial prerogatives that cannot be delegated by the Board of Governors are to: i) admit new members and 
determine the conditions of their admission; ii) increase the capital stock; iii) suspend a member; iv) decide 
appeals from interpretations given by the Board of Executive Directors; v) make arrangements to cooperate with 
other international organizations; vi) decide to suspend permanently the operations of the Bank; and vii) 
determine the distribution of the net income of the Bank. See the Articles of Agreement, Section 2(b). 
106 Ibid., Article V, Section 4(a). 
107 Originally the Articles of Agreement provided for a total number of 12 members with the possibility of 
increasing the composition with the 80 percent of the votes of the Board of Governors. See the Articles of 
Agreement, Article V, Section 4(b). On the current number of Executive Directors see 
<http://go.worldbank.org/N3GU9N02W0>. 
108 The five states with the largest capital shares are US, UK, France, Germany and Japan. There are also one-
country constituencies for China, Saudi Arabia and Russia (sharing the constituency with Syria). For the list of 
current IBRD Executive Directors and their constituencies see 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/278027-1215526322295/BankExecutiveDirectors.pdf>. 
109 See the Articles of Agreement, Article V, Section 3(b). Exemptions are made for several circumstances like, 
for instance, the increase of number of the Executive Directors. 
110 Ibid. Section 3(a). 






Directors, with the consequence that prominence is given to countries that hold high capital 
shares. 
The Board of Executive Directors retains crucial duties and responsibilities including 
the ones of deciding on individual projects’ finance and adopting or amending internal 
regulations.
112
 These comprise a complex set of Operational Policies (OPs) and Bank’s 
Procedures (BPs) directed to the Bank’s staff and management.
113
 Among other matters, 
these regulations lay down several social and environmental safeguards in relation to 
projects and set rules on the establishment and management of trust funds.
114
 As to be treated 
below, the relationship between World Bank’s internal regulations on trust funds and the 





1.6.2. The President, the administrative structure, and the Independent Evaluation 
Group 
The third key figure of the World Bank’s governance is its President which is elected by the 
Board of Executive Directors and stays in charge until the Board decides so.
116
 The President 
is responsible for the conduct of general affairs of the bank and is the chief of staff of the 
Bank. The President does not have any voting power unless his vote is required to define a 
majority. 
                                                     
112 The IBRD By-laws, <http://go.worldbank.org/3PMBT6T7E0> state in Section 15 that: “The Executive 
Directors are authorized by the Board of Governors to adopt such rules and regulations, including financial 
regulations, as may be necessary or appropriate to conduct the business of the Bank.”  
113 DD Bradlow and DB Hunter (eds), International Financial Institutions and International Law (Kluwer Law 
International 2010), at 26, who speak of a ‘soft lex specialis’ enacted by the Bank. The World Bank Operational 
Policies and Bank’s Procedures (OPs and BPs) are <http://go.worldbank.org/4D2JSWFIW0>. 
114 See, respectively, OP series 4, and OP 14.40. 
115 See the sub-section 1.7 below. 
116 Articles of Agreements, Article V, Section 5(a). The seat is traditionally reserved to a US representative while 




 A complex and distributed administration underpins the operations of the Bank and is 
divided in several departmental units with more than 9.000 employees and 100 national and 
regional offices around the world.
117
 
Finally, and in line with the experience of the GEF, the Bank has an Independent 
Evaluation Group with 30 years of experience in independent assessments of the Bank’s 
performance both at project and country level. The group is a unit internal to the 
administration which reports directly to the Board of Directors.
118
 
1.7. Analysis of internal governance and decision making 
There are already some outcomes, which are worth carving out from the analysis of this the 
first regulatory factor as adopted in the previous chapter.
119
 There are two different angles, 
both relevant under a legal perspective, from which it is possible to make a comparative 
appraisal of the internal governance and decision making. The first one relates to the 
composition and decision-making rules within the various executive bodies of those 
institutions, because they assign different weight to industrialized and developing countries 
respectively. The second relates to how and to what extent governance structures have 
developed and informed the governance of other institutions. 
 
There are many similarities and some discrepancies between the various organs’ 
compositions and their decision-making rules. In general and to different degrees, however 
more decisional power is granted to developed states contributing to the various funds. Such 
finding does not come as surprise, since its rationale can be explained by the interest of 
donor countries in ensuring control on the sound and efficient disbursement of finance. 
Nevertheless, it can still be questioned whether this model of governance still reflects not 
                                                     
117 See <http://go.worldbank.org/B6U4HPNDS0> 
118 See World Bank, Operations Evaluation Department: the First 30 years, 2003, 
<http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/24cc3bb1f94ae11c85256808006a0046/5c22e38fcca5c9e28525
6d1f0071dc19/$FILE/OED_30yrs.pdf>. 




only the political balances in UNFCCC negotiations,
120
 but also whether it complies with the 
requirement of “equitable and balanced representation of all Parties” stressed in the 
UNFCCC
121
 as well as with the principle of country ownership set forth in the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.
122
 More importantly, it might be questioned whether the 
model accurately reflects a reasonable fairness threshold of this regulatory factors in relation 
to the particular nature of climate finance, which does not and should not boil down to mere 
official development assistance. 
On the other side, it must be noticed also a recent shift towards enhanced developing 
countries representation and voting weight as marked by the AF and the GCF, although for 
the latter it will much depend on the not yet defined voting rules of the GCF Board. 
 
Proposing, then, a division of decision-making processes between those that favor 
contributing states and those that instead assign a stronger role to the recipients of finance, 
the following distribution emerges: 
Table 1: Contributing and recipient countries’ prevalence in executive organ’s membership and 
decision making rules of selected climate finance institutions 
Contributing countries’ 
prevalence 









                                                     
120 On the changed political dynamics in climate negotiations see Chapter I, at 22. 
121 UNFCCC, Article 11(2). It might be argued however that the provision refers exclusively to the Financial 
Mechanism of the Convention and not to entities external to the UNFCCC, it therefore would be of relevance 
only for the GEF and the GCF as appointed operational entities. 
122 OECD, Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Plan of Action, done respectively on 2 March 
2005 and 4 September 2008, para 14, <http://www.oecd.org/development/effectiveness/34428351.pdf>. 
Although not binding under international law, the principle of country ownership applies at all the levels of 
international aid. As to other institutions and other multilateral fora, para 14 of the Paris Declaration might be 
relevant inasmuch it states that recipient countries will “Take the lead in co-ordinating aid at all levels in 
conjunction with other development resources in dialogue with  donors and encouraging the participation of civil 




Both the World Bank and the GEF grant ample representation in their ‘political 
bodies’ to all participant states. Yet when it comes to their executive organs, weighted 
majority rules take into account the economic effort of each state in the capital base or in the 
trust funds, and as a consequence, this results in a stronger influence of industrialised states 
in the decision making processes. Certainly, the core differences as to the governance of the 
two institutions must be taken into account, especially for the reason that the World Bank is 
an international financial institution based on a corporate model, while the GEF is primarily 
a trust fund managing entity, whose corporate governance nature is only partial.
123
 
On a more neutral position, the Green Climate Fund, the CIFs and the CDM hold a 
balanced decision making structure between industrialized and developing countries. 
However, such balancing takes place by different means, as the institutions act according to 
very dissimilar climate finance modalities, whereby the GCF and the CIFs operate under a 
multilateral, trust fund-based finance model, and the CDM being a hybrid mechanism rather 
works according to the logics of the carbon markets. As described above, the Board of the 
GCF counts an even share of members between developed and developing countries,
124
 
while voting rules are yet to be defined. Similarly, the two CIFs’ Committees guarantee an 
even membership between contributing and recipient countries and decide exclusively under 
consensus. In the case of the CIFs (but also of the GCF if no further rules are adopted), the 
lack of any weighted or simple majority vote is significant to the extent that decisions can be 
blocked by express objections from at least one Committee member, representing either a 
contributing or a recipient country. 
Conversely, a balance between Annex I and non-Annex I countries in the EB is 
maintained by the wide geographical representation of the ten EB members and through a 
qualified majority vote that takes into account both countries blocks. Furthermore, the 
                                                     
123 The two elements that suggest a corporate model of governance are: i) the weighted majority vote depending 
on the positive representation of at least 60% of the total financial contributions; and ii) the existence of a CEO 
with some crucial decision making powers, especially in regards to final approvals in the project cycle. 
124 Interestingly, the constituency divide is between developed and developing countries, rather than Annex I and 




peculiar nature and governance structure of the CDM eventually assigns even more control 
on individual projects to developing countries, given the role of DNAs in granting the legal 
viability of each project in the approval cycle. Differently from multilateral finance, this 
however does not ensue that developing states can decide on the actual disbursement of 
finance through the CDM, as that depends on numerous external factors, including, for 




The only institution that adopts a decision making model clearly favoring developing 
countries is the AF with more than half of its Board members representing non-Annex I 
countries. This is coupled with a qualified majority, in case of lack of consensus, according 
to a one-head-one-vote rule. If the Adaptation Fund, then, constitutes a unique model among 
the most important climate finance institutions,
126
 the nature and scale of resources 
channeled under the supervision of the AFB are instead quite modest,
127
 because stemming 
from a previous arrangement in the Kyoto Protocol and the COP that a small percentage of 
the proceeds from CDM activities would have been set aside for adaptation. These two 
factors can be interpreted as to reduce the actual impact of developing countries in the 
governance of climate finance, as they exert a major role in an institution that channels 
modest amounts of finance. 
 
In regards to the influence and migration of governance structures among parallel 
institutional experiences, it emerges that two main models prevail: namely, the model of 
multilateral trust funds on one side and, on the other, the one of MDBs. In fact, with the 
exception of the CDM, all UNFCCC institutions and the CIFs are based on a multilateral 
                                                     
125 Arguably, the latter factor explains why only 2 percent of CDM registered projects are located in African 
countries. See the official statistics at 
<http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Public/files/201305/proj_reg_byRegion.pdf>. 
126 Especially in terms of access modalities as will be seen below. 
127 By June 2012 the total funds available to the AFB were USD 112.8 million. See Decision 3/CMP.8, UN Doc. 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/13/Add.2, 28 February 2013 para 3. By contrast as of June 2013, the Pilot Programme for 
Climate Resilience under the CIFs’ Strategic Climate Fund has attracted USD 1.3 billion in pledges and allocated 




trust fund model, broadly construed on the interaction of two bodies, one (plenary) of 
general policy making
128
 and the other of executive nature (a Council, a Board or a 
Committee), seconded by an independent Secretariat. The provenance of such model might 
either come from the UNDP experience with its Multi-Partner Trust Funds or from the 
World Bank practice. In particular the World Bank influence in the governance structure is 
signaled by its role as a trustee of all the climate funds here object. An OP of the World 
Bank sets the characteristic and modalities for the establishment of its trust funds
129
 and 
provides by principle that “[…] the Bank encourages trust funds that draw on its operational 
role”.
130
 However, among the provision of this policy there are no direct conditions on the 
governance that the World Bank should impose when creating with participant entities a 
multilateral trust fund.
131
 The specific features are instead left to the particular arrangements 
made on each case.
132
 Nonetheless, a remarkable influence by the World Bank emerges, if 
one puts the various climate funds in a historical context. Accordingly, the Bank was the 
creator of the GEF pilot, and was among the constituting entities of the restructured GEF. 
Subsequently, it established the CIFs in agreement with other MDBs and participating states 
and, finally, it actively participated to the negotiations for the GCF during the work of its 
Transitional Committee.
133
 Understanding the strength of the World Bank’s political pull 
falls outside the object of this work, but –staying within the boundaries of a legal enquiry– it 
can be argued that the World Bank has influenced the governance models of the various 
UNFCCC funds. There are two other elements to support this finding: one is the presence in 
the GEF and the GCF of independent evaluation units within the governance structure, 
                                                     
128 The UNFCCC COP is the general policy making body for the Adaptation Fund and the GCF. That is partially 
true for the GEF, which has its own annual Assembly. 
129 World Bank, Trust Funds, OP 14.40, adopted on 1 July 2008 and amending the previous Operational 
Memorandum dated 16 June 1998, <http://go.worldbank.org/R0724M1S40>. 
130 Ibid., para 1. 
131 The same OPs specify that the Bank recognizes three different types of trust funds: i) Recipient Executed 
Trust Funds; ii) Bank Executed Trust Funds; iii) and Financial Intermediary Funds. The climate funds at object 
belong to the third category as they are “[…] funds that involve financial engineering or complex finance 
schemes, or where the Bank provides a specified set of administrative, financial or operational services.” See Id., 
para 4(iii). 
132 I Bantekas, Trust funds under International Law: Trustee Obligations of the United Nations and International 
Development Banks (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009), at 69-77. 




which replicate the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group; the second, is the fact that 
the secretariats of these funds are either located in the World Bank’s headquarters or directly 
managed by it. 
The second prevailing model of governance is not the one of multilateral trust funds as 
promoted by the World Bank, but the World Bank itself. This finding partially shies away 
from the comparative analysis above and instead recalls the overview proposed in the first 
part of this work, where it was noticed an active involvement in climate finance not only by 
the World Bank, but from all the major MDBs. Given that these institutions mirror the World 
Bank’s corporate governance model,
134
 this confirms the finding above that the internal 
governance architecture of climate finance institutions is designed to assign a prominent role 
to contributing states. 
 
 
2. ACCESS AND DISBURSMENT MODALITIES 
As the second regulatory factor for the analysis, access and disbursement modalities 
constitute a key element in the internal processes of climate finance institutions and can 
reasonably provide meaningful insights as to the legitimacy of an institution in relating with 
its stakeholders. As the name suggests, this regulatory area addresses several key matters of 
resources allocation and project cycle management, such as the division of financial 
resources among different focal areas (e.g. mitigation, adaptation, capacity building, etc.), 
eligibility and priority criteria for beneficiary states, and role division between entities 
implementing the projects. In other words, access and disbursement modalities determine 




                                                     
134 Bradlow and Hunter, International Financial Institutions and International Law, supra note 113. 
135 Other types of conditions for financing are the so called ‘conditionalities’ in financial agreements. They have 




Because different levels of institutional complexity and regulatory overlaps can be 
traced in this context, this can also be taken as a factor affecting process-based legitimacy; 
more specifically as an articulation of the dynamics occurring among all interested actors, in 
particular states and implementing agencies. In the same vein of the previous discussion on 
the internal governance, for the factor of access modalities a fruitful means of comparison is 
to address the whether the way the process is construed fulfills more the interests of 
contributing or recipient countries. 
This assertion does not entail that the structural differences between processes are the 
only determinant of legitimacy. For instance, it was recalled in the first part of this work
136
 
that other key substantive issues also shape the way recipient countries access climate 
finance: namely, the limit of incremental costs in mitigation, additionality as a condition for 
finance, other contractual conditionalities imposed on recipient states by climate funds and 
implementing agencies, and the type of financial instrument used. Nonetheless, as this part 
of the chapter will clarify, the secondary laws of climate finance institutions attribute 
relevant roles to implementing agencies, national administrations and private actors at such 
different levels, that they satisfy on different levels the various interests of developed, 
recipient countries and other institutional actors. Complexity of access and disbursement 
modalities can be necessary, beneficial, but also detrimental to the level of legitimation of an 
institution. It is necessary, because it is widely recognized that the channeling of 
development finance should promote integrity, in a way that resources are spent in an 
efficient manner and wield measurable results;
137
 thus, complexity can be beneficial to the 
legitimating process, because it can enhance the robustness and effectiveness of financing 
through detailed regulations and participation of different entities in implementation 
                                                     
136 See Chapter I above. 
137 See, for instance, the 2008 OECD Accra Plan of Action adopted in the aftermath of the Paris Declaration of 
Aid Effectiveness, supra note 122, at para 10, stating that: “Achieving development results – and openly 
accounting for them – must be at the heart of all we do. More than ever, citizens and taxpayers of all countries 
expect to see the tangible results of development efforts. We will demonstrate that our actions translate into 
positive impacts on people’s lives. We will be accountable to each other and to our respective parliaments and 






 Conversely, complexity can also lead to misalignments between the same entities 
and recipient states’ development strategies, to sluggish and ineffective procedures, and can 
eventually frustrate recipient states and other finance beneficiaries.
139
 This second aspect has 




Finally, two methodological issues should be clarified. First, it must be stressed how 
the following areas of analysis are strictly related to –if now even undistinguishable from– 
the factor of ‘internal governance’ addressed above. Given the indeterminacy at start of the 
term ‘governance’, access modalities, accountability, and participation to the institutional life 
can also be understood as components of the internal governance of an institution. Therefore, 
although perhaps appearing artificial, the distinction here is only instrumental to a structured 
discourse. Secondly, in regards to structure, the following analysis throughout the whole 
chapter will not divide between each institutional experience, but will rather gather and 
address jointly common elements and differences, for the reason that the matter can 
adequately be treated with less detail of description. 
2.1. Countries eligibility requirements, resources allocations and project cycles 
2.1.1. The GEF and the CIFs 
As emerged in the context of their internal governance, both the GEF and the CIFs constitute 
a cooperative initiative of multilateral institutions. The GEF Instrument is an agreement 
adopted between the World Bank, UNDP and UNEP, and only subsequently, participated by 
states, whereas the CIFs have been established via a resolution of the Board of the Executive 
Directors of the World Bank and operationalized through so called Financial Procedures 
                                                     
138 In broader terms, as seen in the previous chapter complexity might work in this way as ‘procedural fairness’ 
according to the framework proposed by Frank. See TM Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions 
(Clarendon Press 1997) at 7-9. Another way of viewing this side of regulatory complexity is from the perspective 
of output legitimacy: see the related discussion in Chapter IV above, at 156. 
139 Such a negative view of complexity emerged in regards to the previous GEF’s access modalities and in 
particular with its Resource Allocation Framework (RAF). 








Eligibility requirements for recipient countries differ between the two institutions, 
with the GEF potentially including a broader array of countries. As regards the climate 
change focal areas managed by the GEF, its Instrument provides that criteria of eligibility 
shall be the ones individuated by the UNFCCC and its COP’s decisions.
142
 In 
implementation of the relevant UNFCCC provision,
143
 the COP clarified that non-Annex I 
countries are all eligible to receive finance, as representatives of the developing countries 
group.
144
 The general governance framework documents of the CIFs instead provide that 
country access to the funds is conditioned by eligibility to i) Official Development 
Assistance according to the OECD-DAC guidelines;
145
 and to  ii) the existence of an active 
MDB lending programme or policy dialogue in the candidate country.
146
 These two are 
however only the first requirements for eligibility, given that additional requirements are 




Parallel to the criteria of country eligibility, the issues of resources allocation and 
project approval process are also of key importance to understand and compare different 
                                                     
141 The FPAs are not disclosed by the MDBs, although their existence is confirmed by related documents or 
agency presses. See, for instance, the African Development Bank communiqué at <http://www.afdb.org/en/news-
and-events/article/afdb-approves-climate-investment-funds-implementation-7198/>.  
142 GEF Instrument, supra note 3, Article I, para 9(a) and (c). 
143 UNFCCC, Article 11 endows the COP with the duty to identify eligibility criteria. 
144 On such rule development see F Yamin and J Depledge, The International Climate Change Regime (CUP 
2004), at 272-3. In addition it should be noted that the GEF has adopted additional criteria of eligibility according 
to its resource allocation frameworks. The last of these, the System for a Transparent Allocation of Resources 
(STAR) adds the following eligibility requirements for potential recipient countries: i) Not to be a member of the 
EU as of July 2010; ii) and to have had at least one national project in the past 5 years. See System for 
Transparent Allocation of Resources, GEF/P.3, 24 June 2010, para 10, 
<http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/document/GEF.P.3.2010-1.pdf>.  
145 The list, updated every three years, is accessible at 
<http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/DAC%20List%20used%20for%202012%20and%202013%20flows.pdf>. 
146 CIFs, Governance Framework for the Clean Technology Fund, supra note 82, para 13. 
147 An example is the Forest Investment Programme under the Strategic Climate Fund, it is stated that the FIP 
Sub-Committee is endowed to make a pre-section of developing states and pilot projects, only after that the 
potential host state, with the support of the MDB can accept to proceed through the financing procedure. See 






access and disbursement modalities. As to the first matter, the GEF, after completing each 
replenishment cycle, usually adopts or modifies its indicators and criteria for allocation of 
resources among its various focal areas and countries. Interestingly, it does not carry out the 
process under the aegis of the GEF Assembly, but according to separate GEF 
replenishments, where no specific rules on contribution to decision-making by recipient 
countries are provided.
148
 The current System for a Transparent Allocation of Resources, 
adopted during the fifth replenishment of the GEF, builds up from the previous, and highly 
criticized, allocation system
149
 and identifies, through various environmental and economic 
indicators, individual countries allocations that work as finance ‘envelopes’, available for 
application by recipient countries and implementing agencies.
150
 Conversely, the CIFs do not 
have a clearly defined procedure for resources allocation, especially because of the different 
nature and aims of the various funds under its umbrella. Thus, there is no formal ranking 
among potential recipient countries for the CIFs Clean Technology Fund;
151
 instead a set of 
priorities is listed to guide the decision of the CTF Committee to approve finance for country 
investment plans, prepared by the recipient government together with the relevant MDB.
152
 
A preliminary individuation of pilot countries and resource allocation has taken place under 
the three programmes of the Strategic Climate Fund, but –differently from the GEF process 
which depends on the UNFCCC COP guidance– the criteria and individuation of resources 
allocation has been delegated by each SCF sub-Committee to different expert groups.
153
 
                                                     
148 See above in this chapter. 
149 The Resources Allocation Framework of the fourth GEF replenishment has been both criticized by developing 
countries and by an independent evaluation. See Fourth Overall Performance Study of the GEF¸ Full Report, 
April 2010, at 65-67, 
<http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/FULL%20REPORT_OPS4%20Progress%20Toward
%20Impact_0.pdf>. 
150 The current country allocations can be found at <http://www.thegef.org/gef/STAR/country_allocations>. 
151 See Climate Investment Funds: the Clean Technology Fund and the Strategic Climate Fund, supra note 82, 
para 41-3. 
152 Ibid.. 
153 See CIFs, The Selection of Countries to Participate in the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR), 
January 2009, 
<https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/sites/climateinvestmentfunds.org/files/PPCR_Selection_of_Countri
es_to_Participate_Report_of_the_Expert_Group_final.pdf>; CIFs, Criteria for Selecting Country and Regional 




Despite different rules of eligibility and allocation find application, both the GEF and 
the CIFs adopt a similar approach to projects approval, which attributes a significant role to 
the various implementing agencies. The GEF regulation divides between different project 
types according to the amount of investment and actors involved.
154
 Full-sized projects, 
amounting to at least to USD 2 million of GEF finance, need to pass through a three-tiered 
project cycle procedure,
155
 consisting of an initial application prepared by a GEF 
implementing agency under the support of the potential recipient country. The application is 
firstly cleared by the GEF CEO and then reviewed by the relevant Convention Secretariat (in 
our case the UNFCCC Secretariat) and, importantly, by other GEF Agencies.
156
 The second 
step is aimed to embed the project within a more extensive work programme to be approved 
by the GEF Council. Finally, in order to align the GEF and agencies’ policies in relation to 
the project, the third step before the actual disbursement sees again the final CEO 
endorsement of the final project documentation prepared by the implementing agency 
according to its internal regulations.
157
 
The CIFs’ process shows a lower number of procedural steps towards project approval 
and disbursement. This is probably due to the fact that the various CIFs Committees rely 
significantly on the regulations and policies of each MDB involved as an implementing 
agency, rather than applying also their own standards, or guidance in connection with the 
                                                                                                                                                      
<https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/sites/climateinvestmentfunds.org/files/criteria_selecting_country_r
egional_pilots_key_doc_120909_0.pdf>; and CIFs, Criteria for Selecting Country and Regional Pilots under the 
Program for Scaling Up Renewable Energy in  Low Income Countries, 26 March 2010,  
<https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/sites/climateinvestmentfunds.org/files/SREP_Criteria_for_Selectin
g_Country_and_Regional_Pilots_under_SREP_final.pdf>. 
154 Full-sized projects consist of projects requiring GEF finance above USD 2 million. Below that threshold the 
GEF identifies medium-sized projects, enabling activities and small grants. While enabling activities aim to 
finance developing countries in the preparation of national communications under UNFCCC Article 12, small 
grants are aimed financing activities of non-governmental organizations. See GEF Council, GEF Project Cycle: 
An Update, GEF/C.22/Inf.9, 5 November 2003, para 14, 
<http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/Loc...Update__FINAL__Nov_5_2003.pdf>. 
155 GEF, Policies and Procedures for the GEF Project Cycle, GEF Policy Paper, November 2008, 
<http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/GEF%20Policies%20and%20Procedures%20for%20
GEF%20Project%20Cycle.pdf>.  
156 It is at this level of project formulation that GEF agencies address their respective comparative advantages in 
the specific project. As seen in chapter II, this has led to harsh contrasts among these entities. For the current 
criteria in assessment of GEF agencies comparative advantage, see GEF Council, Comparative Advantage of the 
GEF Agencies, GEF/C.31/5, 15 May 2007, < 
http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/C.31.5%20Comparative%20advantages.pdf>.  




Convention’s financial mechanism it implements.
158
 Hence, the operationalization of the 
CIFs was started with the submission of general investment plans, prepared by an MDB in 
collaboration with a candidate recipient country.
159
 As a framework document specifies, 
“[…] [investment plans] are the business plans of MDBs, developed under the leadership of 
the government, to assist a country with CTF co-financing in implementing its national 
development strategies or programmes that include low carbon objectives.”
160
 Investment 
plans, then, pass through the scrutiny of the competent CIF Committee and, only if 
approved, the requesting MDB can submit individual project proposals for finance within the 
investment plan framework.
161
 Compared to the GEF project cycle, the CIFs process does 
not envision the preliminary approval of the initial project idea, while both seem structured 
in a way that favors individual projects or programmes to enter within the broader 
framework of MDBs and individual countries development strategies. 
2.1.2. The Adaptation Fund 
An alternative approach in terms of reduced complexity and enhanced access to funds by 
developing countries has been adopted by the AF. Differently from the GEF and the CIFs, 
governments of recipient countries can directly apply to the Adaptation Fund Board for the 
financing of the full costs of concrete adaptation projects or programmes.
162
 This approach 
represents the first experience of direct access by recipient countries in climate finance and 
its rationale can be found in the aim to by-pass the intermediary role of international 
implementing agencies. Direct access modalities under the Adaptation Fund require potential 
                                                     
158 A general linkage by the CIFs with the UNFCCC is the statement in their founding document that the CIFs 
shall follow the UNFCCC principles. See World Bank, Climate Investment Funds: The Clean Technology Fund 
and the Strategic Climate Fund, supra note 82, para 20. 
159 The document establishing the CIFs states that it is the potential recipient country to express interest to the 
MDB. Following, the MDB organizes joint missions aimed at liaising with the local government, private sector 
and other stakeholders, before preparing the investment plan. Country investment plans have been amended 
through time. See World Bank, Climate Investment Funds: The Clean Technology Fund and the Strategic 
Climate Fund, supra, para 18. 
160 CIFs, Clean Technology Fund: Guidelines for Investment Plans, 6 August 2009, para 7, 
<https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/sites/climateinvestmentfunds.org/files/Guidelines_CTF_Investment
_Plan_Revised_After_approval_of_Disclosure_policy_FINAL.pdf>. 
161 See World Bank, Climate Investment Funds: The Clean Technology Fund and the Strategic Climate Fund, 
supra. 




recipients to request accreditation of a national agency as a National Implementing Entity 
(NIE) for the Fund.
163
 Unsurprisingly, accreditation is not an automatic process but requires 
a compliance check of the candidate entity with minimum, capacity, transparency, and 
financial integrity standards.
164
 At the time of writing there are 15 accredited NIEs.
165
 Yet it 
must be noted that direct access to the AF is just one of the options for potential recipient 
countries, since they can also resort to the collaboration of accredited multilateral 
implementing agencies when applying for finance. In regards to eligibility criteria and 
allocation of resources, a decision by the CMP sets the general principle that targeted 
countries –apart from being developing country parties to the Kyoto Protocol– should also be 
the “[…] ones particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change”.
166
 In 
specifying this requirement, the AF Board adopted a series of indicative criteria to inform 
decision making for individual projects,
167
 which also worked as starting ground for the 
process of division of resources among potential recipients:  eventually the AF Board opted 
to maintain a cap of USD 10 million per eligible country.
168
 Thus although on a less 
sophisticated manner, a similar approach to the GEF’s ‘country envelopes’ has been adopted 
also for the Adaptation Fund. Finally, the Adaptation Fund’s project cycle is divided 
between small-sized and full-sized projects, with the latter amounting to more than USD 1 
million for project funding. Similarly to the GEF, the difference between the two project 
cycles stands on the lower number of administrative steps leading to final disbursement. In 
the case of full-sized projects, after express approval of a national administration, accredited 
entities present to the AF Board an initial project proposal which is screened and commented 
                                                     
163 AF, Operational Policies and Guidelines for Parties to Access Resources from the Adaptation Fund, supra 
note 47, para 27. 
164 Ibid., para 33. 
165 See <https://www.adaptation-fund.org/national-implementing-entities>. 
166 Decision 1/CMP.4, supra note 45, para 10. 
167 Namely, (a) Level of vulnerability; (b) Level of urgency and risks arising from delay; (c) Ensuring access to 
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by the AF Secretariat and an ad hoc technical committee. Following the preliminary 
approval, the same accredited entity submits a full proposal and, only after the final approval 
by the AF Board, subsequently receives the agreed finance.
169
 
2.1.3. The Green Climate Fund 
Despite not yet operational, the GCF is likely to be underpinned by a complex set of rules 
addressing its access and disbursement modalities. This might be the case not only because 
of the wide financing ambitions of the fund, which will span from adaptation to mitigation in 
various sectors of national economies, but also because the founding decisions of the COP 
already contain initial directions about its regulatory structure. In fact, the Governing 
Instrument for the GCF states that eligible countries to finance are the developing country 
Parties to the UNFCCC
170
 and not –as it stands for the current GEF funds– non-Annex II 
countries. Although this might appear a formality,
171
 it might assume importance once the 
GCF begins its activities, given the fact that the expression ‘developing country’ does not 
provide an identifiable number of states as it is now the case. 
Further, the same document envisions an approach very similar to the one of the AF, 
with the concurrent presence of direct access by national recipient entities and  an 
‘international access’ whereby recipient countries “will also be able to access the Fund 
through accredited international entities, including United Nations agencies, multilateral 
development banks, international financial institutions and regional institutions.”
172
 In terms 
of resources allocation between founding areas and eligible countries the Governing 
Instrument only traces some broad principles about the need by the GCF Board to strike a 
balance between resources mobilized towards mitigation and adaptation, and the focus on 
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LDCs on the latter.
173
 An innovative feature in terms of access is the establishment of a 
‘private sector facility’ within the GCF which will “[…] directly and indirectly finance 
private sector mitigation and adaptation activities at the national, regional and international 
levels”. This type of direct access by the private sector has been experimented only at pilot 
level by the GEF and the CIFs, and because of the early stage of its definition it is uncertain 
if and how the GCF will build up from those experiences.  
2.1.4. The World Bank and the Clean Development Mechanism 
A comparison under the access and disbursement modalities standard becomes difficult, 
when it comes to canvass the World Bank and CDM, for the simple reason that both the 
entities do not replicate the international trust fund governance model, which typically has as 
a core component the norms that regulate access to its pooled resources. The World Bank is 
together with other MDBs a financial institution with a broad mandate to poverty alleviation 
and finance for sustainable development, which includes climate finance as a part of their 
wide strategies. Being a development bank, the World Bank raises and distributes resources 
according to international financial practices of capital leveraging in global financial markets 
and loan or credit agreements with ‘client’ countries.
174
 Concurrently, the CDM is a hybrid 
mechanism of climate mitigation finance where capitals (private and public) are sourced and 
mobilized according to a complex set of investment factors,
175
 primarily driven by the level 
of revenues that investors can accrue by receiving and selling CERs in the carbon market. 
Despite these differences, there are nevertheless some elements that become relevant to 
address the regulatory complexities of these institutions in relation to their capacity to 
mobilize climate-related finance. 
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Neither the World Bank’s Articles of Agreement nor its internal regulations define any 
procedure through which recipient countries or other entities can actively apply to its 
finance. Simply put, the World Bank does not provide any rules on access in a strict sense. In 
addition, being different from a multilateral trust fund model, it does not rely on the work of 
other implementing agencies to manage and finance climate related projects: that is also 
because of its high and distributed capacity to act as a technical implementing agency on its 
own. Nonetheless, there is a complex set of internal procedural steps that guide the World 
Bank to the definition and offer of its financial products to recipient countries, which lato 
sensu amount to the procedural means according to which the World Bank selects countries 
and distributes its finance. 
Generally speaking, all states members of the World Bank are eligible to receive 
finance,
176
 upon condition that they are potentially able to repay both the principal and 
interest rate from the project’s loan.
177
 A distinction is further drawn between countries 
eligible to either the IBRD, IDA or their joint financing, based on different economic 
indicators used as proofs of their debt sustainability and ability to repay. Accordingly, only 




The World Bank’s choice to offer finance to a climate-related project or programme is 
driven by a highly complex internal process. In a nutshell, it must find basis from Country 
Assistance Strategy (CAS) reports that are prepared every four years for each potential client 
country by the Bank’s regional offices in cooperation with the country administration.
179
 A 
CAS generally takes stock of the previous financing activities of the World Bank and 
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outlines the changing economic and political scenarios of a country together with an 
articulate strategy of intervention, which might include climate related finance.
180
 It is within 
the framework of a CAS that the World Bank offers to the potential client country a set of 
different financial products related to identified project or programmes, through either the 
IBRD or the IDA.
181
 Therefore, differently from the case of the other climate funds, there are 
no specific application procedures and project cycles regulations to receive finance. Rather, 
those internal regulations bind solely the Bank in setting its financing priorities, while the 
eventual disbursement of finance depends on negotiations between the Bank and its client 
countries. 
 
The peculiarity of the CDM among the institutions under analysis extends also to the 
way its finance is sourced and distributed.  The main driving factor for a project developer or 
an investor to participate in the CDM is to raise revenues by selling CERs on the carbon 
market, obtained after the emissions reductions of its activity are verified. In order to 
guarantee a high degree of actual emissions reductions, the CDM regulations lay down a 
complex project cycle, whereby –as seen above in regards to its internal governance– both 
private and public entities (DOEs and DNAs) participate in the administrative process. 
Without delving into its details, suffice here to outline the four different stages of the CDM 
project cycle, which are i) validation; ii) registration; iii) verification of the project activity; 
and iv) issuance of CERs.
182
 Before seeing a project registered in the CDM, a project 
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proponent prepares a design document to be made publicly available for comments by 
stakeholders. The DOE chosen by the proponent validates the proposal by ensuring that all 
the substantive eligibility requirements for the registration of the project are fulfilled, 
including an express approval of a host-country’s DNA. Following, the same entity submits 
a formal request to the Executive Board
183
 for registration of the project activity into the 
CDM pipeline. Registration is only a precondition for the final issuance of CERs and it is 
followed by a stage of monitoring and verification of actual emissions reductions by the 
DOE. Only after the publication of the resulting monitoring report, the DOE can submit a 
request for issuance of CERs to the EB for the emissions reductions occurred for the 
realization of the project activity. 
This brief description may be sufficient to provide a glance of the regulatory 
complexity that allows individual entities (public or private) to eventually raise revenues 
from their climate mitigation activities under the mechanism. During its first years, the 
administrative intricateness of the CDM cycle has raised many concerns among states and 
other stakeholders on various fronts: during the first commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol (2005-2012), both scholars and stakeholders have complained about the sluggish 
and sometimes inconsistent performance of the EB.
184
 This was coupled with the lack of 
clarity of some of the regulatory instruments of the EB in implementation of the various 
CMP decisions and of a due process available to stakeholders to review EB decisions vis-à-
vis the CDM rules.
185
 The responsiveness of the EB to those complaints has resulted in 
several reforms, including a collation and codification of applicable rules,
186
 a clarification 
                                                     
183 In practice this is done to the CDM Secretariat which carries a preliminary check that the submission is 
complete for the EB’s approval. See the CDM project cycle procedure, paras 60-71. 
184 Streck and Lin, ‘Making Markets Work’, supra note 58, 422-8. In 2009 the CMP urged the EB in its annual 
decision on the CDM "[…] to take effective action to ensure compliance with established timelines for each of its 
procedures as well as with decisions of the [CMP] and, where possible, to reduce the established timelines”. See 
Decision 1/CMP.5, UN Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2009/21/Add.1, 30 March 2010, para 3. 
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on the normative hierarchy of CDM regulatory instruments,
187
 a reform of its request for 
reviews in the approval process of each project activity.
188
 That these reforms have positively 
affected the social legitimacy of the CDM is confirmed by the stakeholders’ support.
189
 
While the project cycle regulations determine the process towards CERs issuance, the 
CDM does not provide any rule on the geographical distribution of capital mobilization 
towards CDM projects. The choice, in fact, eventually stands on the project developer or the 
investor and is primarily driven by the investment conditions in a given country and the 
status of the carbon market. If CDM’s access and disbursement rules are not preset by 
regulation, but rather depend on market forces, it is no surprise that the biggest bulk of CDM 
projects are placed in emerging economies such as China and India, while the African 
continent remains almost disregarded.
190
 
2.2. ‘Country ownership’ and the application of implementing agencies regulations. 
The issue of enhanced ‘country ownership’ by recipient countries is somehow related to the 
one of access and disbursement modalities and constitutes a critical feature of disbursement 
models not only in climate finance but in international development finance in general. 
Contrary to what a lawyer might infer, the term does not refer to the legal ownership 
by a recipient country over the disbursed finance, but rather expresses the concept that the 
same country “exercise[s] effective leadership over their development policies, and strategies 
and co-ordinate development actions.”
191
 Understood in this way, the different degrees of 
country ownership that climate finance institutions allow in their access and disbursement 
modalities can indeed affect the legitimacy and effectiveness of institutional action. This can 
occur because the potential alignment of a country national strategy with the financing aims 
                                                     
187 CDM Executive Board Decision and Documentation Framework, Version 04.0, EB 67 Rep., Annex 4, 1. 
188 For an assessment of the requests for reviews see below setion 4.2.1 in this chapter. 
189 See for International Emissions Trading Association, State of the CDM 2010: Focusing on Efficiency, undated, 
<http://www.ieta.org/assets/Reports/ieta-the-state-of-the-cdm-2010.pdf>. 
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of a given institution can legitimize the role of the institution both with the recipient country 
–which enhances its managing role– and with the contributing countries, because of the 
likelihood that such alignment can prove more effective. 
However, the legitimizing effect of country ownership in climate finance can be 
limited by the internal regulations and programming processes of an institution. This is the 
case, for instance, when the programming and the implementation phases –as framed by a 
recipient government– conflict with the social and environmental safeguards and other 
conditionalities imposed by climate finance institutions. 
2.2.1. The Global Environment Facility 
This latter case is exemplified by the GEF, whose Instrument states that: 
 “the institution shall ensure the cost-effectiveness of its activities in addressing the 
targeted global environmental issues, shall fund programs and projects which are 
country-driven and based on national priorities designed to support sustainable 
development and shall maintain sufficient flexibility to respond to changing 
circumstances in order to achieve its purposes.”
192
 
Despite such a general provision and recent efforts, due to its internal governance structure 
the level of country ownership of a recipient country is almost entirely dependent on the 
programming activities and internal procedures of the GEF’s implementing agencies.
193
 As 
noted above, the weighted qualified majority in decision making within the GEF Council 
assigns a prominent role to contributing countries and, concurrently, the same happens 
during the various GEF replenishments where the participating countries agree on a set of 
programming principles that the Council is to follow. Whist being always in the GEF’s 
agenda
194
 and treated in every policy recommendation during GEF replenishments, country 
ownership is ultimately pursued through a Country Support Programme unfolding into 
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several activities, of which the most relevant appear to be the National Multi-Stakeholder 
Dialogues and the National Portfolio Formulation Exercises. The first seeks to build a direct 
bridge between the GEF bodies and individual recipient countries in order to identify 
synergies between national and GEF’s priorities,
195
  while the second consists of a set of 
small grants to recipient governments with the task of individuating coherent areas of 
possible GEF’s financing.
196
 Aside from these two marginal initiatives, the level of control 
by recipient countries over the various stages of programming, proposal and implementation 
eventually depends on their relationship with the selected implementing agency.  
Moreover, country ownership is inevitably affected by the fact that GEF funds are not 
directly transferred to the recipient country, but first flow through an implementing agency’s 
account, and only later secondary transfers are done to the various recipients according to the 
implementing agency’s procedures.
197
 This emerges from the various Financial Procedures 
Agreements, stipulated between the IBRD (as trustee of the GEF) and the various 
international agencies.
198
 Interestingly, a standard clause of these contracts provides that 
ownership of equipment, supplies and other properties shall vest in “[the implementing 
agency], the recipient of the funds or such other entity as may be permitted to retain 
ownership under the policies and procedures of the [implementing agency].
199
 This 
arrangement together with the whole layered process of country programming and 
disbursement do not seem to guarantee a substantive level of ownership, unless it is the 
implementing agency itself to promote it. 
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2.2.2. The Climate Investment Funds 
Although more consistent in terms of alignment of national development programmes and 
climate finance interventions, also the CIFs follow suit in relying on the intermediary role of 
their multilateral development banks acting as implementing agencies. Despite being framed 
in a more open process of national programming, the structure of the overall access 
modalities inevitably impacts on the level of country ownership over the finance.  
Similarly to the GEF, the founding document of the CIFs also contains an explicit 
referral to country ownership, stating that:  
“[…] Activities financed by the CIF will be grounded in country-led and owned 
development strategies, consistent with the MDBs’ own policies and procedures, and 
in support of the Paris Declaration focus on country ownership. Actions to address 
climate change mitigation and adaptation considerations will be integrated into the 




Yet, as has been noted above, the procedure towards a country’s successful application 
to the various CIFs requires the filing of a country investment plan “[…] agreed between, 
and owned by, the Government and the MDBs.”
201
 Arguably, the level of ownership 
eventually depends on one side on the fact that recipient countries have a certain discretion 
on choosing among the various MDBs,
202
 and on the other on each MDB’s actual practice 
with its client country. In this regard, a resolution of the Clean Technology Fund’s 
Committee stressed that “[…] the Government, in collaboration with the MDBs, should take 
the lead in coordinating the preparation of the investment across sectors.”
203
 This concretized 
in joint missions of MDBs representatives, authorized by the CIFs Trust Fund Committees, 
with the task of preparing the plan together with the recipient countries. These missions 
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included a phase of public consultation with different national administration and 
stakeholders,
204
 resulting in an increased involvement of the recipient country and the public 
in the formulation of investment priorities. 
2.2.3. The Adaptation Fund and the Green Climate Fund 
On the other side of the spectrum, the configuration of direct access modalities makes the AF 
the climate finance institution whose regulations currently confer the highest level of 
recipient countries participation over the whole process. Not only have recipient countries 
the option of accrediting NIEs to submit financing proposals to the AFB, but it also clearly 
stated in the AF regulations that NIEs “[…] bear the full responsibility for the overall 
management of the projects and programmes financed by the Adaptation Fund, and […] bear 
all financial, monitoring and reporting responsibilities.”
205
 However, NIEs need to comply 
with several fiduciary standards before being accredited, which means that administrations 
lacking adequate capacity, typically the ones of least developed countries, have to resort to 
the accredited multilateral implementing agencies.  
A similar conclusion to the AF can be drawn also in regards to the GCF for the fact 
that its Governing Instrument clearly envisions the development of direct access 
modalities.
206
 Yet such finding is provisional and dependent of the future operationalization 
of the Fund. 
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2.2.4. The World Bank 
The World Bank’s regulations and policies addressing country ownership should be 
contextualized in the peculiar positioning of this institution in relation to the multilateral trust 
funds here under analysis. The Bank exemplifies the MDBs’ multifaceted role in climate 
finance as direct lenders in mitigation and adaptation projects, and implementing technical 
agencies with operative capacity in developing countries’ territories. It should be also 
recalled that the World Bank acts as trustee of all the major climate multilateral trust funds. 
This is noteworthy because the GEF and the CIFs –and in part the AF and the GCF– 
significantly rely on the country ownership practices of their implementing entities: as a 
consequence, the World Bank’s level of country ownership –and by extension the one of all 
implementing agencies– is indeed relevant also for the main climate multilateral funds. 
At the end of the nineties the World Bank expressly included for the first time country 
ownership as a core element of its approach to poverty reduction with the adoption of a 
Comprehensive Development Framework:
207
 the document adopted an approach to 
international development underpinned by an opening to recipient countries’ administrations 
and other stakeholders in the programming and implementation of Bank’s interventions.  The 
very process of Country Assistance Strategies described above is the result of this broad 
approach and it is practically carried by engaging the countries administrations in identifying 
areas of financial intervention, including climate change. Therefore, a certain level of 
engagement of recipient countries in formulating World Banks financing priorities can be 
found at the level of the Bank’s internal processes. In addition, its Operational Policies 
address the issue of country programming in the field of the environment by stating that 
“[…] the Bank encourages and supports the efforts of borrowing governments to prepare and 
implement an appropriate Environmental Action Plan (EAP) and to revise it periodically as 
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necessary. Although the Bank may provide advice, responsibility for preparing and 
implementing the EAP rests with the government […]”.
208
 Each EAP, then, feeds into the 
frame of a Country Assistance Strategy and reasonably constitutes the basis of identification 
of possible climate-related financial interventions.
209
 Hence, it emerges that the internal 
processes of the World Bank indeed allow a certain degree of involvement, or ‘ownership’, 
of the recipient country. However, while this can be asserted in relation to its internal 
regulations, country ownership might be affected by the terms in the financial agreements 
that the Bank stipulates with the borrowing country each time. It is not possible here to 
provide concrete examples of such agreements related to a climate project, because the 
practice is that they are not disclosed by the parties.
210
 
2.2.5. The Clean Development Mechanism 
For its special nature of a hybrid climate finance mechanism, the CDM promotes ‘country 
ownership’ by the host country over registered projects in a manner that is hardly 
comparable to the processes of multilateral institutions. Due to its market-based nature and 
the pivotal role of private sector entities in mobilizing climate mitigation finance according 
to different investment drivers, developing countries hosting CDM projects have 
nevertheless a high level of regulatory control over individual projects and broader national 
programming in the context of promoting CDM projects investments. 
The main difference with the access and modalities of multilateral trust funds is that 
the recipient state does not receive financial resources directly,
211
 but it is only beneficiary of 
a climate mitigation project that should promote its sustainable development. As a 
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consequence, rather than applying or actively pursuing the finance, the same country is in the 
position of accepting or rejecting investment projects potentially feasible under the CDM in 
the project cycle: as described above, a condition for the validation of a CDM project is the 
formal approval by the DNA of a host country. This preliminary approval of a CDM project 
by the host country arguably assigns a substantive role on national administrations of 
supervision and compliance with national policy objectives. 
2.3. Analysis of access and disbursement modalities 
Like in the case of internal governance, a fruitful criterion to compare different access and 
disbursement modalities is to refer to the often divergent interests between contributing and 
recipient states. From the analysis of the various processes it emerges that these particular 
processes generally strike a balance between two crucial interests: on one side that financial 
resources are raised and distributed in an efficient and verifiable manner, and on the other 
that they form sound normative linkages with the final recipient of finance, mostly public 
and private entities in developing states. It is for the different means according to which this 
has been implemented, that such situation provides good grounds for analysis. 
 
With such a premise, the broad picture shows that on different degrees the access and 
disbursement modalities of climate finance institutions still tend to marginalise the interest of 
recipient countries to a direct, adequate and effective disbursement, while they are construed 
in a manner that assigns a crucial role and control to the various implementing agencies. If 
this might go at odds with recipient countries expectations, it must be noted that climate 
finance institutions are taking efforts to enhance the role of developing states in managing 






In regards to general eligibility requirements, the only relevant note is that while the 
GEF resorts to the UNFCCC distinction between Annex II and non-Annex II parties, the 
GCF generally makes all ‘developing countries’ eligible to finance. Since the definition of 
developing countries is notably contested, this might raise concerns if not disputes, once the 
GCF becomes operational. 
 
Of more importance are the different means of resources allocation adopted by the 
various institutions, as they represent the initial step of disbursement. The GEF, the AF and 
the WB ground their disbursement decisions on clear rules and indicators, although the latter 
does not set in advance a general amount of finance for each client country. The GEF STAR 
programme of allocation and the system of ‘country envelopes’ –replicated by the AF– aims 
to guarantee that all participating countries are allocated a share of potential finance 
regardless of whether specific projects or programmes will be subsequently approved. This 
mode of allocation, however, might lead to unspent resources, if a recipient country does not 
successfully propose viable projects covering its envelope. Conversely, the Clean 
Technology Fund (but not the Strategic Climate Fund) of the CIFs lacks any clear set of 
rules for countries allocations: while this could be justified by the pilot and temporary nature 
of the CIFs at the time of their establishment, because of its growing relevance, this 
regulatory gap might become incompatible with the aim of fair disbursement among 
recipient countries, especially for the large amount of finance that the CIFs have managed to 
mobilize.
212
 Finally, while no substantive rules on resources allocation have yet been adopted 
for the GCF it is not possible to speak of proper resource allocation in the case of the CDM, 
since the eventual generation of CERs depends on many investment and market factors. 
 
As regards the various rules on project cycle, a strong reliance on the role of 
implementing agencies must be noted for the GEF and the CIFs, where both general national 
                                                     




strategies and individual finance proposals are prepared and filed by an agency selected by 
the recipient government. While this might streamline the means of selection and 
individuation of potential projects in a given country, at the same time a double regulatory 
regime applies to the recipient government, namely the regulations and conditions set by the 
implementing agency and the policies and conditions of the climate finance institution. That 
this feature is cause of frustration among developing countries is evidenced by the cases of 
the AF and the GCF, where such countries hold a stronger position in the decisional process. 
Both the AF and the GCF, in fact, envision the possibility to side-step the intermediary role 
of implementing agencies through direct-access windows in the project cycle. Potentially, 
this feature establishes a direct link and responsibility relationship between the climate 
finance institution and the recipient administration in the developing country, although much 
concerns rest on the capacity of different developing countries to meet the required fiduciary 
standards and to work as effective implementers of climate projects. Further, it also must be 
stressed that in quantitative terms, direct access still constitutes but a tiny fraction of actual 
disbursement and its efficacy will only be tested in the coming years. 
On the issue of project cycles and the role of implementing agencies, both the World 
Bank and the CDM do not provide meaningful comparative elements for the fact that on one 
side the World Bank –as the other MDBs involved in climate finance– is an implementing 
agency itself and does not act on the basis of project cycle procedures comparable to the 
other multilateral funds. On the other, the CDM project cycle sees as primary actors 
individual (often private) projects participants, rather than recipient countries, and it is aimed 
to guarantee the environmental integrity of proposed projects with the numerous CDM 
standards.  
 
Shifting to how ‘country ownership’ is achieved among institutions, the very issue of direct 
access appears to work as main watershed. In fact, and despite the loose meaning of the 




implementation of climate finance, is through bypassing implementing agencies both in the 
making of proposals to funds and in project implementation. Hence, what found above 
broadly applies also in the context of ‘ownership’, with the difference that some climate 
finance institutions have set up more indirect means to coordinate their activities with 
recipient countries. This is the case for the CIFs and the World Bank which rely on the 
collaboration of developing countries’ administrations in laying down national climate 
finance strategies. Perhaps surprisingly, no such coordination process has been established 
by the GEF, which instead relies almost entirely on the capacity of its implementing 
agencies: albeit listed in its principles, significant country involvement is not provided by the 
GEF’s regulation on access modalities.  
Finally, a note must be spent on the CDM, whose characteristics allow little 
comparability in terms of ‘country ownership’ of finance: for its peculiar structure countries 
hosting CDM projects are rarely the beneficiaries of CERs issuance.
213
 Nonetheless, DNAs 
retain a pivotal role in assuring that the proposed CDM project complies with national 
sustainable development strategies and laws. 
 
 
3. PARTICIPATORY PROCESSES FOR INDIVIDUALS, NGOS AND CSOS 
The third regulatory factor for the comparative analysis of this chapter is participation 
by non-state actors to the activities of climate finance institutions. Participation represents a 
means of input legitimacy, in the sense that climate finance institutions construct and 
maintain a legitimating process with their numerous actors by receiving contributions of 
knowledge, policy direction, or even contestation. Thus, while until this point the actors 
involved in legitimacy have mainly been the members of each institution, this section and the 
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following will mainly refer to the wide variety of actors that are affected at any level by the 
decisions and activities of the institution. 
To understand how potentially wide the set of interested individuals and entities can 
be, we can make the case of a climate finance institution which is receiving a project 
application to co-finance a hydropower plant in a least developed country. Its decision is 
likely to raise the interests of at least the following, aside from the recipient government: i) 
the local individuals or communities which might be relocated as a result of the change in 
the hydrology of the area, or might even see violated their individual or collective human 
rights, such as private life, health, property, access to justice, and so on; ii) the same people, 
as well as local environmental groups and NGOs, which would be concerned on the 
environmental impact of the project on the local ecosystem; iii) local business associations, 
which instead see in the possible financing an opportunity for economic development; and 
iv) multinational enterprises and technology providers, who are interested in project 
procurement contracts. 
 
There are, therefore, various reasons why climate finance institutions should seek 
direct engagement with entities that do not have procedural rights in their internal decision-
making process. In order to provide a systemic overview of how they translate those 
engagements into actual regulatory mechanisms, the focus here will be only on formal 
procedures that allow a certain degree of participatory rights to the various NGOs and Civil 
Society Organisations (CSOs),
214
 which have an interest in the activities of the institution. 
Further, a distinction is proposed between participatory processes that allow 
stakeholders to participate to the meetings of institutional organs or engage with 
representatives of the institution (general level), and processes that envision participation 
during national programming or at project level. 
                                                     




3.1. General level participatory processes 
With regards to participatory regulations in the formulation of general strategy and policy 
programming, virtually all the climate finance institutions under analysis offer observer 
status to NGOs and other CSOs during the meetings of the various assemblies or executive 
bodies. Observers do not have any power in decision making, but might influence 
discussions, both because of their informal advocacy at meetings and because they are 
allowed in certain circumstances to have the floor and present their views on agenda items.
215
  
Observers’ participation at meetings is often restricted for efficiency purposes. For 
instance, observers can participate only if formally invited by the GEF CEO, during GEF 
Council or GEF Assembly meetings.
216
 The CDM EB meetings are instead potentially open 
to all UNFCCC accredited CSOs, unless if “[…] in the context of efficiency” the EB decides 
to limit the attendance to just its members and the UNFCCC Secretariat.
217
 A similar 
provision applies to the AF Board observers.
218
 Despite the World Bank’s By-Laws 
expressly provide participation of observers by invitation, there is no practice of NGOs or 
CSOs attendance to the Board of Governors and the Board of Executive Directors 
meetings.
219
 As to the CIFs, the Head of the Administrative Unit has the discretion to invite 
CSO representatives, in consultation with the Trust Fund Committees.
220
 Conversely, the 
GCF is the most open to CSOs participation at meetings, as its Board is bound by its 
Instrument to “[…] allow for effective participation by accredited observers in its 
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 thus GCF Board members and Chairs do not have discretion on whether or not 
hosting observers at meetings. 
 
Because of the myriad of potentially interested CSOs, spanning among national, local, 
indigenous, and global organizations, and given the impossibility of having all of them 
observing, climate finance institutions have also promoted the creation of dedicated NGOs’ 
networks or self-selection processes for meetings attendance. 
The GEF-CSO Network counts dozens of CSOs members, from all regions. It was 
established in 1995 and faced a substantive restructuring in 2008.
222
 Differently from 
common practice at international level,
223
 the accreditation of CSO members is left to the 
Network,
224
 whose main body is a Coordination Committee, comprising CSO representatives 
from up to sixteen Regional Focal Points.
225
 The GEF-CSO Network has a pyramidal 
structure of representation, whereby NGOs members from each region elect one 
representative as Regional Focal Point. The Coordination Committee then appoints one 
Central Focal Point to represent the Network at formal meetings, although Regional Focal 
Points can also participate in open sessions with the Council.
226
 The GEF practice is in fact 
to hold consultation with the GEF-CSO Network before, and not during each Council 
meeting,
227
 probably because of the number of CSO representatives wishing to participate. 
Differently from the GEF, the AF NGO Network has been established by a leading 
NGO in the field, Germanwatch, with a view of clustering and organising all interested 
NGOs at the international and national level.
228
 Therefore, it is not created, nor officially 
recognised under a decision of the AF Board, but it is rather a self-regulatory effort by NGOs 
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to organize and have more impact at AF Board meetings. This does not pre-empt accredited 
NGOs outside the NGO Network to participate at AF Board meetings anyway. 
Because the attendance to meetings is restricted to six or eight observers depending on 
the Trust Fund Committee,
229
 the CIFs leave to CSOs the self-selection of their observer 
representatives, with the peculiarity that the CIFs Administrative Unit selects the 
organization to run the self-selection process.
 230
 Moreover, the CIF Partnership Forum, 
which was originally envisioned to gather MDBs, other climate finance institutions and 
country representatives, has been recently called to increase engagement with CSOs.
231
 
Conversely, the World Bank does not have a formal selection process for CSOs, 
although it has increasingly recognized the need of engagement since 1998.
232
 Given its 
prominent role as a global MDB it offers two main –and primarily informal– avenues of 
general engagement. First, the World Bank organises an annual Civil Society Programme 
together with the International Monetary Fund, where numerous CSOs participate in 
discussions and panels with Executive Directors.
233
 Second, it holds Global Consultations 
open to the public on specific topics of the Bank’s future policies: interestingly, one 
consultation verged on the 2008 Strategic Framework for Climate and Development.
234
 
Also the CDM has an established practice of consultative processes over its regulatory 
reforms: the EB is proactive in releasing calls for public inputs for specific technical issues, 
such as methodologies, standards or procedures.
235
 
                                                     
229 CIFs, Guidelines for Inviting Representatives of Civil Society to Observe Meetings of the CIF Trust Fund 
Committees, 20 April 2009, para 7, 
<http://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/sites/climateinvestmentfunds.org/files/Guidelines%20for%20Invitin
g%20Reps%20of%20Civil%20Society...pdf>: four representatives from CSOs; and two from business 
associations for the CTF; in addition, two indigenous peoples representatives for the SCF, and one representative 
from a community subject to adaptation issues in the Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience Sub-Committee. 
230 For NGOs, the organization RESOLVE periodically runs elections for candidate NGOs that respect eligibility 
criteria to attend meetings. 
231 CIFs, Guidelines for Inviting Representatives of Civil Society to Observe Meetings of the CIF Trust Fund 
Committees, supra, at paras 10-1. 
232 WB, Guidance Note on Bank Multi-stakeholder Engagement, Doc. No. 49220, June 2009, para 23, 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2009/06/10792677/guidance-note-bank-multi-stakeholder-
engagement>. 
233 See <http://go.worldbank.org/ZEL7JBJM90>.  
234 WB, Guidance Note on Bank Multi-stakeholder Engagement, supra note 232, para 10. 




3.2. Participation in national programming and at project level 
On different degrees, climate finance institutions also provide means of active engagement 
with individuals, local CSOs and other affected stakeholders during the formulation and 
implementation of single climate projects, as well as in broader national programming for 
climate change. 
The World Bank displays the most detailed set of policies. At the level of national 
programming, the Bank’s Operational Policies on Country Assistance Strategies broadly 
require the Bank’s staff to “seek the government’s prior agreement” to have consultations 
with non-governmental stakeholders,
236
 with the aim of promoting public acceptance of the 
strategy. However, no specific guidance is provided as to the selection of eligible 
stakeholders. 
Other participatory processes that can apply to climate finance are found throughout 
different areas of the World Bank’s internal regulation. For instance, for projects subject to 
environmental impact assessment, the Bank Procedures provide consultation with “affected 
groups and local NGOs” across different phases of the assessment.
237
 Similarly, in case of 
involuntary resettlements due to project implementation, the Operational Policies require that 
displaced persons are informed, consulted, and provided with prompt and effective 
compensation.
238
 Similar consultation processes are also required in projects involving 




In 2012 the GEF Council adopted a revised Policy on Public Involvement in GEF 
Projects, with a view of enhancing the environmental and social sustainability of projects, by 
                                                     
236 See World Bank, Country Assistance Strategies, BP 2.11, revised April 2012, supra note 184, para 6, 
<http://go.worldbank.org/79F6YYJWC0>.  
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taking into account the needs of people affected.
240
 Although the policy requires the GEF 
Agencies and recipient governments to insure that substantive participation of affected 
public is reached, it nonetheless recognizes that “[r]esponsibility for assuring public 
involvement rests within the country, normally with the government, project executing 
agency or agency, with the support of GEF Partner Agencies.”
241
 Thus, apart from a 
performance review, the GEF fully relies on participatory processes of implementing 
agencies and governments, without the possibility of adopting regulatory consequences in 
case of violation of public involvement principles, such as the temporary suspension of 
accredited implementing agency for future projects. 
 
In the context of their peculiar access modalities, the CIFs regulations envision in-
country consultations with CSOs during the phase of national investment plans. Although 
not existing during the initial years of CIFs’ activity,
242
 in 2012 the Joint Meeting of the 
Trust Fund Committees adopted a policy of stakeholders’ involvement in national 
programming activities.
243
 It requests MDBs, when reviewing the various national 
investment plans, to convene programmatic consultations every two years, together with 
other development partners, recipient countries and interested stakeholders.
244
 Furthermore it 
requests countries to undertake a pre-identification of interested stakeholders before the 
process of national investment plans takes place.
245
 Under the Strategic Climate Fund, the 
CIFs Forest Investment Programme regulations appear the most detailed in identifying 
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relevant stakeholders, when they require that the recipient government shall “take the lead” 
in insuring that all stakeholders, including indigenous people and local communities, are 




While no assessment can be done for the GCF, because no specific policies have yet 
been adopted, the AF regulations provide a mechanism similar, but even more transparent 
than the previous ones. The AF Environmental and Social Policies impose as an 
accreditation requirement to all its implementing entities that, during the planning and 
preparation of individual project proposals, all relevant stakeholders shall be consulted in a 
manner that is “[…] timely, effective, inclusive […] and free of coercion”.
247
 Although the 
policies do not specify how and to what extent public comments should be taken into 
account, differently from the previous institutions they also require that environmental and 
social impact assessments should be publicly disclosed and that any subsequent 
modifications to projects should undergo public consultations in a timely manner. 
 
With regards to the CDM, its project cycle regulations provide a necessary step of 
‘global stakeholders’ consultation’ for each project that is passing through the validation 
phase, as conducted by the Designated Operational Entity. In particular, all relevant project 
proposal documentation must be published on the CDM website for a period of at least 180 
days, during which all interested countries and stakeholders, including the public, can submit 
their views and inputs both at national and international level. Following, the DOE and the 
project developers are expected to address all the comments.
248
 Moreover, the lack of 
effective publication for public consultation on individual projects can be ground of requests 
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of reviews proceedings, which, as will be seen below, constitute an effective accountability 
mechanism. 
 
A final issue regards the way minority communities and in particular indigenous 
people’s views and rights are taken into account when projects are framed and implemented 
in a manner that can affect their livelihoods. Since 2005, the World Bank adopted a specific 
Operational Policy which provides that any project to be funded by the Bank and potentially 
affecting indigenous communities shall pass through a process of prior and informed 
consent, and consultation.
249
 It is however a duty of the recipient country to carry on such 
consultative activities, while the Bank only verifies their outcomes. 
The only other institution to contain a special policy on the matter is the GEF. Such 
policy, however, whilst containing various safeguards and conditions for GEF finance, only 




3.3. Analysis of participatory processes 
The analysis above shows that all the climate finance institutions at stake provide pathways 
of engagement with external actors. Taking stock of decades of experience from 
international development activities, it would be unimaginable to see a climate finance 
institution not promoting participatory processes in some way. As seen in the previous 
chapter, meaningful participation is a crucial legitimacy factor in the competitive 
institutional arena of climate finance. 
 
Yet, there are emerging issues and different approaches among institutions that affect 
the substantive working of participatory processes. In regards to the general level of 
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participation, the outcomes of the analysis point to the relevance of selection procedures of 
eligible NGOs and of the locus of observers’ involvement. 
Being involved in an activity of global nature, it is inevitable for climate finance 
institutions to adopt procedures that identify who should be involved as observer, given the 
numerous CSOs potentially interested in being engaged. In doing so, global institutions need 
to strike a balance between the effective running of decision-making processes, and the 
meaningful engagement with external actors, which is vital for input legitimacy. Moreover, 
the same selection procedures can affect the legitimacy of the selected CSO if a fair process 
or good reasons for its selection are not provided. 
The GEF-CSO Network constitutes the most articulate effort in this sense among the 
institutions under scrutiny. Its bottom-up model of selection provides a mainstreamed 
process whereby all interested regional CSOs can contribute to the selection of the central 
Coordination Committee. This level of regulatory engagement is less present in the CIFs 
model, which does not provide a staged procedure of selection and leaves to the CIFs 
Administrative Unit, and not to the CSOs, the individuation of the leading entity to 
coordinate the selection process. The AF, which has not regulated any process of CSO 
selection, fully relies on a self-regulated AF NGO Network, while leaving open participation 
to other entities. Finally, it is perhaps striking that the World Bank neither has a clear 
selection procedure for CSOs nor hosts observers during the meetings of is executive bodies, 
despite the provisions of its Articles of Agreement. 
This leads to the second issue of the locus of general participation, which for the 
World Bank and the GEF appears to take place outside the formal meetings of their 
executive bodies. Again, while this regulatory choice points towards the effectiveness of 
decision-making, nonetheless it raises questions on the substantive role that observers can 
play, as they are not allowed to intervene on specific agenda items during meetings, 
including decisions on project funding. Conversely, all the other institutions provide for 




GCF Board and the CIFs Trust Fund Committees rules impose the participation of selected 
observers, thus granting a substantive participatory right. 
 
Shifting to the participatory processes in national programming and project level, it 
emerges again that all institutions generally provide for some forms of stakeholders’ 
engagement, with the difference that some rely entirely on the regulations and policies of 
their implementing agencies. 
In this regard, while at the level of national programming there are only scant 
provisions, several World Bank regulations require forms of participation and consultation at 
project level in the area of environmental impact assessment, involuntary resettlement, and 
forest-related projects. An inherent limit here is that such regulations require the ‘borrowing 
country’ and not the Bank to implement and ensure public consultations for each project. 
While this approach seems justified to avoid excessive interference by the Bank in the 
borrowing country’s internal affairs, and even if the Bank could review elements of the 
project if consultations have not proved satisfactory, nevertheless substantive participatory 
rights might not be adequately granted, given that the Bank’s regulations are not binding on 
the borrowing state. Yet, as will be seen, lack of consultation can be ground for claims under 
the Bank’s Inspection Panel, where it shows non-compliance with the relevant Operational 
Policies. The same lack of substantive participatory rights at the programming and project 
level is also found in the other multilateral funds with the addition that they entirely rely on 
their implementing agencies for the implementation of participatory requirements. This 
overlapping regulatory setting not only leads to different participatory processes depending 
on the implementing agencies, but has led to critical findings in the last independent reviews 
of the GEF and the CIFs.
251
 Furthermore, the lack of any sanction or accountability for the 
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implementing agencies not complying with the fund’s participatory standards is another 
element that questions the meaningfulness of current participatory processes in multilateral 
climate funds. 
Finally, the CDM grants the highest level of participatory rights at project level: not 
only the documentation of proposed projects must be open to public consultation for several 
months, but the DOE in the validation report must address and respond to all the meaningful 
inputs provided by stakeholders. This participatory requirement is further strengthened by 
the possibility that projects not complying with this requirement might pass under the 
scrutiny of requests for reviews, as will be seen in the next section.  
 
 
4. ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS 
The accountability mechanisms internal to each institution are the final regulatory factor in 
this comparative analysis. As is manifest from their name, such mechanisms relate to the 
concept of accountability, an overarching notion that can be taken from different political 
and legal perspectives. Because the term accountability holds an indeterminate meaning, 
before comparing different institutional models, it is worth dedicating some lines on the core 
features of this concept, the type of accountability mechanisms that are theorised by the legal 
scholarship, and a definition of what typology of accountability mechanisms will be taken 
into account here. 
4.1. Mapping the accountability of international institutions and the role of their 
internal mechanisms 
At the broadest level, accountability describes a phenomenon where “some actors have the 
right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their 




these responsibilities have not been met.”
252
 As Harlow argues, this concept initially took 
shape in Anglo-American constitutional discourses and, subsequently, in response to the new 
and pervasive forms of global governance structures has assumed at international and 
transnational levels the connotations of so called ‘good governance’ values.
253
 
Accountability is linked to democratic structures of government, with the rule of law 
principle and with legitimacy. In regards to the former, Grant and Keohane aptly note that 
the democratic processes typical of nation states are not a necessary condition for 
accountability at the international level. They explain this by making an initial argument that 
accountability can either be understood according to a delegation or a participation model, 
the difference being that delegation attains to the level of power transferred to ‘power-
wielders’ from subjects originally holding those powers (in a democracy these are typically 
the constituent polities); conversely, participation links accountability of a ‘power-wielder’ 
to those subjects that are potentially affected by the authority (still in a national democratic 
context, citizens can exercise accountability through their vote).
254
 While at national level 
democratic structures have generated complex constitutional models granting a certain 
degree of accountability of institutions, in the international (and global) sphere the absence 
of democratic and hierarchical structures led to the engendering of different mechanisms of 
accountability. At the same time, this was also object of critical reflections on the role and 
manifestations of the rule of law.
255
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More importantly, accountability and legitimacy dynamics play in close relationship 
and affect one each other. At the abstract level, the more the actors and stakeholders acting 
under the regulatory umbrella of an institution are facilitated to raise accountability concerns 
and hold the institution in line with its standards, the more the legitimacy of the institution is 
nurtured by the fact that its authority and activity is grounded on moral and reasoned 
justifications. 
 
An ever increasing scholarship is discovering and theorising new means through 
which institutions of global character are subject to or engender different forms of 
accountability under the paradigms of delegation or participation.
256
 The problem is also 
legal since, as Reinisch has pointed out, “the lack of substantive and procedural restraint [by 
IOs] may pose serious problems”,
257
 particularly in terms of access to justice from the actors 
directly affected by the actions of international institutions. 
While the majority of the international legal scholarship focuses on the accountability 
mechanism par excellence, namely international and national judicial adjudication against 
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interests and rights of all affected parties by the activities of international institutions. J Pauwelyn, ‘Informal 
International Lawmaking: An Assessment and Template to Keep It Both Effective and Accountable’ in J 
Pauwelyn, W Ramses and J Wouters (eds), Informal International Lawmaking (OUP 2012) 500-37, at 519-26. 
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For a fierce critique of the current lack of any guaranteed legal remedy versus IOs, see M Parish, ‘An essay on 
the Accountability of International Organizations’ (2010) 7 International Organizations Law Review 277. 
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 arguably, the most promising starting point for a comprehensive understanding of 
accountability of international institutions under a legal framework is the report of the 
International Law Association (ILA) on the accountability of IOs.
259
 This work is the result 
of eight years of research and discussions of an ILA Committee comprising internationally 
renowned lawyers in the field. Correctly, in the report accountability of IOs is defined as a 
notion rather than an accepted general principle of international law which “[…] clearly rules 
out, from the start, any requirement that only legal interests may trigger accountability.”
260
 
With such premise the report distinguishes between three “interrelated and mutually 
supportive”
261
 levels of accountability. The first relates to the internal perspective of IOs and 
concretises in a series of common principles, objectives and practices resulting in forms of 
“scrutiny and monitoring irrespective of potential and subsequent liability and/or 
responsibility.”
262
 The second level of IOs accountability encompasses the area of non-
contractual (tortious) and contractual liability of an IO versus third parties, while the third 
addresses the issue of international responsibility stemming from acts or omissions by the IO 
in violation of an applicable rule of international law.
263
  
While the second and third levels of accountability chiefly involve means of judicial 
dispute resolution and mediation, the first level is so conceptually vast to include elements of 
‘good governance’ (access of information; transparency; a participatory decision-making 
process; a well-functioning international civil service, a sound financial management; and a 
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reporting and evaluation system),
264
 and other principles of institutional activity, including 
inter alia  the principle of good faith, of constitutionality and institutional balance, of reason-




Because the purpose of this section is to provide a fruitful account of how 
accountability is sought in relation to climate finance institutions, the second and third levels 
of accountability will be excluded from the object of analysis for two main reasons. First, 
this chapter’s enquiry rely on the idea and existence of certain regulatory indicators of 
legitimacy, which relate to the procedures of the internal institutional law of an entity. 
Conversely –as will be seen below– judicial accountability before international, national or 
regional tribunals is a process available externally to the regulatory realm of an institution. 
The second reason for dismissing an analysis of judicial accountability is that –despite of the 
vast literature and the complexity of the issue–
266
 IOs, and by extension most of the climate 
finance institutions at object, enjoy functional immunity from states jurisdiction under 
international law.
267
 Furthermore, the overwhelming practice tells that such immunity is 
rarely waived before regional or national tribunals and mainly concerns cases about labour or 
procurement contracts.
268
 Therefore, although intellectually stimulating, for practical reasons 
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Returning to the first level of accountability, in a recent contribution de Wet criticises 
the approach taken in the ILA report. In particular she claims that “[…] decisive is not 
whether the normative act is legally binding in the formal sense, but rather whether it has a 
de facto impact on the rights and interests of States and/or non-State actors.”
270
 In other 
words, conflating heterogeneous accountability concepts in a general ‘first’ and ‘less-legal’ 
category risks to understate their legal significance. The same author goes further by 
proposing a conceptual understanding of the various complexities of those accountability 
mechanisms. First of all, a broad distinction is traced in regards to the constituencies holding 
accountable international institutions: on one side the traditional principle of states equality 
in international law justifies the various means of general accountability that are exercised 
by members of the institution according to its internal governance.
271
 On the other, a 
cosmopolitan understanding of accountability embraces also the ‘interested public’ and 
departs from the traditional, state-centric relationship between an institution and its 
members: under this view, individuals, local groups and other polities should be able to hold 




The following comparative analysis will narrow down the object to formal 
mechanisms of accountability existing within the regulatory process of a climate finance 
institution. For this reason they are defined as ‘centralised’ mechanisms, in opposition to the 
judicial redress, potentially available to both states and individuals, which is instead 
‘decentralised’. 
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4.2. Centralised accountability mechanisms 
Still once the object of analysis of institutional accountability is narrowed down, a further 
distinction must be provided before comparing the various mechanisms: accountability 
mechanisms within an institution can either be of a ‘general’ or of ‘individual’ kind. General 
oversight is often exercised by vertical or horizontal relationships between organs within the 
institution, while for individual accountability mechanisms it is here meant those internal 
processes open to complaints from eligible actors against internally set standards. As de Wet 
notices, general accountability mechanisms are often available only to states or members of 
the institutions; conversely, individual mechanisms reflect a cosmopolitan understanding of 
institutional accountability.
273
 Hence, this differentiation is also fruitful to distinguish 
between the different constituencies of accountability, namely those entities or individuals 
who retain means to hold institutions accountable. Accordingly, the constituencies in general 
mechanisms are chiefly states, acting both as contributors and as recipients of the finance: in 
other words, the broad political interests of states are on one side to ascertain that public 
sources from tax payers are spent efficiently (donors), and on the other that climate finance 
institutions provide a fair, expedite and non-intrusive means of channelling finance 
(recipients). Other constituencies in general mechanisms are institutions themselves: in 
particular, all the institutions under analysis here engender some forms of accountability on 
the other entities they rely on for the proper disbursement and implementation of climate 
projects. This is particularly the case for multilateral trust funds and their implementing 
agencies, which aim to ensure that the latter comply with their social and environmental 
safeguards and other internal regulations for disbursement. What emerges, then, is a complex 
chain of accountability relationships of general type, which stems from the internal 
regulations and reflects the different constituencies interested in keeping the institution into 
account. 
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By contrast, individual mechanisms address different constituencies than general ones 
and find their rationale in a ‘cosmopolitan’ understanding of accountability of international 
institutions, as opposed to the general one hinging on the classical principles of states 
equality in international law.
274
 Directly, or indirectly, climate finance projects and 
programmes may affect the legitimate interests or rights of entities and persons that are 
different from the members of the institution. Examples span from involuntary resettlements 
due to projects’ implementation, to legitimate economic expectations of private sector 
entities for the execution of a procurement contract.  
Accordingly, there appear to be four main avenues that a person negatively affected by 
an act or an omission by an IO can take in order to seek accountability and redress: i) 
diplomatic protection by the State of the national whose legitimate interest is affected; ii) 
requesting the contested IO to waive its immunity when sued before a national court; iii) 
claiming that the IO is acting ultra vires and, by consequence, seek a change of behaviour 
and remedy directly to the competent IO organ; and iv) trying to ‘pierce the corporate veil’ 
of the IO, and bring action against one or more states’ members responsible or liable for their 
conduct within the IO. As Bradlow has noted in the context of MDBs accountability 
mechanisms, none of these strategies has proven successful apart from marginal cases.
275
 
For these reasons, the focus here stands only on those mechanisms working within the 
regulatory processes of the institutions. As will be seen, climate finance institutions have 
responded differently and to different degrees to the accountability demands of 
constituencies that would have otherwise hardly been heard. 
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4.2.1. General mechanisms 
Perhaps the most evident general mechanism of accountability in climate finance institutions 
is the exercise of voting rights and political pressure of members of the institutions according 
to the regulations and processes of internal governance. The nature of such accountability is 
primarily political and depends inter alia on the internal configurations of power within the 
executive organs of climate finance institutions as reflected by decision-making procedures. 
Therefore, the findings of the first section of this chapter dedicated to this matter apply also 
in regards to a comparison between the impact of this type of accountability amongst the five 
institutions: thus, balances vary between those institutions that bestow more weight (hence, 
more room to make accountability claims be heard) on contributing countries, and those that 
either strike a balance or, like the AF, assign a major role to recipient countries. 
Still, it is important to remark how the notion of accountability requires a set of 
standards against which the institution can be hold accountable:
276
 with this premised, the 
direct consequence is that only when states directly seek to hold accountable the institution 
for violation or lack of implementation of a standard then an actual general accountability 
takes place. While a thorough analysis of cases where such an action has been exerted by 
climate finance institutions falls outside the object and capacity of this analysis, the above 
findings on the internal governance structure of these institutions allows drawing two broad 
assessments. On one hand, it is evident that not all member states have ‘parity of arms’ in 
successfully raising accountability concerns within an institution, given the different weights 
afforded to contributing and recipient countries in decision-making. On the other, it might 
not always be the case that the interests of a state in the finance and implementation of a 
climate project coincide with the equally legitimate interests of affected stakeholders and 
individuals within the jurisdiction of the same state. This latter point is made by Bradlow and 
Hunter about the World Bank, noticing how through time this institution has paralleled a 
                                                     




host of direct and non-contractual relations with local entities to the formal legal 




The CDM makes a special case in the context of these general means of 
accountability. Within its complex project cycle the CDM regulations codify a process of 
review of individual projects that can only be initiated by a participant state or at least three 
members of the Executive Board, which –as found above– comprises only elected states 
representatives. There are two Requests for Reviews (RfRs) available across the project 
cycle: one can be started after the Executive Board has registered a project in its pipeline, 
while the other can occur after the same body has decided on the issuance of Certified 
Emissions Reductions (CERs) from a registered activity.
278
 The nature and mode of 
implementation of RfRs are similar: the main difference stands on the standards of 
accountability, which in the case of RfRs during registration are based on issues related to 
the lack of compliance with CDM requirements during the validation process as carried on 
by DOEs; instead, RoRs contesting the issuance of CERs are only confined to cases of 
“fraud, malfeasance or incompetence” of the DOE.
279
 If the nature of such mechanism is 
general because open only to states, nonetheless the implementing procedures for RoRs 
adopted by the EB envision a quasi-judicial process, whereby the affected project participant 
and the DOE can file documents clarifying their position in regards to the matter.
280
 Given 
their peculiar structure, RoRs work as an effective and highly procedural general 
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The second kind of general accountability mechanisms reflects the vertical 
relationship between on one side power-delegating entities and climate finance institutions, 
and on the other between climate finance institutions and their delegated agent entities, 
mainly implementing agencies. As previously underlined in Chapter II, also here a basic 
distinction can be made between climate finance institutions formally linked by inter-
institutional or constitutive instruments with the UNFCCC supreme bodies, the COP and the 
CMP, and those that instead are outside any relation of delegation from the UNFCCC, but 
nonetheless act for the implementation of UNFCCC’s obligations on finance. 
The AF and the CDM have been created by and are under a relationship of authority 
and guidance with the CMP. In a similar fashion, being operative entities of the UNFCCC 
Financial Mechanism, it is provided that both the GEF and the GCF shall be accountable and 
function under the guidance of the COP.
 282
  
Being an institution formally established outside the UNFCCC umbrella, the 
accountability relationship between the GEF and the COP is crystallised in a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU) between the two entities.
283
 The instrument generally clarifies that 
the COP retains the authority of deciding on “policies, programme priorities and eligibility 
criteria” related to the Convention, and that the GEF Council must ensure compliance with 
such criteria and shall periodically report to the COP.
284
 Interestingly, a specific procedure 
for reconsidering funding decisions of the GEF Council envisions the possibility for a state 
Party to raise the matter to the COP. If the COP finds the claim founded – it “[…] may ask 
the Council of the GEF for further clarification on the specific project decision and in due 
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time may ask for a reconsideration of that decision”.
285
 This accountability mechanism has 
never been exercised either by a UNFCCC Party or the COP for the likely reason that –as 
has been noted–
286
 the MoU does not explain the consequences of the GEF Council not 
addressing the matter or deciding contrary to the indications of the COP.
287
 
Also the GCF is formally positioned in an accountability relationship with the COP, 
the latter being supreme body of the Convention and of its Financial Mechanism. At the time 
of writing an accountability mechanism is yet to be formalised, since that GCF is still at an 
embryonic stage before its operationalization. However, the COP has lately mandated its 
Standing Committee on Finance
288
 to agree with the GCF on future arrangements between 
the COP and the GCF.
289
 The interesting side of this solution is that –contrary to the cases of 
the AF and the CDM– the COP decided to afford quite a high degree of institutional 
independence to the GCF, for the reason that any accountability relationship will be agreed 
by the two entities rather than being imposed from the COP. 
The accountability relationship between the CMP and its dependent institutions, the 
AF and the CDM is instead stricter. As noted above, the relevant CMP decisions clarify that 
the two entities are under the authority and guidance of the CMP. In terms of general 
accountability mechanisms this concretises in a more substantive decisional role of the CMP 
in the regulatory realm of this two entities. For instance, certain relevant prerogatives for the 
functioning of the CDM have not been delegated by the CMP to the EB, such as the formal 
accreditation of DOEs and decision-making on general aspects.
290
 In a similar vein, the CMP 
decides over “the overall policies” of the AF,
291
 it periodically reviews its performance, and 
provides general guidance on its strategies and institutional arrangements. If this is coupled 
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with the fact that the GCF Board, AF Board and EB members are formally nominated by the 
COP/CMP Parties, it might be questioned to what extent then the supreme bodies of the 
climate conventions can be deemed as separated organs from the internal governance those 
institutions. The decision not to consider the former hypothesis, when treating of the internal 
governance structures of those institutions, is mainly for descriptive purposes and to simplify 
the comparative analysis. Conversely, no vertical accountability relationship is formally 
established between the UNFCCC supreme bodies on one side and the CIFs and the World 
Bank on the other, because of their complete institutional independence from the climate 
treaties. As will be seen, while this is a typical feature of international composite 
administration, it might also signal an emerging accountability gap. 
 
A third and final type of centralised general mechanisms of accountability are the 
periodical and independent evaluations that occur within the five institutions, which in some 
cases led to the actual establishment of independent evaluation units as part of the internal 
governance. As found above in the first section of this chapter, this is the case for all the 
institutions under analysis apart from the CDM. In particular, the WB, the GEF and the GCF 
have their own in-house evaluation units;
292
 The AF relies on the external evaluation of the 
GEF Evaluation Office,
293
 while at the same its Board established an Ethics and Finance 
Committee to which are delegated monitoring and evaluating functions, including the one to 
recommend decisions to the AF Board.
294
 The CIFs rely, instead, on a delegated joint 
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General accountability mechanisms in climate finance institutions are not exhausted 
from the three types analysed here. The same institutions enter into different accountability 
relationships depending on the constituencies they address. For instance, if it is a 
contributing country’s interest the one of effective and sound disbursement of its money, 
climate finance institutions then will stipulate a financial agreement with a recipient 
country’s entity, ensuring the compliance with its own fiduciary standards during the 
implementation of the projects. At the same time, the recipient country’s interest in the 
effective and streamlined disbursement of finance is consolidated through the accreditation 
standards that implementing agencies of the multilateral trust funds need to fulfil in order to 
be eligible under a fund’s scheme. Although relevant for a general assessment of 
accountabilities in climate finance, these numerous chains of legal engagements fall out the 
object of this analysis for the reason that they do not directly address the accountability of a 
climate finance institution, but it is rather the climate finance institution that promotes the 
accountability of other entities. 
4.2.2. Individual mechanisms 
Whilst a certain uniformity of practice emerges in the context of general accountability 
mechanisms, the climate finance institutions compared here show different degrees of 
implementation of individual accountability mechanisms. 
 
The first in time and arguably the most developed mechanism is the Inspection Panel 
of the World Bank (WBIP), established in 1993 by a resolution of the Bank’s Board of 
Executive Directors
296
 in response to two main concerns:  one –shared by the President and 
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the Board– of improving the management of the Bank’s portfolio, and the other, coming 
from the public, regarding the lack of accountability and transparency of the Bank.
297
 It is 
noteworthy that it was a Bank’s co-financed large-scale hydropower project in India (hence, 
a ‘climate finance project’) that in the late eighties fuelled public resentments towards the 
Bank’s approach to financing and led to the establishment of the WBIP.
298
 Legal scholars 
have produced a vast amount of literature addressing the nature of the WBIP from different 
perspectives.
299
 Further, this mechanism also served as a primer for other MDBs which later 
adopted their own independent individual mechanisms.
300
 
The WBIP counts three members, appointed by the Bank’s President after consulting 
with the Executive Directors. They must be in an independent and impartial position from 
the Bank’s management and from specific “developmental issues” in developing 
countries.
301
 They hold a five years’ mandate and elect a Chairperson, who works on a full-
time basis at the Bank’s headquarters, and are formally appointed as officials of the Bank.
302
 
With regards to its ‘jurisdiction’, the Panel  receives “[…] requests for inspection presented 
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to it by an affected party in the territory of the borrower which is not a single individual 
[…]”: hence only a minimum of two individuals or a legal person like local CSOs are 
eligible to initiate the accountability process.
303
 
The WBIP Resolution sets clear limits on the admissibility of the claim and the 
applicable standards against which accountability is checked: 
“The affected party must demonstrate that its rights or interests have been or are likely 
to be directly affected by an action or omission of the Bank as a result of a failure of 
the Bank to follow its operational policies and procedures with respect to the design, 
appraisal and/or implementation of a project financed by the Bank (including 
situations where the Bank is alleged to have failed in its follow-up on the borrower's 
obligations under loan agreements with respect to such policies and procedures) 




This provision clearly defines the contours and the nature of the WBIP process. The 
Resolution affords quite an ample spectrum of protection of standards, because it embraces 
‘rights’ (although it is not specified whether they are national and/or international) and quasi-
administrative legitimate interests. A direct link between the harm (or the risk of its 
occurrence) and the action or inaction of the Bank needs to be proved by the claimant, which 
is further restricted to limit its claim to the fact that such harm must go against the internal 
policies of the Bank.
305
 
If claims before the WBIP report “serious alleged violations” of Bank’s policies, an 
investigation may be initiated at the request of an Executive Director.
306
 However, before 
reaching this stage, it is requested that the claimants try to address the matter with the Bank’s 
management before resorting the WBIP, while the management is allowed to file evidence of 
its compliance with the Bank’s policies and procedures.
307
 Following these steps, the WBIP 
produces a recommendation to the Executive Directors as to whether an investigation should 
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be initiated. If the Executive Directors response is positive, one or more WBIP members 
shall initiate an investigation which culminates into a final report. 
At the time of writing, 88 cases have been brought before the WBIP since 1994
308
 and 
of these at least eleven are about climate-related mitigation projects:
309
 the most recurrent are 
claims stemming from the implementation of hydropower projects involving cases of 
involuntary resettlement, and other environmental and social issues.
310
 
As a Clarification of the Executive Directors stated, rather than a judicial body, the 
WBIP is a “fact-finding” entity under the authority of the Board of Executive Directors.
311
 
The appointment process, the decisional role of the Executive Directors during the process 
and, more importantly, the lack of authoritative decisional (jurisdictional) power of the 
WBIP, make this mechanism more an administrative process internal to the institution, than 
an example of international administrative justice.
312
 If that is true, Parish goes further by 
noting the complete lack of due process requirements in the WBIP for the reason that it does 
not hold hearings, hear witnesses, or order discovery.
313
 Such critique is partially
314
 founded 
if one uses traditional international tribunals as a comparative term, but not if the World 
Bank is compared with other IOs which completely lack any type of internal accountability 
mechanism despite their potential to affect individuals and groups within states. 
 
The GEF, the AF and the GCF have also established internal mechanisms open to 
individual complaints. 
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In 2007 the GEF CEO set up a Conflict Resolution Commissioner to be responsible 
for addressing and solving complaints put forward by national administrations or by local 
CSOs.
315
 The object of complaint can be “a contract dispute, lack of communication, the 
perception of wrongdoing, or genuine concerns.”
316
 Although documents regarding cases are 
not publicly available, this feature of the mechanism makes the figure of the Commissioner 
closer to the one of an ombudsman, than to the quasi-judicial procedure of the WBIP. The 
ombudsman is traditionally an entity which addresses accountability issues in an informal, 
flexible and less proceduralised manner. Flexibility and practicality emerge from the fact that 
the type of person or entity eligible to report a claim is unrestricted, as well as the content of 
the claim, whose admissibility is not restricted to a violation by the GEF of its internal 
regulations. Although available documents do not substantiate it, it might be the case that the 
establishment of the Conflict Resolution Commissioner derives from the Compliance 
Advisor Ombudsman, a similar figure present in the IFC and MIGA, which are two entities 
part of the World Bank Group.
317
 In addition to the figure of the Commissioner, individual 
accountability at the GEF is also delegated to its implementing agencies. A recent GEF 
policy, in fact, requires its partner agencies implementing and disbursing finance at national 
level to have a system or a set of practices that ensure accountability from complaints or 
grievances raised by local stakeholders.
318
 Due to its networked structure hinging on the 
collaboration of other entities, this latter policy, although very recent, appears to fill 
accountability gaps, whenever an issue related to a GEF financed project involves an 
implementing agency rather than the GEF itself. Yet the policy does not prescribe clear 
consequences from non-compliance with accountability standards by implementing agencies. 
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Shifting to the case of the AF, the Rules of Procedure of its Board, approved via a 
CMP decision, require the Chair of this organ to accept “unsolicited communications” from 
the public and address them after consultation with the AF Board.
319
 With the 
operationalization of the Fund, in 2012 a Mechanism for Handling Complaints was 
established
320
 with the scope of collecting alleged cases of frauds and misconduct of the AF 
national or multilateral implementing agencies. This accountability mechanism is open to 
any individual or entity and, similarly to the case of the GEF, relies on a broad procedure 
which leaves ample discretion to the AFB as to whether consider individual claims. At the 
time of writing no formal complaints have been raised by affected individuals or private 
entities, but only by recipient authorities against multilateral implementing agencies.
321
 At 
the same time, the AF Board is considering the adoption of a set of principles and guidelines 




Although not yet operational, the GCF is also expected to establish its own redress 
mechanism. In this regard, both the Governing Instrument and a recent decision of the GCF 
Board contain very broad provisions outlining that such mechanism is expected to “[…] 
receive complaints related to the operation of the Fund and will evaluate and make 
recommendations.”
323
 From this sentence it is possible to anticipate that the GCF redress 
mechanism might consist of a process of administrative rather than judicial or quasi-judicial 
character, although it is not specified who will be the subjects allowed to seek redress as well 
as the standards to be respected. 
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Finally there are no individual accountability mechanisms available in the CDM and 
the CIFs. The former constitutes a peculiar case for the reason that EB final decisions on 
projects registration and issuance of CERs indeed directly affect the legitimate expectations 
of various actors, in particular project participants. Even if concerns have been raised both 
by the literature and several Kyoto Protocol parties on the need to establish an independent 
review process of EB decisions,
324
 at the time of writing the issue is still under negotiations 
before the Subsidiary Body for Implementation to the CMP and is expected to lead to a final 
decision at the CMP-9.
325
 
In line with their institutional governance, the CIFs entirely rely on the individual 
mechanisms of the implementing MDBs. Two remarks in this regard are that all MDB 
participating to the CIFs have an established complaint mechanism similar to the WBIP; at 
the same time, however, it is unlikely that an individual claim concerning an alleged 
violation by the MDB of CIFs regulations and standards would be admissible before such 
mechanisms. Referring at least to the WBIP requirements reported above, this is confirmed 
by the fact that the panel is competent to hear cases of alleged violations of the World 
Bank’s standards only. 
 
Internal accountability mechanisms of climate finance institutions extend to the case 
of corruption, fraud and malfeasance committed either by the staff of the institution itself or 
during procurement activities. Being a large and ramified IO, the World Bank is the only 
institution of the ones under analysis to have set up in 2001 a Department of Institutional 
Integrity
326
 which investigates alleged cases of corruption. As a Vice-Presidency unit, it 
works independently from other units of the Bank and has full access to all internal 
documents related to projects. Any individual can report, even in anonymous form, 
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allegations of frauds and corruption. Once the Department has carried its investigation, it 
then reports its findings to the World Bank President, who as chief of staff can take 
appropriate measures.
327
 In addition, the department can debar private enterprises which are 
found to incur in fraudulent or corrupt practices during procurement activities with the 
Bank.
328
 Also this process is based on a detailed quasi-judicial procedure, whereby the 
Department of Institutional Integrity carries on individual investigations and recommends 
possible sanctions to a special Sanctions Committee.
329
 Respondents have the chance to be 
heard before the latter body and to appeal its final decision. In the case such grievance is 
rejected, the firm is put on a public list of debarred enterprises.
330
 In 2010 the World Bank 
made a step further by adopting together with other major MDBs an Agreement for Mutual 
Enforcement of Debarment Decisions.
331
 The core innovations of the agreement are the 
automatic acceptance of a debarment decisions amongst MDBs and a harmonisation of 
internal procedures of investigation which guarantee due process for respondent entities. 
The other multilateral funds do not have existing procedures of similar kind and 
reasonably rely on the existence of anti-corruption policies of their implementing agencies. 
Hence, a concern might be raised in regards to corruption practices of climate finance 
institutions officials, although of little relevance due to their small number and 
‘concentrated’ presence at the World Bank headquarters.
332
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To conclude, a self-standing case is the one of the CDM for the fact that it receives 
administrative services from the UNFCCC/KP Secretariat. While no specific policies address 
corruption practices of UNFCCC officials,
333
 the CMP is considering the adoption of CDM 
procedures to address the liability of DOEs for “significant deficiencies in validation, 
verification and certification reports”.
334
 Given such a broad mandate, it is not possible at the 
moment to grasp whether such liability process will extend to corruption and malfeasance by 
DOEs. 
4.3. Analysis of accountability mechanisms 
Climate finance institutions appear to include in their structures several types of centralised 
mechanisms in a way that their accountability can be sought in various forms and by 
different constituencies. However, there are dissimilarities on the means they can eventually 
be hold accountable, which can potentially raise considerable gaps and, as a consequence, 
affect their legitimacy. 
 
The internal governance and decision-making rules of each institution can affect the 
capability of state members to raise accountability claims through general mechanisms. 
Recalling the findings of the first section of this chapter, it can be affirmed that general 
accountability is more successfully sought by the constituency that has the major decisional 
weight in the internal governance of an institution. Put simply and with an example, it is 
more likely that the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors will be more sensitive to 
accountability claims of state members with major voting power, than to the ones raised by 
client states. The contrary stands in the case of the AF, whose internal governance gives 
prevalent weight on developing countries. 
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In this context, the RoRs in the CDM are instead a case of neutral general 
accountability, because they define a process according to which EB members, nominated by 
states parties, can raise accountability concerns in regards to individual projects. 
To the extent that one sees the UNFCCC as the ‘natural place’ where international 
climate finance policies should be formulated, another issue stemming from the analysis of 
general mechanisms is the ‘vertical’ accountability gap for those institutions lacking any 
formal relationship with the UNFCCC supreme bodies. Such accountability gap indeed can 
work against the interests of those actors who see in the UNFCCC the legitimate forum for 
regulatory action on the climate. As a consequence, this can affect the legitimacy of those 
institutions acting outside the UNFCCC authority and guidance.  
In this comparative analysis, this is the case for the CIFs and the World Bank, because 
they are not formally bound by any relationship of ‘accountability’ or ‘guidance’ from the 
COP. General accountability in this context might be demanded by states in the case where 
those two institutions would depart from or go against general principles, guidance or 
standards present in the UNFCCC and its implementing decisions. Given the general 
character of UNFCCC provisions on finance, this accountability gap has not yet emerged. 
However, it might become relevant if a future international agreement on the climate or COP 
decisions will regulate in more detail modalities and standards of climate finance.  
 
Shifting the focus on individual mechanisms, the panorama appears less homogenous. 
For though all the institutions engendered participatory mechanisms with their stakeholders, 
some of them receive accountability claims through internal procedures, while others either 
rely on their implementing agencies or lack any mechanism. 
It might come as surprise that the World Bank –one of the most criticised international 
institution by the scholarship, NGOs and media– 
335
 indeed provides developed means for 
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individual accountability claims. Its Inspection Panel constitutes the most defined and 
transparent mechanism of the ones canvassed here: it is framed in a way that guarantees a 
certain degree of independence of its three members; it provides reasoned answers to 
accountability claims from a defined range of subjects; and is bound to make 
recommendations on the basis of clearly identifiable standards. Further, the World Bank 
offers the possibility to raise accountability claims also in regards to individual misconduct 
of its officials and enterprises with whom it deals to implement its projects. 
In the middle ground, the GEF and the AF provide less defined accountability 
mechanisms. Their respective Conflict Resolution Commissioner and Mechanism for 
Handling Complaints appear to work more as an informal dispute resolution service 
provided by the institution’s administration, in a similar vein to the ombudsman figure in 
other international or national administrative experiences. While this solution might be a 
practical response to the concerns expressed by their stakeholders, they nevertheless amount 
to individual mechanisms that do not follow due-process requirements, such as transparency 
and availability of reasons giving, clear rules of procedure and definition of the standards 
against which accountability claims can be raised. The lack of due process indeed raises 
questions on the substantive contribution that these mechanisms make to institutional 
accountability. 
Finally, two institutions of the ones canvassed do not provide any means of individual 
accountability. In the case of a multilateral fund, the CIFs, this lack is possibly justified by 
its reliance on the activity and regulations of their implementing MDBs: however, it might 
be regarded a partial justification, because, despite all their implementing MDBs make 
available complaint mechanisms similar to the WBIP, nonetheless this would not provide 
substantive accountability when individual claims would address breaches of CIFs internal 
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regulations. For instance, the WBIP rules make admissible only claims having at object 
breaches of World Bank’s internal regulations. 
The lack of individual mechanisms in the CDM is even more striking, for the fact that, 
differently from other institutions, the EB has de facto the authority to regulate and decide on 
matters that directly affect the legitimate interests of individuals, in particular project 
developers and investors. Given the numerous projects registered and private entities 
involved in the CDM, the lack of a grievance mechanism available to them to review EB 
decisions taken in breach of CDM regulations and standards has raised well founded 
concerns. It must be noticed, however, the promising fact that the matter is under 
consideration in the EB and the CMP.  
 
Two concluding reflections should be made in regards to the overall significance of 
the current individual mechanisms. First, even the more available and defined, constitute 
only internal administrative processes, rather than proper judicial or quasi-judicial means of 
accountability. None of the described mechanism, in fact, seems to fill one of the core 
general principles of judicial proceedings, namely the nemo judex in causa sua principle. 
Even the WBIP, for how independent its members might be, is eventually a consultative 
body embedded within the World Bank’s administration, also for the reason that the ultimate 
decisional power on its cases rests on the Board of Executive Directors. Hence, referring to 
national experiences in administrative law, Hey makes a good parallel when she recalls how 
– before becoming proper administrative courts – also the French Conseil d'Etat and the 
Dutch Raad van State were consultative bodies to the Crown.
336
 However, it would be 
difficult to maintain that a transformation in proper judicial devices should be the natural 
solution for global governance mechanisms like the ones at object. What eventually matters 
is noticing that, the more the climate finance institutions will mobilize finance and affect 
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interests of individuals and local groups, the more the lack of availability of proper judicial 




The second and final point is related to the previous and in a way justifies the current 
lack of judicial or fully-fledged individual accountability mechanisms amongst all climate 
finance institutions. It is, in fact, a matter of institutional sensitiveness and political economy 
within each institution to gauge what kind of individual mechanisms are needed. In this 
regard, institutional responsiveness is crucial and the two cases of the World Bank and the 
CDM form two clear, yet contrasting example. While the former has since the nineties 
arguably proved quite sensitive to stakeholders’ claims for more accountability, the CDM 
has shown restraints and sluggishness in considering the creation of an appeal mechanism to 
EB decisions. These different degrees of sensitiveness eventually may indeed affect the 




This chapter delved into a detailed comparative analysis of four regulatory factors as enacted 
by six climate finance institutions. Given the complexity, the study has led to numerous and, 
at times, divergent findings on their quality and relevance for legitimacy. Hence, by way of 
illustration, the GEF has the most developed regulatory process of stakeholders’ 
participation among the six institutions, but it lacks a meaningful internal mechanism of 
accountability, as well as an access modality enhancing ‘country ownership’. By the same 
token, the World Bank internal governance favours major contributing countries more than 
the other models, however its secondary law establishes a comprehensive programming 
process which engages both recipient countries administrations as well as interested 
                                                     




stakeholders; in addition it also created the most articulate internal accountability mechanism 
among the six institutions. 
 
The theory and methodology expressed in Chapter IV specifies that the issue should 
be viewed under the lens of an integrated ‘interplay of legitimacies’ between all the six 
institutions, in a way to provide an understanding of the overall legitimacy of the 
international composite administration of climate finance. 
Crucial findings under this perspective, as well as some key reflections on the overall 










Climate finance is indispensable for a global low-carbon pathway and climate-resilient 
development in developing countries. As emerged in various parts of this work, the type of 
finance that is public or managed by public institutions is but a fraction of the current and 
projected private capital flows towards climate-related infrastructures and projects in 
developing countries. Despite the small number, one can hardly dispute its pivotal role in 
adaptation, as well as in capital leverage, and building ‘enabling environments’ for private 
investments in mitigation activities. Moreover, ensuring a sustainable institutional structure 
and a clear international legal framework for climate finance can also provide the needed 
stimulus to the slow-paced international negotiations under the UNFCCC. 
 
The findings of this work spring from some reflections both on the institutional 
difficulties and substantive legal issues arising from the current state of climate finance, 
against the background of scaling such finance up to the needed levels. Overall, while the 
findings and arguments have been perhaps numerous, the core aim of this work has been 
answering to two broad questions: i) what is the international law applicable to climate 
finance? And ii) how can one address under a legal purview the problems arising from its 
institutional complexity? 
 
It is worth dividing the answers into two levels, a ‘micro-’ and a ‘macro-level’. The 
first, ‘micro-’, level will address those two questions within the specific ambit of climate 




findings into a broader reflection for clarifying and, perhaps, reviving a legal method to 
canvass the institutional complexities of all areas of global governance (section three). 
 
 
1. THE INTERPLAY OF LEGITIMACIES IN CLIMATE FINANCE 
Part II of this work was dedicated to the problem of the contested legitimacies of climate 
finance institutions, against the background of an institutional governance dominated by the 
dynamics of complementarity and competition. The choice to look through the prism of 
legitimacy indeed offered insights in addressing the legal consequences of institutional 
complexity. 
In particular, the argument went as far to find that in the context of a heterarchical and 
competing ground for managing scarce financial resources and acquiring ‘regulatory 
shares’,
1
 the more an institution is perceived legitimate vis-à-vis the numerous actors it 
interacts with, the more it will be successful in this competition. Furthermore, Chapter IV set 
the methodological basis for engaging into an in-depth analysis of regulatory factors of 
social legitimacy of the six most relevant climate finance institutions, with the clarification 
that from a legal purview, the most meaningful –yet limited– approach would have been to 
focus on the procedural components of legitimacy, because expressed via regulatory devices 
displaying the nature and language of law. 
While the previous chapter has proceeded with such comparative analysis and offered 
insightful findings for each of the four factors, this heading will apply the general ‘standard 
of review’ adopted in Chapter IV, with a view of shedding light on the interplay of 
legitimacies
2
 in the context of an international composite administration.
3
 As argued in that 
chapter, it would be unwieldy –and impossible with the results of the analysis– to weight 
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precisely the different legitimacies and to draw a final ‘legitimacy rank’ of climate finance 
institutions. The same findings are rather useful to understand how the balance between the 
legitimacy of each institution plays against the possibility that an institutional alternative is 
always available in a competitive international composite administration.
4
 The interplay of 
legitimacies is a crucial factor in the institutional proliferation in climate finance, with its 
positive and negative features. 
An example of institutional alternative stems from the establishment of the Green 
Climate Fund, which was created by the COP in response to the developing countries 
discontent about the Global Environment Facility, particularly to its internal governance and 
access and disbursement modalities. Also the establishment of the Climate Investment Funds 
can be seen as an institutional alternative to existing financial channels at the time, initiated 
by a developed countries call on multilateral development banks to scale and coordinate their 
climate finance efforts. To be sure, the Climate Investment Funds have proven to be a valid 
alternative to other mitigation and adaptation funds, being able to source a major share of 
capital from developed countries. 
 
In order to provide a fair picture of how the interplay of legitimacies works, three 
cross-cutting and inter-connected themes emerged from the analysis: i) the dominating role 
of contributor countries; ii) country ownership of funds; and iii) the accountability of climate 
finance institutions and international implementing agencies. These themes shape the 
interplay of legitimacies by influencing the possibility that either an institutional alternative 
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1.1. Contributor countries bias 
It comes perhaps as no surprise that both the institutional governance and the way some 
substantive provisions have been implemented favour the interests of contributor countries. 
To be sure, this is a feature of the law and administration of international development 
cooperation taken at large,
6
 but it also takes specific forms in the context of climate finance.  
There is a generally-acknowledged interest by contributors in climate finance that 
sums mobilized towards climate-related activities should effectively serve their purposes. 
This is particularly a sensitive issue in mitigation, where agreed measuring, reporting, and 
verification standards (MRV, in the ‘climate jargon’) are claimed by developed countries as 
a pre-condition for increased levels of finance.
7
 Yet the findings in the first chapter revealed 
also that developed countries’ interests might go further than the reasonable expectations of 
‘effective spending’ and lead in extreme cases to forms of ‘mission creep’, through certain 





As emerged in the previous chapter, the internal governance and decision making 
rules of the institutions under analysis tends to assign a major role to contributor countries 
with clear consequences on the issue of ‘general accountability’ that developing countries 
can exercise. The Global Environment Facility and the World Bank’s executive bodies 
assign decisional power depending on the level of funds pledged or capital share. 
Furthermore, the very corporate governance model of the World Bank is replicated by other 
multilateral development banks engaged in climate finance. Furthermore, it was noted that, 
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notwithstanding its role as a mere trustee of funds, the World Bank has also influenced the 




The tendency of favoring developed countries interests was also found in the context 
of access and disbursement modalities. On one side, the level of regulatory complexity and 
overlap between multilateral trust funds and accredited international implementing agencies 
seems to fulfill the general interest of achieving higher control and fiduciary standards, at the 
cost of challenging the capacity of developing states (particularly least developed ones) to 
navigate such complexity. On the other, the ample discretion of multilateral development 
banks in access and disbursement modalities and the lack of pre-set regulations for the 
Climate Investment Funds eventually leave the final decision to their respective internal 
governance structures, which in the first case is unbalanced towards contributor countries 
and in the second is evenly split between developed and developing countries, but with 
substantive influence from multilateral development banks. 
 
The ‘contributor country bias’ has nonetheless been facing several readjustments both 
at general level, with the adoption of two non-binding declarations under the aegis of the 
OECD and developments in the UN,
10
 as well as within climate finance, after the 
establishment of the Adaptation Fund and the Green Climate Fund. These two funds shifted 
their internal governance and decision making in such a way that it gives increased 
decisional power to developing countries. This change, taken also in response to the current 
geopolitical shifts in international relations and climate politics, should however be seen 
against the background of the framework adopted in this work. Looking at the low level of 
sourced funds from the Adaptation Fund, it could be argued that the interplay of legitimacies 
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has played against this institution and in favour of the competing adaptation programme 
under the Climate Investment Funds:
11
 because the internal governance rules and access and 
disbursement modalities assign a prevalent role to developing countries, this might have 
worked as a crucial factor for contributors not to pledge sums under the Adaptation Fund and 
rather prefer other multilateral and bilateral institutions. Although it is too early to make an 
assessment, also the Green Climate Fund might face legitimacy challenges in its ability to 
source ambitious funding, if implementing secondary laws in access and disbursement 
modalities under the Board and its sub-bodies, will tend to favour developing countries 
standards and direct access. A crucial test ground in the interplay of legitimacies for the 
Green Climate Fund is likely to be the issue of country eligibility: the analysis above found 
that the broadly-defined ‘developing countries’ and not the listed Annex-II countries to the 
UNFCCC are eligible to the Fund’s finance. The way the Board will shape further 
differentiations among developing countries under the various financing windows 
(mitigation, adaptation, REDD+, etc.) is likely to play a considerable role for the Green 
Climate Fund’s legitimacy in relation to other institutions. 
1.2. Country ownership 
The concept of ‘country ownership’ stands at the basis of recent regulatory developments 
from some climate finance institutions: it is adopted as a response to the frustration of 
developing countries about regulations and practices assigning increased executive roles to 
international implementing agencies, reflecting the general ‘contributor country bias’ of their 
institutional governance. While ‘country ownership’ was first formulated in the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness
12
 and, therefore, in the broader context of official 
development assistance, it also assumes a stronger legitimacy pull in climate finance: it is, in 
fact, highly contested from the beginning whether the latter should constitute mere official 
development assistance, or a special form of financial transfers owed by industrialized states 
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for their ‘ecological debt’ resulting from centuries of unfettered GHGs emissions. Arguably, 
developing countries tend to view the issue from this second perspective, particularly in the 
case of adaptation finance. Therefore, they call for a high level of country ownership in 
climate finance, being a type of money ‘owed’ by industrialized states. 
 
Against this contested background, climate finance institutions have interpreted and 
implemented the concept in two main procedural components: the regulations on national or 
subnational programming, and direct access in access and disbursement modalities. 
The foregoing comparative analysis gave evidence of regulatory processes requiring 
climate finance institutions to engage in national programming activities with eligible host 
states, before progressing to the project design and approval stages. The core scope of these 
programming activities is to align national development priorities, as identified by 
government and participatory processes, with potential climate finance interventions. Hence, 
the World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategies, the Climate Investment Funds’ joint 
missions, and the Designated National Administrations in the Clean Development 
Mechanism serve the purpose of fostering the ‘country ownership’ of the approval process or 
the project cycle. 
By the same token, direct access has been the flagship initiative to enhance country 
ownership in the Adaptation Fund. The possibility to accredit National Implementing 
Agencies as eligible entities to submit project proposals to the Adaptation Fund Board is 
indeed an innovation in the context not just of climate finance, but of all multilateral 
development financing. The influence of direct access in the interplay of legitimacies has led 
other climate finance institutions to also adopt similar processes: among the entities in the 
comparative analysis this has been the case for the Green Climate Fund and partly for the 
Global Environment Facility. 
However, even if direct access can potentially revolutionize the administration of 




role of this process in garnering legitimacy from developing countries. First, in terms of 
institutional competition in sourcing funds, the scarce resources pledged to the Adaptation 
Fund should work as signal of the role direct access can play in the interplay of legitimacies, 
where its main competing institution, the Climate Investment Funds which lack direct access 
modalities, has managed in comparison to almost triple the capital pledged in adaptation. 
Another substantive issue is the lack of capacity that least developed countries might face in 
setting up accredited administrative structures to the various multilateral climate funds. The 
issue is particularly relevant in the case where a least developed country facing capacity 
restraints to accredit directly to a fund, eventually enjoys less ‘country ownership’ and, 
possibly, success to receive finance than other, ‘more capable’, eligible countries. Therefore, 
lack of capacity in the context of direct access can frustrate the expectations from some 
developing countries and affect the legitimacy of the climate finance institution. 
1.3. Accountability 
Accountability is a cross-cutting theme affecting the legitimacy of institutions and their 
interplay. The comparative analysis showed the complex and manifold accountability 
relationships of general and individual kind that climate finance institutions establish with 
both their members, and other international and national entities. 
Across the complex chains of accountabilities, several gaps in terms of standards and 
sanctions emerged throughout this work, which if taken together can shed some light on the 
interplay of legitimacies. In particular, they evidence an unbalanced structure of 
accountabilities potentially favouring contributor countries and climate finance institutions, 
at the expense of recipient countries and affected groups and individuals. 
One type of gap pertains to the general accountability between the COP and the 
operational entities of the Financial Mechanism (the Global Environment Facility and the 
Green Climate Fund). These entities are under the guidance and shall be accountable to the 




envisioned from a possible diversion from the COP guidance, while the standards of 
accountability are currently being negotiated for the Green Climate Fund. At the same time, 
another accountability gap –or, rather, different standards of accountability– apply to climate 
finance institutions untied from formal accountability relationships with the UNFCCC 
supreme bodies, such as multilateral development banks and the Climate Investment Funds.  
Under the lens of the interplay of legitimacies, these gaps and misaligned 
accountability regimes in the composite administration imply that eventually standards and 
sanctions depend on the different regulations on internal governance and decision making of 
the ‘power-wielders’.
13
 While for institutions acting within the international climate change 
regime the ‘power-wielders’ are the supreme bodies of the treaties (the COP and the CMP), 
instead for those acting outside this framework general accountability takes place only 
within the internal governance structures, which, as seen, tends to favour contributing 
countries. For instance, in the case of the COP-Global Environment Facility relationship, 
accountability will be sought both via the COP and the general accountability under the 
internal governance of the Global Environment Facility. Conversely, general accountability 
in the World Bank will mainly depend on Boards of Governors and Executive Directors, as 
well as on the President. 
 
A second type of accountability gap emerges from the role of international 
implementing agencies as ‘end-users’ and implementers of climate-related projects in 
developing countries. As outlined in several parts of this work, climate finance institutions 
often delegate the management and implementation of individual projects to accredited 
agencies, being themselves international institutions. The existence of accreditation 
procedures, social and environmental safeguards, individual accountability mechanisms, as 
well as financial agreements applicable to international implementing agencies engenders 
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different accountability (and responsibility) relationships between them and the climate 
finance institution. However, as the comparative analysis showed, the regulatory overlap 
between climate finance institutions and international implementing agencies along the 
process cycle can lead to a double and misaligned regulatory regime applicable to the 
recipient country, which is instead left with little-defined accountability mechanisms, when 
they are available. By way of example, this is the case for the Global Environment Facility 
and in part for the Adaptation Fund: despite the existence of environmental and social 
safeguards applicable to all accredited agencies,
14
 the Global Environment Facility lacks an 
accountability mechanism that sanctions breaches of and ensures compliance with such 
regulations, furthermore the same regulations apply only during the process of accreditation 
of implementing agencies and not also during project implementation. The same applies to 
the Adaptation Fund’s Environmental and Social Policy,
15
 with the difference that its 
Mechanism for Handling Complaints
16
 admits informal complaints by recipient countries 
against implementing agencies. However, the same mechanism does not envision clear 
sanctions or consequences. 
 
The third and final type of accountability gaps concerns the relationships between the 
climate finance institution on one side, and the local groups and national entities affected by 
its decision-making and regulations on the other. The comparative analysis showed that on 
different degrees climate finance institutions offer forms of individual mechanisms –some of 
them at an embryonic stage. Yet a more complete picture of accountability gaps can be 
drawn if one parallels the findings of individual accountability mechanisms with the ones on 
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participatory processes available for the same kind of groups and entities, because 
accountability from non-state actors can also be indirectly sought by raising reasons for 
grievance in participatory processes. 
Therefore, when neither the accountability mechanism nor the participatory process 
allows a meaningful assessment of the grievance, an accountability gap of the climate 
finance institution might ensue and, as consequence, the legitimacy of the institution finds 
grounds of contestation. As seen, the World Bank Inspection Panel is the most detailed and 
proceduralized individual mechanism among the ones addressed. Furthermore, the mix of 
general and in-country participatory processes allow different avenues for affected groups or 
entities to make their case heard and assessed. Conversely, the GEF displays both a loosely-
structured individual mechanism and a participatory process which, even if thoroughly 




2. UNDERLYING TENSIONS FOR LONG-TERM FINANCE 
In addition to understanding the mechanisms of the legitimacies interplay, by adopting a 
long-term perspective, there is a second strand of reflections on climate finance stemming 
from the findings throughout this work. 
Climate finance is clearly at crossroads: following the period of ‘fast-track finance’ 
(2010-2012) envisioned in the ‘Copenhagen pledge’, the challenge has shifted on framing a 
complex structure capable to source and channel at least USD 100 billion a year, from 
multiple sources in a fair and effective manner. Yet, negotiations and policies are still in the 
limbo of diverging interests and unclear commitments. The discussion on legitimacy in 
Chapter IV described how the COP has been seeking to facilitate negotiations under a two-




mobilizing and scaling up the finance. Expectedly, issues familiar in this work are contained 
in the report, such as defining and accounting for climate finance; coherence and 
coordination of in-country efforts among all institutions; individuating financial instruments 
to scale up private investments; country ownership; accountability of climate finance 
institutions, etc… Overall, rather than clear suggestions, the findings of the report simply 





The core reflection here is that under a legal perspective this work has unveiled some 
tensions underlying these policy “barriers” to long-term finance, which should prompt 
further study and interpretation by lawyers and inform policy processes. In particular, against 
the background of indeterminate international legal obligations, this work found that the 
subsequent practice of states and, especially, climate finance institutions, both under 
international law and an ‘intimated’ inter-institutional law, has already engendered agreed 
forms of implementation. It is submitted that also such tensions, and not just the ensuing 
‘policy barriers’, as unravelled by the UNFCCC work programme above, need to be properly 
addressed. 
These tensions can be divided into two broad areas: one related to the sphere of 
substantive law and the other of institutions. 
2.1. Substantive tensions 
An interpretation under the subsequent practice tells that the international obligations 
applicable to long-term finance are likely to be more burdensome on recipient countries than 
the letter of the UNFCCC seems to provide, and this inevitably raises suspicions and 
scepticism in negotiations. 
                                                     





In Chapter I this interpretation was reached after looking at the nature of financial 
instruments viable to implement the UNFCCC financial obligations, and at the practice of 
conditionalities found particularly in financial agreements between climate finance 
institutions, including bilateral agencies, and recipient countries. After the paradigm shift of 
the ‘Copenhagen pledge’, it is accepted, for the purposes of compliance under the UNFCCC, 
that long-term public finance will be channelled also via non-concessional loans of 
multilateral and bilateral institutions, thus increasing the financial burden on recipient 
countries. Although accepted and practiced, yet this stands at the heart of the tensions 
between developed and developing countries, particularly those who deem climate finance a 
form of ‘payment for the ecological debt’ due to the historical responsibilities of 
industrialized states in polluting the atmosphere. 
At the same time, the practices of conditionalities, despite recent changes, still end up 
framing individual projects and programmes under goals and policy objectives that might be 
misaligned with the ones of the recipient country. This tension is only partially mitigated by 
some genuine efforts from climate finance institutions to enhance participation and ‘country 
ownership’, because, as just seen above in the context of the interplay of legitimacies, these 
initiatives often come at a legitimacy cost for the same institutions in their ability to source 
public funds from industrialized states. 
 
To be sure, the tensions stemming from this interpretation of the extant international 
law and practice go hand in hand with the indeterminate and changing nature of the very 
legal principle buttressing climate finance. The hard dichotomy developed/developing 
countries of the Common But Differentiated Responsibility principle is being progressively 
softened
18
 to reflect the most recent science on emissions reduction scenarios, the new 
morphologies of climate politics, and, more generally, global economic and geopolitical 
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shifts, such as the sheer economic growth in the last two decades of some developing 
countries. Thus, under the recent COP developments, both developed and developing 
countries need to submit their voluntary pledges with a view of reaching “an agreed outcome 
with legal force” by the end of 2015.
19
 Moreover, a new biannual reporting process and 
review is being established for both developed and developing countries, although a less 




Yet one must also notice that other areas of practice in climate finance do not replicate 
the tensions stemming from the use of financial instruments and conditionalities. The Clean 
Development Mechanism, as a hybrid market-based mechanism of climate finance, neither 
relies on conditionalities on recipient states, nor on loans or other traditional financial 
instruments. It was rather demonstrated how the rules of its complex project cycle and its 
governance indeed confer quite a substantive role on recipient countries during the design 
and approval of individual projects. Certainly the Clean Development Mechanism comes 
with its own substantive issues of accountability, integrity, additionality, scarce price signal, 
and so on. However, they do not hamstring the relationships between contributors, climate 
finance institutions and recipients of finance. 
 
On the legal plane, transition and indeterminacy do not and should not lead to an over-
simplistic call for an international agreement on each of the policy barriers, or on each 
substantive tension: the means of reaching set goals is a policy task. Rather, the legal 
clarifications in this work should prompt a constant engagement by lawyers with the 
subsequent practice of states and climate finance institutions, which might lead to 
interpretations addressing and, possibly, soothing substantive tensions. This claim will be 
further refined in the final section below. 
                                                     
19 Decision 1/CP.17, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, 12 March 2012, para 2. 




2.2. Institutional tensions 
The second area of the underlying tensions for future long-term finance pertains to the 
institutional dimension standing at the core of this work. Arguably, the very framework of 
the competition/complementarity dynamics in an international composite administration 
unveils some crucial tensions among climate finance institutions with the policy problems of 
uncoordinated and incoherent financing at the global and national levels in the foreground. 
These tensions stem from the relationships between the two dynamics and do not just 
occur between climate finance institutions, but also within each institution. The former, 
horizontal, tensions take place in the context of scarce public financial resources, which, as 
seen, prompt climate finance institutions to compete and, at the same time, to strive in 
promoting complementarity of their activities with other overlapping institutions. The latter, 
vertical, tensions instead require each institution to shape its internal processes and 
secondary law in order to reflect the expectations of its members and actors. 
What both types of institutional tensions imply is that each climate finance institution 
must entertain complex exercises of balance, which this work has been able to dissect and 
define under a legal purview and should be carefully addressed for the prospects of long-
term finance. Such exercises, in fact, should take into account the regulatory factors of 
legitimacy used in this work’s analysis. 
Should a climate finance institution adopt access and disbursement modalities with 
pre-defined ‘envelopes’ so to guarantee each recipient country a share of the pot?
21
 If so, 
how would that impact on the contributors interest in effective financing, if some country 
envelopes remain ‘unspent’ at the end of a funding cycle? And should direct access be 
extended to all multilateral trust funds, and, partly to multilateral development banks? How 
stringent should the fiduciary standards and the accreditation process be? If stringent, how 
would that impact on the different capacities of developing countries in dealing with such 
regulatory complexity? 
                                                     




These are but few sample questions which creep under the policy mantra of ‘more 
institutional coherence and coordination’, and shape the ‘intimated’ law of the discovered 
inter-institutional processes of complementarity. Thus, under a legal understanding, this 
again implies constant analysis of the developments and subsequent practice by climate 
finance institutions. At the same time, this work shows that, given the scarce probability of 
having a centralized and hierarchical institutional structure of climate finance in the future, 
these tensions will hardly be eased or leapfrogged by ‘more defined’ international 
obligations in the much-waited “legal outcome” of the 2015 COP20 in Paris. Therefore, the 
spontaneous development of inter-institutional instruments and of the interplay of 
legitimacies should also be recognized as relevant issues to take into account for the 
development of long-term finance. 
 
 
3. THE GOVERNANCE OF LEGITIMACY AND THE LEGITIMACY OF 
GOVERNANCE: A ROLE FOR THE LAW 
Whilst the two sections above have distilled some reflections on the legal challenges in the 
prospect of ambitious long-term finance objectives, this conclusive one zooms out the view 
and offers a broader, macro-level, reflection which, going beyond the boundaries of climate 
finance, seeks to suggest a legal method to be exercised in the interstices of global 
governance. 
 
The word ‘governance’ and ‘legitimacy’ have permeated the analytical parts of this 
work and, as seen, at the same time have sparked a wealth of theorizations from legal 
scholars on how law, and international law in particular, should ‘react’ and relate to the 
dynamic realities of institutional complexity. 
To be sure, both the terms are outside the law-speak and the techniques of legal 




perhaps ‘something more’ than, ‘government’: the conceptual tenets of the state and its 
sovereignty enmesh with new spaces of authority of transnational and at times private nature. 
Polities, as construed under the idea of modern constitutional states, are not the only pillars 
upon which governance architectures are legitimately built: new arcades are being erected 
beside the refined central structures of constitutionalism. 
‘Legitimacy’ follows suit. Not only because of its fluid and essentially contested 
nature, but also because the process of its verification leads to nuanced (more or less 
legitimate) results, which the binary logic of legal reasoning cannot fully grasp: on the legal 
plane, there is no place for facts that are ‘more or less’ legal. It comes natural to say that a 
legal understanding of institutional legitimacy comes with inherent limitations, mainly 
because it constitutes but a variable of a more complex equation. 
 
Overall, this work has also investigated and proposed a legal method to address and 
understand a very specific ambit of global governance. Importantly, it has not created a 
novel theoretical framework, but has relied on the existing, more convincing ones.  Even if 
limited and initial, both the approaches adopted in the arenas of governance and legitimacy 
have been premised by careful re-imaginations or meta-conceptualizations, stemming both 
from theory and from the empirical realities of climate finance. 
 
Thus, in Chapter III addressing the ‘governance’ issue, the strand of institutional 
theory of international relations helped to re-imagine the institutional structure of climate 
finance as a regime complex. On the legal plane, the core implication was that the idea of 
fragmentation, prominent in the international legal scholarship, does not embrace the 
institutional aspects of climate finance, because ‘fragmentation’ presupposes some kind of 
‘unity’, which in such case has never existed. The idea of regime complex instead translated 




meta-concept able to expose the nature and role of climate finance institutions under the 
exercise of public authority in the global sphere. 
A final step was nonetheless needed, in order to discover whether international or 
other ‘intimated’ law was emerging within this international composite administration: 
namely, to single out from the empirical realities and contestations the two key dynamics 
occurring among climate finance institutions. Therefore, only after being equipped with the 
details of complementarity and competition, it has been possible to filter some ‘intimated’ 
legal realities that are being forged in the international composite administration in order to 
overcome regulatory, geographical and functional overlaps among institutions. 
 
Chapter IV, dealing with legitimacy, also entered into a path of meta-
conceptualization before progressing into the actual analysis. The method hinged on two 
conceptualizations: one, stemming from the empirical contestations of legitimacy made by 
all actors, went to discover four regulatory factors affecting social legitimacy. The second 
grounded such standards both on broader theorizations of input and output legitimacy, as 
well as under an international legal scholarship deeming the concepts of ‘democracy’ and 
‘fairness’ as the key determinant of global governance legitimacy in international law. 
Nonetheless these methodological efforts encountered limits inherent in the very legal 
approach proposed. On one side, in fact, the toolbox of international law proved inadequate 
at start to embrace the relevant facts of institutional complexity as legal facts of the system. 
By necessity this led to a shift on heterodoxy and on deeming legal developments towards 
institutional complementarity as ‘intimated’ law, which is by definition still loosely-framed 
and contested. At the same time, the very analysis was limited by the high degree of 
informality in the legally-relevant dealings among institutions. 
On the other hand, the limits of a legal analysis of institutional legitimacy are twofold: 
first, the analysis relied on the assumption that those regulatory factors indeed affect the 




evaluation documents. Second, the standard of review based on the interplay of legitimacies 
is not purely legal, but admittedly comprises ideas of political theory and morality. 
 
To conclude with the gist of this broader set of reflections, the argument is that 
methodologically it is a more fruitful path for international lawyers to deal with the 
legitimacy of (global) governance, rather than with the governance of legitimacy. The reason 
is that the intellectual goal of ‘governing legitimacy’ hinges on a managerial idea of the law: 
once some key ‘problems’ of institutional governance are spotted, international law is seen 
as a tool to ‘manage’, or ‘solve’ them. Thus international legal scholars have questioned how 
to make the WTO more legitimate;
22
 the UN Security Council more accountable;
23
 how to 
‘orchestrate’ an effective climate regime complex;
24




These are but a few of the emerging questions posed under the ‘managerial’ idea that 
no underlying political choice is already made; and that law is neutral in answering these 
questions. As Koskenniemi has aptly highlighted in the very context of international regimes 
interactions,
26
 this attention by international legal scholars in suggesting how institutions 
should govern their legitimacy or their components is a reflection of their discomfort in 
dealing with some valid discoveries and new languages from other branches of political 
science –in particular international relations. Moreover, on the legal plane the heuristic of 
these approaches at times overshadows the complex relationships between international law 
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–or other law– and these institutional realities, or least recognizes the scarce problem-solving 
capacities of the law in a managerial context.
27
 
The broader legal method of this work instead reversed the focus on the ‘legitimacy of 
governance’. In contrast to the managerial approach the method suggested here is primarily 
analytical and dependent on those re-imaginations and meta-conceptualizations described 
above with all their inherent limits. 
The promise of this approach is that it can work as fertile ground for analytical 
advancements and discoveries in the law rather than politics. This very method is similar in 
kind, but smaller in proportion, to what prompted the re-imaginations and meta-
conceptualizations of other branches of law, which today are regarded as fully-fledged legal 
systems. After all, public international law was prompted by the imagining that states should 
be treated as equally sovereign and independent monads in a heterarchical legal system;
28
 
modern administrative law was reflective of the dynamics between an authoritative and 
unaccountable administration of the crown, and the subject facing his/her legitimate interests 
affected by the same administration; finally, the very idea of sovereignty, seeding the later 




Yet, this work has focused on a very specific realm of global governance, which 
presents its own dynamics, substantive issues and peculiarities: thus, despite relying on 
recent legal theorizations of international law, it also found that the same theorizations –such 
as global administrative law, international public authority, constitutionalism, and informal 
international lawmaking– are still too general to work as toolbox of legal conceptualizations 
in each global governance domain: the mutating realities of global governance are unlikely 
to be captured by a one-size-fit-all theory of law. 
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While this view in a way espouses accounts of global legal pluralism,
30
 it also does not 
imply a full rejection of general theories, but rather a complementary effort by international 
lawyers to deepen, re-conceptualize and look afresh into each ‘micro-space’ of governance. 
Only if also these dimensions will be covered, international law or other laws are likely to 
spring from the spontaneous and burgeoning social realities of global governance. 
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